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This article presents a legal perspective on regulatory institutions, procedures and processes. Analysis of legal instruments examines justifications for regulatory interventions, and considers the inadequacies of private law remedies to instances of market failure (such as monopolies, inadequate or asymmetric information, externalities and co–ordination problems). A distinction is drawn between social and economic regulation: the former deals with such matters as health and safety, and environmental and consumer protection; and the latter is needed where there is insufficient competition. Instruments of social regulation include prior approval, mandatory standards and information disclosure. A range of instruments of economic regulation is also assessed, including competition law, public ownership, price and quality regulation, and competitive public franchising. Analysis of regulatory processes focuses on regulatory rule–making, delegated regulation and self–regulation. Particular weight is given to different forms of accountability—financial, procedural and substantive—which draws attention to the significance of the public interest dimension of regulatory systems.

The reform of the electricity supply industry is gathering pace in many countries. Independent regulatory agencies and other regulatory bodies have been created, and regulatory responsibilities redefined. This book reviews the evolving institutional structures to regulate the electricity supply industry in IEA member countries. It is the latest in a series of IEA publications on energy market reform.

AbstractMany agreements to liberalize trade in services tend to be limited in scope. This is a puzzle considering the high share of services in total employment and value added and relatively high barriers to trade in services in many countries. In this paper we argue that neglected complementarities between services trade policies and domestic regulation may help to understand the limited ambition on services observed in many trade agreements. We show that the productivity effects of services trade liberalization are conditional on regulatory quality. Our findings suggest that greater effort to design trade agreements with a view to improving regulatory quality may be a necessary condition for deepening the services coverage of trade agreements and will enhance the welfare gains from services trade liberalization.

Annotation

Domestic regulatory institutions are essential components of emissions trading systems (ETS). Not only do they shape the ways that markets operate, they also condition the environmental value of the carbon credits they produce. However, the literature on global carbon politics has paid little attention to local ETS regulators. In a decentralized system increasingly based on a noodle bowl of diversified environmental markets, the study of carbon markets must integrate the institutions in which they operate. This article focuses on China, which, due to its size, is both keen to and expected to have a significant impact on the global system of market-based instruments. We examine how China's regulatory institutions have worked to implement the seven ETS pilots launched since 2012, and tease out some implications regarding how China's national ETS may contribute to global climate change governance. In this study, we analyze both formal and informal regulatory institutions, through the practice of local actors. The main finding is that the tension between the state and markets in China's ETS implementation has resulted in a reinforcement of state domination rather than the emergence of robust regulatory institutions. The contribution that the ETS makes to China's emissions reduction is also limited by more pressing environmental and industrial policies that local regulators must prioritize. Local nonregulatory implementation practices could undermine the long-term objective to integrate China's ETS with others under article 6 of the UNFCCC.

Purpose
This paper aims to review the effects of home regulatory institutions on outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in the context of China and discuss the extent to which they can be extended to other emerging markets. The authors especially compare these empirical studies with theoretical discussions in each category, identify research gaps and suggest future research ideas. Practical implications are discussed.


Design/methodology/approach
It focuses specifically on three categories of regulatory institutions, including overall institutional development, liberalization of OFDI policies and state ownership (and its closely approximate forms). Using a systematic review, this paper has reviewed 26 empirical studies (23 quantitative and 3 qualitative studies) published in peer-reviewed journals.


Findings
These studies suggest that overall institutional development toward a market economy in general leads to increased OFDI, but this effect is contingent on the stage of such development and the capabilities of Chinese multinationals. Liberalized and supportive OFDI policies also facilitate OFDI activities but only into selective areas. Findings on state ownership have been mixed.


Originality/value
This review offers a full picture of empirical evidence on how multiple levels of regulatory institutions affect OFDI from China. In this way, the authors can identify the research gaps between theoretical discussions on home institutions and OFDI and empirical evidence. Thus, they make suggestions for future directions of studies.

In this paper we analyse the manner in which the regulatory function is discharged in five European countries for the telecommunications, electricity and gas industries. For each case we describe the past, current and foreseeable regulatory arrangements, and compare the different country scenarios and the respective degree of compliance with EU directives and recommendations. We also analyse each case and the current EU proposals in the light of existing regulation literature. Our main conclusion is that, amongst EU countries, the*UK is a distinctive case, since its current dispositions are well beyond those approved at the EU level. Independent regulation of public utilities is virtually non-existent in all the other countries studied in this paper. ; N/A