In analysing the dynamics and mechanisms of mass protest from 1987 to 1988 in Lithuania, this article explores what kind of social ties – strong or weak – are conducive to the mobilisation of collective action in a (post-)totalitarian society. The empirical analysis is based on data collected as part of the 2009-2011 research project 'The Phenomenon of Sąjūdis: Network Analysis of a Civic Movement'. First, the article defines the distinction between strong and weak ties, and highlights the importance of social networks for the mobilisation of collective action. Second, it analyses the micro-structure of Lithuanian society in the Soviet period. Based on the type of network ties, three distinct social arenas are distinguished: underground society, alternative legal society and official society. Finally, the article analyses which of these arenas could be seen as the seedbed of the Sąjūdis movement. Also demonstrated is the distinct role of different kinds of social ties at different stages in the development of the movement.
In analysing the dynamics and mechanisms of mass protest from 1987 to 1988 in Lithuania, this article explores what kind of social ties – strong or weak – are conducive to the mobilisation of collective action in a (post-)totalitarian society. The empirical analysis is based on data collected as part of the 2009-2011 research project 'The Phenomenon of Sąjūdis: Network Analysis of a Civic Movement'. First, the article defines the distinction between strong and weak ties, and highlights the importance of social networks for the mobilisation of collective action. Second, it analyses the micro-structure of Lithuanian society in the Soviet period. Based on the type of network ties, three distinct social arenas are distinguished: underground society, alternative legal society and official society. Finally, the article analyses which of these arenas could be seen as the seedbed of the Sąjūdis movement. Also demonstrated is the distinct role of different kinds of social ties at different stages in the development of the movement.
In analysing the dynamics and mechanisms of mass protest from 1987 to 1988 in Lithuania, this article explores what kind of social ties – strong or weak – are conducive to the mobilisation of collective action in a (post-)totalitarian society. The empirical analysis is based on data collected as part of the 2009-2011 research project 'The Phenomenon of Sąjūdis: Network Analysis of a Civic Movement'. First, the article defines the distinction between strong and weak ties, and highlights the importance of social networks for the mobilisation of collective action. Second, it analyses the micro-structure of Lithuanian society in the Soviet period. Based on the type of network ties, three distinct social arenas are distinguished: underground society, alternative legal society and official society. Finally, the article analyses which of these arenas could be seen as the seedbed of the Sąjūdis movement. Also demonstrated is the distinct role of different kinds of social ties at different stages in the development of the movement.
In analysing the dynamics and mechanisms of mass protest from 1987 to 1988 in Lithuania, this article explores what kind of social ties – strong or weak – are conducive to the mobilisation of collective action in a (post-)totalitarian society. The empirical analysis is based on data collected as part of the 2009-2011 research project 'The Phenomenon of Sąjūdis: Network Analysis of a Civic Movement'. First, the article defines the distinction between strong and weak ties, and highlights the importance of social networks for the mobilisation of collective action. Second, it analyses the micro-structure of Lithuanian society in the Soviet period. Based on the type of network ties, three distinct social arenas are distinguished: underground society, alternative legal society and official society. Finally, the article analyses which of these arenas could be seen as the seedbed of the Sąjūdis movement. Also demonstrated is the distinct role of different kinds of social ties at different stages in the development of the movement.
During the Soviet occupation, the whole Lithuanian SSR media was regarded as one of the key propaganda tools based on pure ideological content and socialist-communist messages. In such a media setting television played an essential role; together with radio (as in Moscow's example) the latter felt under control of a committee ruled by the Council of Ministers (CM), Central Committee (CC) and Moscow patrons itself. But this situation was about to change when Sąjūdis (Reform Movement of Lithuania) came to public and tried to established its right to uncensored broadcast time via television for its own dissemination of information, which sometimes had a strong political message and was not in favour of ruling regime and party. Sąjūdis had a purpose which was totally new during Lithuanian SSR times since the start of television broadcasts in 1957 – it was uncensored broadcasting time. Based on archive sources, memoirs and press articles, this research focuses on the telecast "Atgimimo banga" as one of the essential informational channels for Sąjūdis. This article tries to disclose its history, influence and conflicts between Sąjūdis and ruling regime, which tried to control and censor telecast's content. Eventually, the sporadic telecast's format had another effect: when in 1989 Sąjūdis became important part of the Lithuanian SSR political system, telecast's popularity came to decline. One of the most popular perestroika time TV programs had some unfulfilled expectations, and, during the time, it made it as one of the most unpopular. The chronological boundaries of this research start at June of 1988, when Sąjūdis was created, and ends in March of 1990, when Lithuania declared its independence from Soviet Union.
