Understanding the Regulation Making Process
In: Canadian parliamentary review, Volume 25, Issue 1, p. 13-19
ISSN: 0707-0837, 0229-2548
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In: Canadian parliamentary review, Volume 25, Issue 1, p. 13-19
ISSN: 0707-0837, 0229-2548
The purpose of law is to implement the ideals of order and justice into the interpersonal space of life that is society. Therefore, every legal regulation must abide and be based on norms that exist in society which envisages the modern ordered and just society. The law should be prospective, understandable, clear, fixed and certain. In Indonesia, Pancasila is a set of five principles by which the whole systems of government, law, and social life should be adopted by the nation. However, the current political climate has changed the political reception towards reinforcing Pancasila as the basic philosophy of regulation-making. This conceptual article discussed about how the process of regulation-making should be based on Pancasila as grundnorm, or basic norms of the nation's life. This article concluded that the elaboration of the grundnorm in the formation of laws and regulations by taking into account the principles of the formation of laws and regulations as well as the principles of material content along with the guidelines and techniques for their formation, so that the formation of laws and regulations fulfills the rules in substance (materially) and formally.
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In: Melbourne University Law Review, Volume 40, Issue 3, p. 738-768
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The lawmaking process has diffused substantially in the past years, resulting in an increasing maze of departmental subordinate legislation. This phenomenon has not been accompanied by a parallel development of controls resulting in complaints about "bureaucracy", red-tape, inaccessability, and poor draftsmanship, and in demands for review and control. Professor Arthurs recognizes the practical inevitability of the system, but discusses the present situation critically, suggesting reforms which might help to make the regulatory process more compatible with "participatory democracy".
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Niamh Dunne undertakes a systematic exploration of the relationship between competition law and economic regulation as legal mechanisms of market control. Beginning from a theoretical assessment of these legal instruments as discrete mechanisms, the author goes on to address numerous facets of the substantive interrelationship between competition law and economic regulation. She considers, amongst other aspects, the concept of regulatory competition law; deregulation, liberalisation and 'regulation for competition'; the concurrent application of competition law in regulated markets; and relevant institutional aspects including market study procedures, the distribution of enforcement powers between competition agencies and sector regulators, and certain legal powers that demonstrate a 'hybridised' quality lying between competition law and economic regulation. Throughout her assessment, Dunne identifies and explores recurrent considerations that inform and shape the optimal relationship between these legal mechanisms within any jurisdiction
In: Employee relations, Volume 39, Issue 3, p. 274-290
ISSN: 1758-7069
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of specific active labour market policies (ALMP) and increased use of zero hour contracts (ZHCs) in creating an environment in which low-wage jobs flourish. Alongside these, it examines the role of financialization over the last 30 years in fostering the nuturalization of policies that institutionalize low wages and deregulate the economy in favour of big business.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper draws upon academic literature, official statistics, and analyses via the concept of neoliberalism.
Findings
This paper demonstrates that via a set of interconnected macro and micro factors low pay is set to remain entrenched in the UK. It has demonstrated that this is not the result of some natural response to labour market demands. Far from it, it has argued that these policy choices are neoliberal in motivation and the outcome of establishing low pay and insecure employment is a significant character of the contemporary labour market is deliberate.
Research limitations/implications
This paper encourages a re-think of how the authors address this issue of low pay in the UK by highlighting alternative forms of understanding the causes of low pay.
Practical implications
It presents an alternative analysis of low pay in the UK which allows us to understand and call into question the low-pay economy. In doing so it demonstrates that crucial to this understanding is state regulation.
Social implications
This paper allows for a more nuanced understanding of the economic conditions of the inequality caused by low pay, and provides an argument as to alternative ways in which this can be addressed.
