Suchergebnisse

This working paper investigates public policies that precede the rise of populism. A mixedmethod research design is applied: on the one hand, we use data from international surveys and databanks to explore the policy–populism nexus from a comparative European perspective. On the other hand, country case studies have been prepared to understand the country-specific historical and socio-economic features of populism and its potential policy roots. Four countries were selected as national case studies: two EU member states (Greece and Hungary) because of a strong, long-term support of populist parties; one EU member state (Lithuania), where support of populist parties remain moderate, although historical and socio-economic features suggest a likely rise of populism; and one country (Turkey) that exhibits the potential hybridization tendencies of populism and the role of policies in the shift from democratic towards authoritarian regimes. We found that the content of policies were weak predictors of the rise of populism. Country-specific measures were more important predictors than policy ideas. At the same time, our results demonstrate that the lack of activation policies may be a strong predictor of welfare populist attitudes of citizens, and the exclusion of a significant proportion of young people from the labour market clearly feeds populist attitudes. Another important finding is that crisis management policies matter, but not the socio-economic crisis in itself: the management of crisis by non-elected policy experts, through technocratic governance methods, will likely trigger populism. This is particularly true in societies where political polarization is high

The representative of the Hungarian peace delegation took over the final regulations of the peace conference that closed the I. World War, in the beginning of May 1920. The peace treaty dislocated Hungary and with the disannexed territories millions of Hungarians were forced to live in the neighbouring countries. The Hungarian government could react for this dramatic and significant event in two ways: on one hand accept and undersign, on the other side refuse its signatory. After a long debate, the government and the assembly –notwithstanding the public"s dismissal –were under the necessity of the pressure of the victorious powers, and made up their mind of signature. This study leads on this decisionmaking progress, on the strength of the elaboration and analysis of the reports of the government meetings in May 1920. The first part of the study shows debates in the meetings of the cabinet council and the political circumstances of the decision. The second part, in turn, shows the dramatic progress of the decisionmaking, as a result of which they pointed the representatives, whose task was the signature on the 4th June 1920 in the Castle of Grand Trianon. As a part of this, the study examines the personal decisions, the possible signatories, the ones who previously undertook the task. The study furnishes an answer for the controversial question, that why Dr. Ágost Benárd, welfare and labour minister and Alfréd Drasche-Lázár, extraordinary delegate were chosen by the government for the signature.