During the Soviet occupation, the whole Lithuanian SSR media was regarded as one of the key propaganda tools based on pure ideological content and socialist-communist messages. In such a media setting television played an essential role; together with radio (as in Moscow's example) the latter felt under control of a committee ruled by the Council of Ministers (CM), Central Committee (CC) and Moscow patrons itself. But this situation was about to change when Sąjūdis (Reform Movement of Lithuania) came to public and tried to established its right to uncensored broadcast time via television for its own dissemination of information, which sometimes had a strong political message and was not in favour of ruling regime and party. Sąjūdis had a purpose which was totally new during Lithuanian SSR times since the start of television broadcasts in 1957 – it was uncensored broadcasting time. Based on archive sources, memoirs and press articles, this research focuses on the telecast "Atgimimo banga" as one of the essential informational channels for Sąjūdis. This article tries to disclose its history, influence and conflicts between Sąjūdis and ruling regime, which tried to control and censor telecast's content. Eventually, the sporadic telecast's format had another effect: when in 1989 Sąjūdis became important part of the Lithuanian SSR political system, telecast's popularity came to decline. One of the most popular perestroika time TV programs had some unfulfilled expectations, and, during the time, it made it as one of the most unpopular. The chronological boundaries of this research start at June of 1988, when Sąjūdis was created, and ends in March of 1990, when Lithuania declared its independence from Soviet Union.
During the Soviet occupation, the whole Lithuanian SSR media was regarded as one of the key propaganda tools based on pure ideological content and socialist-communist messages. In such a media setting television played an essential role; together with radio (as in Moscow's example) the latter felt under control of a committee ruled by the Council of Ministers (CM), Central Committee (CC) and Moscow patrons itself. But this situation was about to change when Sąjūdis (Reform Movement of Lithuania) came to public and tried to established its right to uncensored broadcast time via television for its own dissemination of information, which sometimes had a strong political message and was not in favour of ruling regime and party. Sąjūdis had a purpose which was totally new during Lithuanian SSR times since the start of television broadcasts in 1957 – it was uncensored broadcasting time. Based on archive sources, memoirs and press articles, this research focuses on the telecast "Atgimimo banga" as one of the essential informational channels for Sąjūdis. This article tries to disclose its history, influence and conflicts between Sąjūdis and ruling regime, which tried to control and censor telecast's content. Eventually, the sporadic telecast's format had another effect: when in 1989 Sąjūdis became important part of the Lithuanian SSR political system, telecast's popularity came to decline. One of the most popular perestroika time TV programs had some unfulfilled expectations, and, during the time, it made it as one of the most unpopular. The chronological boundaries of this research start at June of 1988, when Sąjūdis was created, and ends in March of 1990, when Lithuania declared its independence from Soviet Union.
During the Soviet occupation, the whole Lithuanian SSR media was regarded as one of the key propaganda tools based on pure ideological content and socialist-communist messages. In such a media setting television played an essential role; together with radio (as in Moscow's example) the latter felt under control of a committee ruled by the Council of Ministers (CM), Central Committee (CC) and Moscow patrons itself. But this situation was about to change when Sąjūdis (Reform Movement of Lithuania) came to public and tried to established its right to uncensored broadcast time via television for its own dissemination of information, which sometimes had a strong political message and was not in favour of ruling regime and party. Sąjūdis had a purpose which was totally new during Lithuanian SSR times since the start of television broadcasts in 1957 – it was uncensored broadcasting time. Based on archive sources, memoirs and press articles, this research focuses on the telecast "Atgimimo banga" as one of the essential informational channels for Sąjūdis. This article tries to disclose its history, influence and conflicts between Sąjūdis and ruling regime, which tried to control and censor telecast's content. Eventually, the sporadic telecast's format had another effect: when in 1989 Sąjūdis became important part of the Lithuanian SSR political system, telecast's popularity came to decline. One of the most popular perestroika time TV programs had some unfulfilled expectations, and, during the time, it made it as one of the most unpopular. The chronological boundaries of this research start at June of 1988, when Sąjūdis was created, and ends in March of 1990, when Lithuania declared its independence from Soviet Union.
