Suchergebnisse

The perceptions of science by the Croatian public & the political elite are a combination of scientific-technological optimism, the exemption of science from social responsibility, the skepticism regarding the speed of changes that science brings into people's lives, & a mixture of cognitive realism & optimism, & the reservations towards the cognitive possibilities of science. Also, the perceptions of science by the public & by the elite differ significantly. The public perceptions link modernism & traditionalism, confidence & a lack of it in the socially responsible role of science (& technology). Politicians nurture three different views of science. The first view implies both the beneficial & the neutral social role of science. The second view implies the reservations of the elite regarding the humanistic social role of science & its cognitive power, while the third way links the cognitive limitations of science & the skepticism regarding the way in which it changes the traditional way of life. The perception of science by the public depends on the social composition, while the politicians' views are significantly influenced by their political worldview & orientations & party allegiance. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

In a response to Vujcic's reply to the earlier polemics regarding the review of the author's Politicka i medijska kultura u Hrvatskoj (Political and Media Culture in Croatia), the question of how to define tolerance, & whether this should imply support for the minority instead of just acceptance is taken up once again. The author defends himself against Vujcic's charge that he has not analyzed his own data correctly, pointing out that public opinion & media polling show a broad & general correlation for tolerance of minority viewpoints. Disagreements over the semantics of "tolerance" continue, as Voltaire's definition is once again held up as a model. 1 Table. A. Siegel

As the medium of democracy, the Public is a communicational trace of the missing Collective Sovereign: the People or Demos. In political life, we often refer to the People, but in reality the People does not make a community. It is instead a notion, a missing Sovereign, the one who exists as concept but does not speak for oneself. The community is yet to be established, and this can be done only by communication. The aim of such communication is to formulate norms, rules and principles which are to be implemented or encouraged in public life. On a more normative level, this can be done in the process of writing a Constitution. The other objective is to discuss the concept of public good. This is left to communicational functions of the Public. The concept of the Public is left to citizens, who communicate with other citizens, and thus create public opinion. By doing that, the Public is here to remind the government that somebody else is to be Sovereign, i.e. that there is also the People. The Public is thus a substitute for the "missing Sovereign". There can be no Democracy without this role of the Public. Adapted from the source document.

In the last in a series of polemics the author despairs at the pointlessness of further argument with Vujevic over his review of the latter's Politicka i medijska kultura u Hrvatskoj (Political and Media Culture in Croatia). The sticking point is the question of how to interpret a survey result showing that 38% of those surveyed in Croatia were in favor of legally protecting political parties of non-mainstream viewpoints as indicating a majority of Croatians are "tolerant." Cited is international political science research that indicates the relative consistency of such views & their percentages in both Europe & the US. A. Siegel

From an extensive comparative study conducted in 27 European countries about the attitudes of young people toward history, the winnowed variables show not only attitudes toward history & the causes of historical changes, but also attitudes toward nation & religion. The results (obtained from a sample including 1,025 Croatian first-year high school students) show that the attitudes of young people toward history do not significantly differ from those in other European countries. However, the interest of young people in national problems, national communities, & religions has increased. Their attitudes toward history are shaped by the factors that homogenize the living space of young people. 5 Tables, 7 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

According to the regularly conducted polls by "Globus," political rating of HDZ significantly increased after the military actions "Flash" & "Storm" while those of liberals & other parties decreased. On the basis of certain assumptions, the author concludes that this does not indicate a radical change in political attitudes & orientations of the electoral body; the changes have been caused by political conjuncture. The research has shown that political attitudes are halfway between traditionalism & modernism & that the prospects for the development of democracy in Croatia once peace has been established are notable. Adapted from the source document.

The notions of Left & Right form a fundamental semantic pattern within which voters construct their political perceptions & attitudes. Their universal meaning lies in a simple spatial approach to politics as conflict; functionally, Left & Right are "shortcuts" for political communication. In the empirically oriented political science, the Left-Right scale has become a standard variable in public opinion polls. After the initial pessimistic interpretations, in the last 20 years or so, this scale has increasingly demonstrated its validity & reliability. The sources of the Left-Right identification may be manifold, & not solely ideological. Also, the Left-Right scheme has demonstrated a remarkable potential to -- in time -- encompass new political contents & thus create a need for new cross-national & longitudinal studies. Voters -- not scientists -- are those who define what is Left & what is Right. 19 References. Adapted from the source document.

From an extensive comparative study conducted in 27 European countries about the attitudes of young people toward history, the winnowed variables show not only attitudes toward history & the causes of historical changes, but also attitudes toward nation & religion. The results (obtained from a sample including 1,025 Croatian first-year high school students) show that the attitudes of young people toward history do not significantly differ from those in other European countries. However, the interest of young people in national problems, national communities, & religions has increased. Their attitudes toward history are shaped by the factors that homogenize the living space of young people. 5 Tables, 7 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

Using the results of the poll on the eve of the 2003 parliamentary elections, the author analyzes the determinants of their ideological cleavages. The analysis shows that the most significant determinants are the attitudes concerning the role of tradition & the Catholic Church in the society, the role of women in the society, the attitude towards the minority groups & the attitude to the Croatian history, primarily regarding World War Two & the post-war period. Of all the attitudes-measuring variables the most significant ones for the ideological left-right self-identification are those concerning the role of the Church & tradition & the attitude towards the history. The most important determinants of concrete ideological orientations in Croatia are those variables that measure the attitudes to traditional values & the role of the Church in the society, the attitude to the minorities & the position of women & the attitude to the history. While the attitudes to tradition & the role of the Catholic Church, & to a somewhat smaller extent to the minorities & the position of women in the society distinguish the liberals & social-democrats from the Christian-democrats, the attitude to the history distinguishes primarily the liberals from the social-democrats. The analysis has also shown that the variables measuring the attitude to the parties undoubtedly have the biggest influence on ideological self-identification, whether this is the left-right self-identification, or the identification with a concrete ideological orientation. However, in interpreting these results one should bear in mind that the causal link among these variables can be established both ways. Nevertheless, regarding the level of political sophistication of the public it might be said that the respondents will more easily identify with a party than an ideology, which for most voters is an abstract category. Party identification (preference) may be a consequence of a variety of factors ranging from the early political socialization in the family to the ideological affinity concerning certain issues or trust in party leadership etc. Hence we can conclude that regarding their ideological self-identification the respondents use their party identification as an information shortcut in order to get their bearing in, for most voters, the abstract world of ideologies. Tables, Graphs, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

A field research has been carried out on a representative sample of the Croatian people of full age in which the respondents were asked the same questions previously posed in the TV polls in some popular programs by HTV & OTV. There is a statistically relevant variance between the responses of the TV viewers & the field research respondents, which indicates a lack of credibility of the results obtained through TV polls. This lack of credibility stems from the multiple selectivity of the data resulting from the data collection method of TV polls. 6 Tables, 7 References. Adapted from the source document.