Suchergebnisse

As the articles in this Symposium suggest, populism and authoritarianism present ongoing challenges not only to liberal democracy but also to its legal underpinnings. Manipulation, avoidance, evasion, and outright rejection of the constitutional and legal frameworks of liberal democracy are features of populist authoritarianism. The basic argument of this article is that liberal-democratic public law and legal theory no longer satisfy human needs and desires because they were conceived in worlds that no longer exist, when the main pre-occupation was to secure liberty, not equality. The aim of the article is to explain the inherited structure of our public law and theory and the main events and developments that have produced this mismatch between public law and social aspiration.

This is a brief surreply to Charles Barzun, Working for the Weekend: A Response to Kessler & Pozen, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. Online 225 (2017), which responds to Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819 (2016). Our article Working Themselves Impure concludes by calling for lawyers to take more seriously the failure of prescriptive legal theories to produce the results they once promised. When prescriptive legal theories that fail to achieve their initial, publicly stated goals nonetheless gain and sustain broad support, "external" explanations of their persistence may offer a compelling alternative to increasingly convoluted internal explanations. The former kinds of explanation cannot decisively defeat the latter, but they do give the legal community a choice. Barzun would prefer to foreclose this choice: while sociologists and political scientists might be expected to prefer a given external explanation, he submits, the puzzled lawyer "likely will (and probably should) adopt the internal account." Barzun certainly has history on his side in assuming that many in the legal community will be inclined toward internal accounts of theory persistence – believing that those prescriptive theories that enjoy long lives do so in virtue of their "intrinsic merits" or "rightness." Yet a dissenting tradition of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars, from early-twentieth-century legal realists to late-twentieth-century crits, has sought to trouble this professional panglossianism. It is our hope that Working Themselves Impure will prove useful to those who might wish to do so in the future.

Preliminary Material /Thom Brooks -- Introduction /Thom Brooks -- Review Article: Democracy, Law and Authority /Samantha Besson -- Rorty, the First Amendment and Antirealism: Is Reliance upon Truth Viewpoint-Based Speech Regulation? /Brian E. Butler -- Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification /Andrew F. March -- The Ideality of Law /Sean Coyle -- Review Article: Legal Theory, Law, and Normativity /Leonard Kahn -- Review Article: Raz on the Social Dependence of Values /Hanoch Sheinman -- Legal Reasons: Between Universalism and Particularism /María Cristina Redondo -- Criminal Harms /Thom Brooks -- On the Non-Instrumental Value of Basic Rights /Rowan Cruft -- Group Rights and Group Agency /Adina Preda -- State Denunciation of Crime /Christopher Bennett -- Imprisonable Offenses /Richard L. Lippke -- Punishing the Guilty, Not Punishing the Innocent /Richard L. Lippke -- 'Who's Still Standing?' A Comment on Antony Duff's Preconditions of Criminal Liability /Matt Matravers -- The Paradox of Forgiveness /Leo Zaibert -- Bibliography /Thom Brooks -- Index /Thom Brooks.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court's ruling that the applicant had no locus standito challenge the compatibility of a loan made by the Government to the InternationalMonetary Fund with Art 144(1) of the Constitution. On the interpretation of Art 144(1), therewas no prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that such incompatibility existed. Moreover,the applicant did not have sufficient interest in the matter.

By many yardsticks, public choice is the single most successful transplant from the world of economics to legal scholarship., As with other law-and-economics scholarship, critics have attacked its assumptions, its methodology, and its conclusions. But nearly everyone concedes the power of at least some of the insights of public choice, and many of its terms, including "public choice" itself, have become common coinage in the legal literature, even among those who would never overtly rely on law-and-economics perspectives in their work. Although both Maxwell Stearns's collection of readings and commentary, Public Choice and Public Law, and much of this Review focus principally on public choice in the legal literature, it is useful to begin with a brief description of the emergence of public choice outside of law. The antecedents of public choice date back over two centuries, but the modern public choice literature is usually traced to pathbreaking work by Duncan Black in 1948 and Kenneth Arrow in 1951. Black's work, together with that of several other theorists," suggested that interest groups will exercise disproportionate influence over the political process. Arrow's work on collective decisionmaking underscored the difficulty of ensuring both fairness and rationality in legislative decisionmaking. Public choice emerged at a time when, although recognizing the influence of interest groups, many leading political theorists assumed that pluralism-often defined as vigorous competition among a variety of interests-would lead to legislation that generally furthered the public good. If nothing else, public choice cast cold water on this perspective and offered a much more sober view of the political process.

European law is a very strange creature. It is something that has been created, produced, mostly by jurisprudence and doctrine, and this makes European law especially challenging and interesting for scholars, because it has been, in many respects, a product of scholars. How should we approach the study of European law? How could we approach in a sensible way the study of European law?