How do emotions contribute to mobilizing the international community to join massive protests against climate change? Although it is common to superficially state that protests are full of various emotions, it remains unclear how emotions become collective on the international level and how they ensure the spread of mass mobilization. This research paper examines the process of collectivization of emotions and how it explains mass mobilization in the case of international climate change strikes. This paper raises the question of how the emotional environment was favourably constructed in Greta Thunberg's case in order to mobilize international society to join climate change strikes, and it aims to reveal how group emotions play an important role in successful international mobilization. Based on Sarah Ahmed's theory of cultural politics of emotions and James M. Jasper's theory linking emotions and social movements, it is assumed that specific emotions were circulated to create a distinct emotional environment that inspired the international community to join Thunberg's climate strike. An Emotional Discourse Analysis revealed that Thunberg's speeches are full of emotional potential that provokes reactive emotions such as fear, anger and hope in the global society and establishes an injustice-based framing of the problem as well as the dichotomy between the political elite and the global society. This study contributes to the research field of emotions in international relations by exploring in more depth the collectivization of emotions and expands the theory of cultural politics of emotions to include explanations of international politics phenomena such as mass mobilization.
How do emotions contribute to mobilizing the international community to join massive protests against climate change? Although it is common to superficially state that protests are full of various emotions, it remains unclear how emotions become collective on the international level and how they ensure the spread of mass mobilization. This research paper examines the process of collectivization of emotions and how it explains mass mobilization in the case of international climate change strikes. This paper raises the question of how the emotional environment was favourably constructed in Greta Thunberg's case in order to mobilize international society to join climate change strikes, and it aims to reveal how group emotions play an important role in successful international mobilization. Based on Sarah Ahmed's theory of cultural politics of emotions and James M. Jasper's theory linking emotions and social movements, it is assumed that specific emotions were circulated to create a distinct emotional environment that inspired the international community to join Thunberg's climate strike. An Emotional Discourse Analysis revealed that Thunberg's speeches are full of emotional potential that provokes reactive emotions such as fear, anger and hope in the global society and establishes an injustice-based framing of the problem as well as the dichotomy between the political elite and the global society. This study contributes to the research field of emotions in international relations by exploring in more depth the collectivization of emotions and expands the theory of cultural politics of emotions to include explanations of international politics phenomena such as mass mobilization.
How do emotions contribute to mobilizing the international community to join massive protests against climate change? Although it is common to superficially state that protests are full of various emotions, it remains unclear how emotions become collective on the international level and how they ensure the spread of mass mobilization. This research paper examines the process of collectivization of emotions and how it explains mass mobilization in the case of international climate change strikes. This paper raises the question of how the emotional environment was favourably constructed in Greta Thunberg's case in order to mobilize international society to join climate change strikes, and it aims to reveal how group emotions play an important role in successful international mobilization. Based on Sarah Ahmed's theory of cultural politics of emotions and James M. Jasper's theory linking emotions and social movements, it is assumed that specific emotions were circulated to create a distinct emotional environment that inspired the international community to join Thunberg's climate strike. An Emotional Discourse Analysis revealed that Thunberg's speeches are full of emotional potential that provokes reactive emotions such as fear, anger and hope in the global society and establishes an injustice-based framing of the problem as well as the dichotomy between the political elite and the global society. This study contributes to the research field of emotions in international relations by exploring in more depth the collectivization of emotions and expands the theory of cultural politics of emotions to include explanations of international politics phenomena such as mass mobilization.
How do emotions contribute to mobilizing the international community to join massive protests against climate change? Although it is common to superficially state that protests are full of various emotions, it remains unclear how emotions become collective on the international level and how they ensure the spread of mass mobilization. This research paper examines the process of collectivization of emotions and how it explains mass mobilization in the case of international climate change strikes. This paper raises the question of how the emotional environment was favourably constructed in Greta Thunberg's case in order to mobilize international society to join climate change strikes, and it aims to reveal how group emotions play an important role in successful international mobilization. Based on Sarah Ahmed's theory of cultural politics of emotions and James M. Jasper's theory linking emotions and social movements, it is assumed that specific emotions were circulated to create a distinct emotional environment that inspired the international community to join Thunberg's climate strike. An Emotional Discourse Analysis revealed that Thunberg's speeches are full of emotional potential that provokes reactive emotions such as fear, anger and hope in the global society and establishes an injustice-based framing of the problem as well as the dichotomy between the political elite and the global society. This study contributes to the research field of emotions in international relations by exploring in more depth the collectivization of emotions and expands the theory of cultural politics of emotions to include explanations of international politics phenomena such as mass mobilization.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.