Suchergebnisse

What are the welfare effects of enhanced disclosures of public information ? Is it always the case, that frequent and timely publication of economic statistics by government agencies and the central bank are desirable ? This question has become one of several interlinked strands of debate on the desirability of transparency in hte conduct of monetary policy. Here we put to the test the presumption that greater disclosures of public information is always welfare enhancing. We examine the impact of public information in a setting where a principal provides public information to private sector agents. The principal's interest is in inducing the agents to take actions that are appropriate to the fundamentals. The agents, too, are motivated to take actions appropriate to the underlying state, but they also have a coordination motive arising from a strategic complementarity in their actions. When there is perfect information concerning the underlying state, there is no conflict of interest between the principal and the agents. However, when there is imperfect information, the welfare effects of increased public disclosures is more equivocal.

What are the welfare effects of enhanced disclosures of public information - Is it always the case, that frequent and timely publication of economic statistics by government agencies and the central bank are desirable - This question has become one of several interlinked strands of debate on the desirability of transparency in hte conduct of monetary policy. Here we put to the test the presumption that greater disclosures of public information is always welfare enhancing. We examine the impact of public information in a setting where a principal provides public information to private sector agents. The principal's interest is in inducing the agents to take actions that are appropriate to the fundamentals. The agents, too, are motivated to take actions appropriate to the underlying state, but they also have a coordination motive arising from a strategic complementarity in their actions. When there is perfect information concerning the underlying state, there is no conflict of interest between the principal and the agents. However, when there is imperfect information, the welfare effects of increased public disclosures is more equivocal. ; Welche Wohlfahrtseffekte hat eine größere Publizität öffentlicher Informationen? Ist die häufige und zeitnahe Veröffentlichung von Wirtschaftsstatistiken durch Regierungsstellen und die Zentralbank immer wünschenswert? Diese Frage zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch die Diskussion über das Thema, inwieweit Transparenz bei der Durchführung der Geldpolitik wünschenswert ist. Wir prüfen die These, dass eine verbesserte Publizität öffentlicher Informationen stets wohlfahrtssteigernd ist. Wir wollen im Rahmen eines Modells, bei dem der Prinzipal (Zentralbank) Informationen an die Akteure im privaten Sektor gibt herausfinden, wie öffentliche Informationen wirken. Der Informationsgeber möchte bewirken, dass die Akteure den wirtschaftlichen Grunddaten entsprechend handeln. Die Akteure sind ihrerseits auch daran interessiert, ihr Handeln an den grundlegenden Bedingungen zu orientieren, aber sie sind auch auf Koordination bedacht, da sich ihre Handlungen aus strategischen Gründen gegenseitig ergänzen müssen. Bei vollkommener Information über die Grundbedingungen besteht kein Interessenkonflikt zwischen Informationsgeber und Akteuren. Bei unvollkommener Information hingegen sind die Wohlfahrtseffekte einer größeren Publizität öffentlicher Informationen weniger eindeutig.

Discusses effects of bipartisan agreement, weakness of outside interest groups, and background forces unique to the state on the development of Wisconsin Works (W-2), instituted in 1997; past interpretations of welfare politics in the US.