Search results

According to the democratic interpretation of public reason, political justification ought to appeal to the tacit dimension or common sense of society's actual historical moment. This article claims that a consequence of this interpretation is that religious reasons can be stable public reasons. More specifically, it claims that religious reasons can be public reasons in pervasively religious communities that are democratic, even in circumstances of ongoing social secularization. Three theoretical consequences are derived from this claim: first, democratic public reason assumes more social integration than other interpretations of public reason; second, religious reasons are not always inaccessible to non-believers; and third, religious reasons, when public reasons, can have normative force upon non-believers. Additionally, the following practical implication is made explicit: while justification of state power can appeal to religious reasons only, the law cannot be written in religious terms.

Law is the expression of public reason. I want to explicate and justify this assertion, which lies at the core of a normative theory of law. Primarily, I want to focus on the concept of public reason, showing what it is, relating it to private or individual reason, and finding its rationale in that relation. I shall then argue that public reason exhausts the normative space where law may be found. Appealing to public reason, I shall show that the authority that law claims over the judgments and actions of citizens must ultimately be grounded in their own rationality.

This dissertation looks at the linked issues of justification and public reason – under what conditions do political authorities count as legitimate, and what is the appropriate mode of reasoning together in the public sphere? The main contender in the field currently is Rawls's political liberalism. His conception of justification gives a key role to the justifiability of political power to each citizen, based on shared (because mutually acceptable) reasons. This approach to justification affects how we reason in the public sphere – in discussing certain fundamental issues, Rawlsian public reason requires limiting our reasons to public ones (viz., those which others could reasonably endorse), and bracketing those based on disputed conceptions of the good. How we think about justification thus has concrete implications for how we live together in political society. Rawls's political liberalism is commonly pitted against comprehensive liberalism. The disagreement tends to be cast as being about comprehensive liberals rejecting the need for justifiability. I argue that this is mistaken, and that Rawls shares more than we might think with the comprehensive liberal. Taking Raz as the modern champion of comprehensive liberalism, I show that both Rawls and Raz are deeply committed to justifiability, and trace the disagreement between the two to a metaphysical dispute about how to conceive of the project of justifying the implementation of political principles. In light of their shared commitment to justifiability, the question becomes whether justifiability requires shared reasons. I propose a heuristic reading of Rawls's requirement of mutually acceptable reasons, which explains how Rawls's and Raz's views on justification can be brought together without needing to bracket the truth of the principles of justice. This proposed reconciliation leads to a mode of reasoning in the public sphere that does not require setting aside non-public reasons in order to proceed.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: The Task before Us -- I. TOWARD A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION -- 1 The Tyranny of Minimalism -- 2 Prospectivism and "The Will to Believe" -- 3 Narrative and Moral Reasoning -- II PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY -- 4 Against a Second Pragmatic Acquiescence -- 5 Against Deweyan Democracy -- III POLI TICAL LIBERALISM -- 6 Political Liberalism and the Limits of the Political -- 7 Public Reason and Public Institutions -- 8 The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism -- Conclusion: Liberalism after Minimalism -- Index

This book shows how public reason is both central and useful for thinking about legitimacy in constitutional law and theory. It helps academics to understand many important doctrines in constitutional adjudication of some leading constitutional courts around the world and in the supranational sphere.

This text shows how public reason is both central and useful for thinking about legitimacy in constitutional law and theory. It helps academics to understand many important doctrines in constitutional adjudication of some leading constitutional courts around the world and in the supranational sphere.

Public reason liberals expect individuals to have justificatory reasons for their views of certain political issues. This paper considers how groups can, and whether they should, give collective public reasons for their political decisions. A problem is that aggregating individuals' consistent judgments on reasons and a decision can produce inconsistent collective judgments. The group will then fail to give a reason for its decision. The paper considers various solutions to this problem and defends a deliberative procedure by showing how it incentivizes information sharing and leads to outcomes most acceptable to the group members.

THAT GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND OFFICIALS SHOULD BE NEUTRAL REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IS A COMMONPLACE IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT. THE RELATED IDEA THAT PERSONS HAVE A MORAL DUTY TO EMPLOY SECULAR REASONS AND ARGUMENTS WHEN PARTICIPATING IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE IS ALSO WIDELY HELD. THUS, WHEN PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC POLITICAL DISCOURSE, THE RELIGIOUS BELIEVER HAS A MORAL DUTY TO BOLSTER HIS RELIGIOUS REASONING AND ARGUMENTS WITH SECULAR REASONS. IN THIS ESSAY, THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THERE IS GOOD REASON TO DOUBT THAT INDIVIDUALS HAVE A MORAL DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM EMPLOYING ONLY RELIGIOUS REASONS IN PUBLIC POLITICAL DISCOURSE. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT INDIVIDUALS HAVE SUCH A RESPONSIBILITY SINCE THE ALLEGED DUTY HAS A CONSEQUENCE THAT WOULD BE EPISTEMICALLY DISASTROUS IF WIDELY ADOPTED AND, MOREOVER, THE ALLEGED DUTY WOULD LIKELY HAVE THE PERNICIOUS EFFORT OF DISCOURAGING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION.