Suchergebnisse

To what extent can market participants affect the outcomes of regulatory policy? In this paper, we study the effects of one potential source of influence – campaign contributions – from competing interests in the local telecommunications industry, on regulatory policy decisions of state public utility commissions. Using a unique new data set, we find, in contrast to much of the literature on campaign contributions, that there is a significant effect of private money on regulatory outcomes. Indeed, this result is robust to numerous alternative specifications and persists with instrumentation. We also assess the extent of omitted variable bias that would have to exist to obviate the estimated result. We find that for our result to be spurious, omitted variables would have to explain more than five times the variation in the mix of private money as is explained by the variables included in our analysis. We consider this to be very unlikely.

AbstractIndependent regulatory agencies are created in order to enhance the stability and credibility of economic regulation, and to improve policy implementation. So far, most research in political science has focused on explaining the reasons for independence, while less attention has been paid to analysing the consequences of independence. Aiming to start filling this gap, this article seeks to test if (and to what extent) independence makes a difference in competition policy enforcement. Original data on formal independence of national competition agencies in EU Member States from 1993 to 2009 are employed to test if different degrees of independence (and changes in independence over time) affect foreign direct investment and consumer prices. The results indicate that the formal independence of a competition agency does not have any significant impact on either indicator, thus questioning the assumption that independence yields better regulatory performance.

Reference methods in the field of microbiology of the food chain are standardised at the European level by the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and at international level by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Historically, these methods were not fully validated. In 2010, the European Commission gave a mandate to CEN to fully validate a set of 15 methods covering the main bacteria, viruses, as well as bacterial toxins and metabolites, through inter-laboratory studies, and to standardise these methods or to revise the existing standards. The programme ended in July 2017 with the publication of the corresponding 15 CEN/ISO validated Standards. In addition, the International Journal of Food Microbiology recently published a special issue with the results of the validation studies that were conducted, and the European Regulation (EC) 2073/2005 on microbiological criteria was amended to include references to the new standards resulting from the CEN Mandate.

Smart Regulation embraces complementary combinations of environmental instruments tailored to specific policy circumstances. It seeks to build on the concept of an enforcement pyramid, that is at the core of responsive regulation, by engaging government as well as business and other third parties in the regulatory process. As such, it canvasses a range of environmental instruments, including information, self-regulation, co- regulation, economic instruments, as well as command and control regulation. The use and application of various instrument combinations and regulatory actors are governed by a set of regulatory design principles that can adapt to different environmental imperatives and circumstances, and aim to provide for better regulatory outcomes. In this regard, complementary combinations of instruments are key. The principles of smart regulation are pertinent today where governments confront complex environmental issues, and yet appear unable or unwilling to produce adequate regulatory responses

This practical guide to understanding how regulators build insight and form judgements will help organisations to develop their strategy and approach to engagement and to improve their regulatory outcomes. From robot-assisted surgery and advances in stem cell technology, the explosion in use of social media and advances in computing power to the development of autonomous vehicles and digital environments such as the metaverse, these exciting developments present questions, invite debate and have implications. These rapidnew developments also join a world described as being increasingly VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous), making industry-regulator relationships more important than ever to prevent consumer harm and to configure business success. This book is written for those who wish to build positive and progressive relationships with their regulators in these exciting times of rapid advancement. From developing their strategy, through to the practicalities of how to prepare and engage with regulators, readers are navigated through an ecosystem of insight to help build an understanding of what informs their regulator's opinion and judgements. Underpinned with real-world experiences and examples, this book shows that, through clearer strategic focus and more effective relationships, organisations can refine their approach and build their relationships to drive mutually beneficial regulatory relationships that avoid negative consequences and unnecessary costs. Board members, executives, senior leaders, risk, compliance, legal professionals, regulators, and students of business, finance, and law will refer to this book again and again to guide holistic thinking about regulatory relationships and use the insights these can provide to help them calibrate their actions, activities, and progress.

BERRY REVIEWS THE MAJOR THEORIES FOR WHY LEGISLATIVE INTENT DIFFERS FROM REGULATORY OUTPUT INCLUDING: (1) THEORIES OF COMMISSION INADEQUACY, (2) GROUP THEORIES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND (3) GROUP THEORIES OF REGULATION OFFERED BY ECONOMISTS. HE CONCLUDES THAT NONE ALONE INCORPORATES A SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION FOR THIS WIDE RANGE OF REGULATORY OUTCOMES.