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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the accuracy of program performance measurement in US financial regulatory programs.Design/methodology/approachThis research uses the US Government's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) system of output and outcome data collection, performance data from financial regulatory programs were examined to determine: if PART data revealed any degradation in external financial conditions or internal regulatory performance prior to the Great Recession of 2008, and whether output performance influenced outcome performance.FindingsThe results indicate that outcome measures did "capture" some deterioration in the performance of the financial industry before the Great Recession, but these measures were arguably not influenced by program outputs. This represents a potentially problematic use of performance measures in that programs used outcome measures which were not controlled by programmatic actions.Originality/valueThis project adds to a growing body of literature on the challenges of program performance measurement in government. However, this analysis is unique in that it specifically examines the performance of the US Government's financial regulatory programs, as measured by PART, before the Great Recession of 2008.

AbstractThis paper develops a role‐based framework of intermediaries in regulatory programs. In examining the types of roles that organizations adopt in regulation and governance, we argue that roles have important implications for understanding organizational and program level dynamism and outcomes. We use the Regulator–Intermediary–rule‐Taker framework to describe how organizational roles can be adopted through assignment, appropriation, or promotion. We then go deeper into how intermediaries adopt a variety of different roles in key regulatory programs. We examine generic intermediary roles across programs that involve four main groups of activities: creating and/or organizing, coordinating between programs, supporting implementation, and voicing an opinion. All in all, our role‐based framework allows for a novel relational way to understand interorganizational and institutional dynamism in complex, interactive, and ever‐changing regulatory regimes.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues regulations that states, localities, and private companies must comply with under the existing federal approach to environmental protection. This approach has been widely criticized for being costly, inflexible, and ineffective in addressing some of the nation's most pressing environmental problems. The states have used several methods to obtain EPA approval for innovative approaches to environmental protection. Among the primary approaches cited by the state environmental officials GAO interviewed are EPA's Project XL and the Joint EPA/State Agreement to Pursue Regulatory Innovation. Officials in most states told GAO that they faced significant challenges in submitting proposals to EPA, including resistance from within the state environmental agency and a lack of adequate resources to pursue innovative approaches. EPA recognizes that it needs to do more to encourage innovative environmental approaches by states and other entities. As a result, EPA has (1) issued a broad-based draft strategy entitled "Innovating for Better Environmental Results" and (2) adopted the recommendations of an internal task force, which advocated the consideration of innovative alternatives as new regulations are developed."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Both federal and state governments exercise regulatory authority in many of the same policy areas. In enacting new legislation in these shared areas, Congress must provide federal protections, guarantees, or benefits while preserving an appropriate balance between federal and state regulatory authority and responsibility. State efforts can be directed toward federal or nationally shared regulatory objectives through various arrangements, each of which reflects a way to define and issue regulations or standards and assign responsibility for their implementation or enforcement. Regulatory and standard-setting mechanisms for achieving nationwide coverage include (1) fixed federal standards that preempt all state regulatory action, (2) minimum federal standards that preempt less stringent state laws but permit states to establish more stringent standards, (3) the inclusion of federal regulatory provisions in grants or other forms of assistance, (4) cooperative programs in which voluntary national standards are formulated by federal and state officials working together, and (5) widespread state adoption of voluntary standards formulated by quasi-official entities. The first two of these mechanisms involve preemption; the other three represent alternative approaches. Each represents a different combination of federal and state regulatory authority. The mechanisms also offer different options to implementation or enforcement. Furthermore, each standard-setting mechanism offers advantages and disadvantages that reflect the key considerations of federal-state balance in the context of a given national regulatory objective. Shared implementation involves several operational challenges, such as finding the appropriate level of federal oversight, allocating costs between the federal government and the states, potentially increasing the vulnerability of federal agencies to sudden increases in responsibilities and costs, handling variations in implementation from state to state, and adjusting to the new federal-state balance."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The appraisal and mortgage lending industry has changed dramatically since the passage of Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Some have concluded that the problems Title XI was intended to address--the risk to the federal deposit insurance funds and the lack of uniform standards and qualifications--no longer exist. This statement is based on GAO's May 14, 2003, report and discusses the roles of private, state, and federal entities that oversee the appraisal industry; the challenges that Title XI presented to these entities; and industry participants' concerns about the effectiveness of the Title XI regulatory structure."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Since the passage of Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, the appraisal and mortgage lending industry has changed dramatically. Some have concluded that the law is obsolete because the problems Title XI was intended to address--the risk to federal deposit insurance funds and the lack of uniform standards and qualifications--no longer exist. Others argue that the law's purpose and scope should be expanded. To help Congress better understand these issues, GAO looked at the roles of the private, state, and federal entities that oversee the appraisal industry, the challenges Title XI presented to these entities, and industry participants' concerns about the effectiveness of the Title XI regulatory structure."