Suchergebnisse

Regulation of industrial water pollution in the US by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the "best practicable technology" (BPT) guidelines is examined as an example of how regulatory agencies translate general policy into specific rules. The econometric model employed focuses on explaining the stringency of the BPT standards finally promulgated, & tracing them from the contractor's suggested standards, to their proposal, & final designation by the EPA. Variables & hypotheses used in the model are described in detail. The resulting statistical evaluation of EPA decisions is useful for understanding rulemaking behavior & drawing general conclusions about implicit rules & standards governing regulatory agency policy implementation. The cost of gathering data -- on the regulations & the factors that influence regulatory decisions -- is singled out as a problem with this approach. The need for a unified theory of rule-making behavior is asserted. 12 References. J. Weber.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has powers under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwlth) to accept undertakings from industry participants interested in taking actions, such as mergers, that may potentially be anticompetitive. This paper analyses the role of undertakings, focusing on horizontal mergers. We demonstrate that undertakings can provide an imperfectly in‐formed regulator with a credible signal of the positive social benefits of a proposed merger. In particular, if the merged parties undertake not to reduce their output following the merger, then the merger will only be proposed if it results in net social benefits. We discuss the practical issues of implementing a behavioural undertaking such as a minimum quantity commitment, and argue that these are no less difficult than other regulatory activities currently pursued by the ACCC.

This article presents a conceptual model based on social‐network measures to capture how regulatory decisions are made at the de facto level, using data from Colombia's telecommunications sector. "De facto" means how decision making takes place in practice and how the actors involved in the process perceive it. The data is the product of a social‐ network analysis survey applied to the actors involved in the country's telecommunications sector. The results suggest that in the case of Colombia, the decision‐making process functions as a sparse or fragmented network where there are few central actors in a very influential position. We find that while the sector regulator and the telecommunications ministry influence decisions, market operators, trade organizations, and the competition authority have similar leverage in the decision‐making process. This article contributes to recent research on regulatory governance that has shown that sector regulators must interact with other organizations when making regulatory decisions, and these interactions occur at the de facto level. It offers a way to conceptualize these interactions and presents data from a region not often studied.

Examines extent of power which the US Supreme Court has over government regulatory agencies; 1900-87.