Originality/value
The paper examines the relationship between the rise of neoliberalism and finance capital, the subsequent emergence of the neoliberal organization, the associated proliferation of ALMP and ZHCs, and the impact of these on creating a low-wage economy. It makes the argument that the UK's low-wage economy is the result of regulatory choices influenced by a political preference for financialization, even if such choices are presented as not being so. Thus, the contribution of this paper is that it brings together distinct and important contemporary issues for scholars of employee relations, but connects them to the role of the state and neoliberal regulation.
In: A. Edgar, "The Westminster Model in Comparative Administrative Law: Incentives for Controls on Regulation-Making", University of Tasmania Law Review, 38:1, 2019, pp. 47-71
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In: Science, technology & society: an international journal devoted to the developing world, Volume 28, Issue 4, p. 517-534
ISSN: 0973-0796
The paper contributes to the under-researched domain of standard setting for bottled water quality in India. The paper opens-up the 'black box' of regulation-making by analysing the mandatory bottled water quality standards set by the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS). The regulation-making exercise is dominated by bureaucrats and technocrats representing government departments, publicly funded institutions and representatives of big industries. In the standard-setting committees, representation of NGOs, small firms, technology suppliers, independent experts, consumers and citizens are either missing or limited. The kind of experts enrolled by the technical committee and the practice and principles employed by BIS for decision-making have a strong bearing on the regulatory standards. The standard setting for bottled water was the outcome of a complex process that was significantly shaped by the views and values of the dominant regulatory actors, especially what was perceived as valid and superior 'regulatory knowledge'. Discrete actors, such as bureaucrats, technocrats, big firms and NGOs, supported the wider adoption of international standards, but they had different rationales for advocating the adoption. However, the uncritical adoption of international standards has resulted in a disregard for incorporating environmental, epidemiological, dietary and diverse socio-economic factors into setting standards. Inclusion of socio-economic and other contextual factors could increase the validity and effectiveness of regulatory standards.
In: Canadian public policy: Analyse de politiques, Volume 39, Issue 3, p. 359-370
ISSN: 1911-9917
This paper looks at the changing nature of regulation making with a special emphasis on the role that economists should play. It focuses specifically on the processes used to develop regulations. It argues that the traditional process for regulation making is breaking down and that the quality of regulation will decline if processes do not adapt to the changing environment. In addition to their traditional work of comparing regulatory instruments and calculating their benefits and costs, economists can play an important role by serving as strategists to help the public interest win in the strategic game of regulation making.
At the end of the 19th century, the Parliamentary Republic took root by exalting the principles of 1789 French Revolution and rejecting personal power. Following this ideal, the Executive's power to make regulations is dreaded – only allowed when strictly subordinate to the law supremacy. In the 20th century, the situation has changed. Wars and crises caused an essential transformation of the activities of the State, which disturbed the exercise of legislative functions and republican ideals. This thesis aims to explain how, between 1914 and 1958, the Executive Branch recovered a power to make regulations, that exceeds the mere implementation of legislation. The data show that this emancipation process stemmed from both disruption of practices and constitutional violations, gradually establishing a new law – thanks to the influence of law professors and advisory departments of the Conseil d'Etat. This dynamic relied on the need for Executive regulation to protect the security and the continuity of the State. Progressively, that kind of regulation got an autonomous constitutional basis, and the Executive enjoyed an increased level of discretion to enact it. The result is that, already under the Third and Fourth French Republics, the implementation of legislation no longer defined the source and the scope of the power to make regulations. Finally, these findings allow to challenge the current understanding of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic : the articles 16, 21, 34, 37, 38, 41 and 92 should no longer be considered as "innovations", but only as a formalisation and a systematisation what previous constitutional law introduced. ; La République parlementaire s'enracine, à la fin du XIXe siècle, dans l'exaltation des principes de 1789 et le rejet du pouvoir personnel. Dans cet idéal, le pouvoir réglementaire fait figure de hantise. Il n'est admis qu'à condition d'être étroitement subordonné à la loi. Au XXe siècle, cette situation change. Les guerres et les crises économiques, financières ou sociales sont à ...
