Suchergebnisse

Themen dieser Arbeit sind Notwendigkeit und Grenzen staatlicher Regulierungspolitik in Australien. Im Anschluß an eine allgemeine Einführung in Sinn und Zweck öffentlicher Regulierung in Teil A werden in Teil B die verschiedenen Formen von Regulierung analysiert. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Frage, welchen Einfluß die staatliche Intervention bestimmter Märkte und allgemeine regulatorische Maßnahmen (z.B. Handelsvorschriften, Arbeits- und Sozialgesetzgebung) auf wirtschaftliches Wachstum, Beschäftigung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit haben. Die Autoren kommen zu dem Ergebnis, daß die bisherige Regulierungspolitik in Australien nur unzureichend auf die Veränderung nationaler und internationaler Rahmenbedingungen reagiert hat. (DÜI-Bsn)

In Tanzania, poor enforcement of occupational health and safety (OHS) regulations has been associated with weak regulatory systems as well as lack of proper procedures on construction sites. However, the role of health and safety actors including organisational structures as enabling or disabling factors are under researched. This study employed qualitative research approach to discern the role of health and safety actors together with reasons for poor OHS enforcement on construction sites. Semi-structured interviews collected data from several health and safety actors within the sector. The salient findings from the study indicate that while legislation for enforcement of OHS exists, there is demonstrated lack of coordination including focus on formality, insufficient resources and overlapping roles regarding management of OHS. Power relations exercised by elected officials over regulators exacerbate these to influence public policy and purposeful violation of rules as a form of informal welfare policy for largely informal workers. This study recommends a need for promotion of safety leadership and behavioral change together with adequate supply of health and safety resources to the whole organisational system. Planning, tendering, designing and implementation stages of construction projects should embrace safety culture.

The California Air Resources Board mandated the production of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) starting in 1998. Other states may follow. Among the types of vehicles that may satisfy the requirements of this mandate are small, neighborhood electric vehicles (NEVs) that would be used in urban areas and on collector and arterial streets for a wide range of short trips. Although NEVs hold the potential for large energy and environmental benefits, their introduction is hindered by two institutional barriers. The first of these is the federal safety standards designed for full-sized, gasoline-powered automobiles. The second is the California ZEV regulations that may not award ZEV credits to manufacturers for all vehicles certified as ZEVs, particularly very small NEVs. Also there are important inconsistencies in the vehicle definitions used in these and other regulations and vehicle codes. This has created confusion with regard to their applicability to various small vehicle designs. The history of legislative rule making as it relates to small vehicles is explored, and possible strategies for overcoming these regulatory barriers to the production and sale of NEVs are discussed.

The California Air Resources Board mandated the production of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) starting in 1998. Other states may follow. Among the types of vehicles that may satisfy the requirements of this mandate are small, neighborhood electric vehicles (NEVs) that would be used in urban areas and on collector and arterial streets for a wide range of short trips. Although NEVs hold the potential for large energy and environmental benefits, their introduction is hindered by two institutional barriers. The first of these is the federal safety standards designed for full-sized, gasoline-powered automobiles. The second is the California ZEV regulations that may not award ZEV credits to manufacturers for all vehicles certified as ZEVs, particularly very small NEVs. Also there are important inconsistencies in the vehicle definitions used in these and other regulations and vehicle codes. This has created confusion with regard to their applicability to various small vehicle designs. The history of legislative rule making as it relates to small vehicles is explored, and possible strategies for overcoming these regulatory barriers to the production and sale of NEVs are discussed.

"Serial no. 112-16." ; Shipping list no.: 2011-0447-P ; Includes bibliographical references ; Mode of access: Internet.

Myanmar's political transition of 2011 was followed by changes in the political and economic realms of society. The transition emboldened social activism, expressed as protests regarding the injustices suffered by people under the military regime. Many of these protests were related to large-scale extractive investments that had little regard for local communities and the environment. After the West lifted most of its sanctions, transnational capital actors who had been absent for the previous two decades returned to the country, many of them offering higher investment standards. In response to the "push" of public pressure and the "pull" of new investments, reformists in the Government of Myanmar (GoM) are now attempting to implement a stronger investment regulatory framework. The GoM's new demands on foreign investments to comply with higher investment standards are strengthened by Chinese state reformers' own nascent efforts to curtail the excesses of that country's state-owned enterprises globally. As a result, prominent SOEs are being pressured to adapt to the new operating environment, resulting in observable changes in investment behaviour. We conclude that reform efforts are challenged by limitations on reformist state actors' autonomy and capacity to regulate investments.

Myanmar's political transition of 2011 was followed by changes in the political and economic realms of society. The transition emboldened social activism, expressed as protests regarding the injustices suffered by people under the military regime. Many of these protests were related to large-scale extractive investments that had little regard for local communities and the environment. After the West lifted most of its sanctions, transnational capital actors who had been absent for the previous two decades returned to the country, many of them offering higher investment standards. In response to the "push" of public pressure and the "pull" of new investments, reformists in the Government of Myanmar (GoM) are now attempting to implement a stronger investment regulatory framework. The GoM's new demands on foreign investments to comply with higher investment standards are strengthened by Chinese state reformers' own nascent efforts to curtail the excesses of that country's state-owned enterprises globally. As a result, prominent SOEs are being pressured to adapt to the new operating environment, resulting in observable changes in investment behaviour. We conclude that reform efforts are challenged by limitations on reformist state actors' autonomy and capacity to regulate investments. (JCSA/GIGA)