Effective and Responsive Government—Regulatory Reform Initiatives of Union Government
In: Indian journal of public administration, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 240-249
ISSN: 2457-0222
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In: Indian journal of public administration, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 240-249
ISSN: 2457-0222
In: The Indian journal of public administration: quarterly journal of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 240-249
ISSN: 0019-5561
Item 766-C-3 ; "August 1988." ; Shipping list no.: 88-482-P. ; Spine title: The administration's final report on the National Governors' Association's regulatory reform initiatives, phase II. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Federal regulation is a basic tool of government. Agencies issue thousands of rules and regulations each year to achieve goals such as ensuring that workplaces, air travel, and foods are safe; that the nation's air, water and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amount of taxes are collected. The costs of these regulations are estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and the benefits estimates are even higher. Over the past 25 years, a variety of congressional and presidential regulatory reform initiatives have been instituted to refine the federal regulatory process. This testimony discusses findings from the large number of GAO reports and testimonies prepared at the request of Congress to review the implementation of regulatory reform initiatives. Specifically, GAO discusses common strengths and weaknesses of existing reform initiatives that its work has identified. GAO also addresses some general opportunities to reexamine and refine existing initiatives and the federal regulatory process to make them more effective. GAO's prior reports and testimonies contain a variety of recommendations to improve particular reform initiatives and aspects of the regulatory process."
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In: Business and Society Review, Band 117, Heft 2, S. 185-195
ISSN: 1467-8594
ABSTRACTOn January 18, 2011, President Obama signed Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, which instructs federal regulators to do the following: coordinate their agencies activities to simplify and harmonize rules that may be overlapping, inconsistent, or redundant; determine whether the present and future benefits of a proposed regulation justify its potential costs (including taking into account both quantitative and qualitative factors); increase participation of industry, experts, and the public ("stakeholders") in the formal rule‐making process; encourage the use of warnings, default rules, disclosure requirements, and provisions of information to the public as an alternative to traditional "command‐and‐control" rule‐making restricting consumer choice; and mandate a government‐wide review of all existing administrative rules to remove outdated regulations. Executive Order 13563 includes a qualitative "values" provision to be considered in the required cost–benefit analysis, which can potentially counteract the alleged regulatory reform rationale of President Obama. Furthermore, in Executive Order 13563, President Obama established a deadline of May 18, 2011, for all executive branch agencies to submit their plans to streamline their rulemaking operations and repeal those "overlapping, inconsistent, or redundant" rules. These two issues, along with complementary regulatory review proposals being discussed in the U.S. Congress, are evaluated in this essay.
This dissertation examines the evolution of energy policy and regulatory reform in California from an institutional perspective. The analysis centers on the ideological and interest group political dynamics responsible for the market and regulatory reform initiatives and the development of energy policy in California from the 1970s to the present. The regulatory and legislative arenas are chosen as the institutional location in which ideological and interest group politics converge to shape the origins, development, and implementation of public policy. The study begins by describing the anatomy of the organizational structure of the bureaucratic institutions that play the major role in developing and implementing energy policy nationally and within California. It presents the theory of public utility regulation and examines the historical relationship between the modern state and private industry through the lens of the "regulatory compact." It traces the history of key legislative measures that mark the evolution of energy policy and regulatory reform and explains the role that crisis played in creating the social and political conditions that defined and, over time, redefined institutional relationships between the modern state and private industry. The analysis presented supports the claim that crisis in the energy sector led to regulatory and policy initiatives that disrupted long-established institutional relationships between the state regulator and the regulated energy industry. Political conflict among interests embedded in the structure of the energy industry transformed the traditional role of the regulator from an impartial judge and arbiter of interest group conflict to an active interventionist in the creation and deployment of public policy. The study closes with some reflections on California's energy future, drawing lessons learned from California's experience in initiating market and regulatory reforms in the energy sector.
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In: OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform
Denmark's large welfare state and its open market economy have successfully delivered relatively high standards of living. Danish regulatory reform has proceeded with many pragmatic steps that have contributed to solid economic performance, management of economic and social adjustment to changing conditions, and improved efficiency of government services. However, sheltered sectors, including service industries, still suffer from co-operation and price fixing, contributing to high consumer prices. The competition regime is weaker than in many other countries, and so are regulatory regimes in a
In: OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform
At the end of 1997, Korea suffered one of the worst economic crises ever experienced by an OECD country. An ambitious programme of regulatory, financial, and structural reforms, among the most far-reaching efforts at reform of regulation undertaken in OECD countries, was key to the strong economic recovery in 1999 and 2000. This programme not only stabilised the crisis, but also helped recreate the foundations for future sustainable growth. The Korean experience can be useful to other countries seeking to boost market-led growth. Reforms now are moving Korea from a highly interventionist and a
In: OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform
After ten years of determined reform, Hungary has constructed the legal and policy frameworks consistent with market democracy, and is nearing completion of an historic economic transition. This challenging process required extensive regulation and institution building, as well as massive deregulation, and has generated significant economic benefits. Today, convergence with the EU and achievement of OECD best practices still represent daunting tasks. But in most areas, Hungary faces challenges much like those of other OECD countries in establishing the quality regulatory regimes needed to supp
In: OECD reviews of regulatory reform
In: OECD reviews of regulatory reform
In: Business and Society Review, Band 117, Heft 2, S. 185-195
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In: Annual Review of Financial Economics, Band 10, S. 153-172
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Working paper