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At the end of the 19th century, the Parliamentary Republic took root by exalting the principles of 1789 French Revolution and rejecting personal power. Following this ideal, the Executive's power to make regulations is dreaded – only allowed when strictly subordinate to the law supremacy. In the 20th century, the situation has changed. Wars and crises caused an essential transformation of the activities of the State, which disturbed the exercise of legislative functions and republican ideals. This thesis aims to explain how, between 1914 and 1958, the Executive Branch recovered a power to make regulations, that exceeds the mere implementation of legislation. The data show that this emancipation process stemmed from both disruption of practices and constitutional violations, gradually establishing a new law – thanks to the influence of law professors and advisory departments of the Conseil d'Etat. This dynamic relied on the need for Executive regulation to protect the security and the continuity of the State. Progressively, that kind of regulation got an autonomous constitutional basis, and the Executive enjoyed an increased level of discretion to enact it. The result is that, already under the Third and Fourth French Republics, the implementation of legislation no longer defined the source and the scope of the power to make regulations. Finally, these findings allow to challenge the current understanding of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic : the articles 16, 21, 34, 37, 38, 41 and 92 should no longer be considered as "innovations", but only as a formalisation and a systematisation what previous constitutional law introduced. ; La République parlementaire s'enracine, à la fin du XIXe siècle, dans l'exaltation des principes de 1789 et le rejet du pouvoir personnel. Dans cet idéal, le pouvoir réglementaire fait figure de hantise. Il n'est admis qu'à condition d'être étroitement subordonné à la loi. Au XXe siècle, cette situation change. Les guerres et les crises économiques, financières ou sociales sont à l'origine d'une mutation profonde des activités de l'Etat, qui bouleversent l'exercice des fonctions de législation et heurtent les idéaux républicains. Cette étude entend démontrer comment, entre 1914 et 1958, l'Exécutif retrouve un pouvoir réglementaire non réductible à l'exécution des lois. Né d'un dérèglement des pratiques, et des violations (souvent assumées) des textes constitutionnels, ce processus d'émancipation se trouve progressivement – sous l'influence de la doctrine universitaire et des sections administratives du Conseil d'Etat – rapatrié sous l'empire du droit. Sur la période considérée, la législation gouvernementale apparaît effectivement nécessaire à la sauvegarde et à la continuité de l'Etat. Elle acquiert alors un fondement autonome et gagne en discrétionnalité. Sous les IIIe et IVe Républiques déjà, l'exécution des lois ne justifie plus l'existence et ne définit plus l'étendue du pouvoir réglementaire. Les innovations – supposées – de la Constitution de 1958 doivent donc être relativisées. Loin d'innover, le dispositif des articles 16, 21, 34, 37, 38, 41 et 92 du texte constitutionnel de la Ve République formalise, et systématise, les acquis du droit constitutionnel antérieur.
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In: The Routledge Companion to Fair Value in Accounting, 2019, Eds. Gilad Livne and Garen Markarian; ISBN 9781138656505
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In: Understanding and Strengthening European Union-Canada Relations in Law of the Sea and Ocean Governance, 2009
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In: African and Asian studies: AAS, Volume 15, Issue 2-3, p. 215-241
ISSN: 1569-2108
This research studied the village regulation making process based on the Law No. 32/2004 and the relationships among head of village, administrators of Village Consultative Board (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa/bpd/bhp), and adat leaders in the village of Adat Saibatin community. The research was conducted in several villages of Cukuh Balak sub-district, Tanggamus district, Lampung province, Indonesia in 2012. The data were collected by employing interview and observation. The results of this study showed that the regulation making process in the village of Adat Saibatin community did not have clear stages to which the regulations were made unilaterally by the head of the village himself/herself. The adat leaders' participation as community leaders in the villages almost disappeared and unstated in the regulations. Furthermore, Village Consultative Board was also in a weak position due to the absence of deliberation and agreement as the core principle known as the villages' law in the process of making the regulations.