Regulatory Oversight and Managerial Ability
In: Hesarzadeh, R. (2020). Regulatory oversight and managerial ability. Eurasian Business Review, 10(4), 559–585. doi:10.1007/s40821-020-00150-0
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In: Hesarzadeh, R. (2020). Regulatory oversight and managerial ability. Eurasian Business Review, 10(4), 559–585. doi:10.1007/s40821-020-00150-0
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In: Presidential studies quarterly, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 71-90
ISSN: 0360-4918
In: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Environmental Policy, and Emerging Economies (Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds.,) 2013, Forthcoming
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In: Presidential studies quarterly, Band 27, S. 71-90
ISSN: 0360-4918
Analyzes President Clinton's approach to regulatory reform, and the impact of presidential support for reducing regulation on the pro-business agenda of the Republican Congress; 1993-97; US.
In: The Globalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Policy, S. 123-141
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In: Public policy & aging report, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 62-66
ISSN: 2053-4892
This book should be read by anyone who is interested in the way in which the administrative state functions in the U.S. Dr. Epstein develops and explains two important points. First, that congressional oversight should be considered part of the administrative process. Second, that congressional oversight should be viewed broadly to include oversight that has been authorized by Congress in addition to congressional hearings, e.g., oversight by agency inspector generals and oversight by the public and the press through use of the Freedom of Information Act. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Professor of Law, George Washington University, USA. This book is a timely examination of congressional oversight in the United States, serving as a definitive guide for scholars and political, legal, and media observers seeking to navigate contemporary conflicts between Congress and the White House. Author Daniel Epstein has spent his professional career as a lawyer serving all sides of the regulatory process: he ran investigations for Congress, defended the White House from congressional oversight, and represented individuals, nonprofit news organizations, and entrepreneurs in federal court to fight for regulatory transparency and fairness. Epstein uses historical and observational data to argue that the modern federal bureaucracy did not begin as a regulatory state but as an investigative state. The contemporary picture of Congress having empowered the bureaucracy to set policy through rules is a relatively recent development in the political development of administrative law. The books novel econometric models and historical analyses force a shift in how legal scholars and judges understand delegation, congressional oversight, and agency investigations. Daniel Epstein is an Assistant Professor of Law at St. Thomas University in Miami and Director of Trust Ventures LP, USA.
In: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5868715/
From 1994 to 2009, federal oversight of human pathogens and toxins was limited to facilities importing human pathogens and toxins into Canada under the Human Pathogens Importation Regulations (HPIR). This narrow focus of authority restricted the Government of Canada's ability to regulate and monitor a full range of activities, including those involving human pathogens and toxins acquired from domestic sources. In 2009, the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (the Act) received Royal Assent to establish a national safety and security regime and expand oversight through a national, standardized process to verify safe and secure use of human pathogens and toxins in Canada.
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Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: The American Political History and Jurisprudence Behind Congressional Delegation of the Investigative Power -- Chapter 3: Congressional Delegation of Its Power to Monitor Policy Implementation -- Chapter 4: The Politics of Overseeing the Federal Bureaucracy -- Chapter 5: Punctuated Delegation and the Politics of Administrative Law.
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Working paper
In: Journal of benefit-cost analysis: JBCA, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 62-70
ISSN: 2152-2812
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Executive Office of the President coordinates the federal government's regulatory agenda, reviews executive branch agencies' draft regulations, and oversees government-wide information quality, peer review, privacy, and statistical policies. Remarkably, its regulatory oversight functions, and the benefit-cost framework underlying them, have not changed significantly through six very different presidential administrations. This article examines the evolution of executive regulatory oversight and analysis from the 1970s to today, exploring the reasons for its durability and whether the current imposition of a regulatory budget challenges the bipartisan nature of regulatory practice.
In: Management Science, forthcoming
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Working paper
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated insurance regulatory oversight and information-sharing in the matter of a highly publicized insurance investment scam exposed in May 1999, focusing on: (1) the alleged scam; (2) the oversight and information-sharing by insurance regulators; and (3) cross-financial-sector coordination issues, including those emanating from the scam relevant to financial regulators' efforts to implement the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act."
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Working paper