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In his writings, Freud used the term atheism only once. However, he became one of the most illustrious despisers of religion and this has fuelled the common opinion that psychoaknalysis has an atheistic character. Psychoanalysts of all persuasions have gladly described themselves as atheists. They have approached the problem of atheism and have appropriated the philosophic, political and theological references concerning this question. Has this appropriation ended in the formation of a restricted and psychoanalytical notion of atheism? To answer this question, we identified the uses of the term atheism in the psychoanalytic literature. We looked at how psychoanalysts have contributed to knowledge about atheism.Our precise reading of the publications has allowed us to highlight the absence of a properly psychoanalytic sense of atheism. However, we were able to extract at least two main senses. The first one concerns atheistic thought. Psychoanalysts have frequently pointed out its incoherence and analyzed it as resulting from psychic conflicts. The second meaning refers to the atheist perspective of psychoanalysis, that is to say the inaugural separation between psychoanalysis and theism. ; Dans ses écrits, Freud a employé une seule fois le terme athéisme. Pour autant, il est devenu un des plus illustres contempteurs de la religion et l'opinion commune a facilement retenu le caractère athée de la psychanalyse. Des psychanalystes de toutes obédiences se sont eux-mêmes volontiers qualifiés d'athées. Ils ont évoqué le problème de l'athéisme et se sont appropriés les références philosophiques, politiques et théologiques portant sur cette question. Cette appropriation a-t-elle aboutit à la formation d'une notion restreinte et psychanalytique d'athéisme ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous avons recensé les usages du terme athéisme dans les écrits psychanalytiques. Nous nous sommes penchée sur la manière dont les psychanalystes ont constitué des savoirs à propos de l'athéisme.Notre lecture précise des publications ...

In his writings, Freud used the term atheism only once. However, he became one of the most illustrious despisers of religion and this has fuelled the common opinion that psychoaknalysis has an atheistic character. Psychoanalysts of all persuasions have gladly described themselves as atheists. They have approached the problem of atheism and have appropriated the philosophic, political and theological references concerning this question. Has this appropriation ended in the formation of a restricted and psychoanalytical notion of atheism? To answer this question, we identified the uses of the term atheism in the psychoanalytic literature. We looked at how psychoanalysts have contributed to knowledge about atheism.Our precise reading of the publications has allowed us to highlight the absence of a properly psychoanalytic sense of atheism. However, we were able to extract at least two main senses. The first one concerns atheistic thought. Psychoanalysts have frequently pointed out its incoherence and analyzed it as resulting from psychic conflicts. The second meaning refers to the atheist perspective of psychoanalysis, that is to say the inaugural separation between psychoanalysis and theism. ; Dans ses écrits, Freud a employé une seule fois le terme athéisme. Pour autant, il est devenu un des plus illustres contempteurs de la religion et l'opinion commune a facilement retenu le caractère athée de la psychanalyse. Des psychanalystes de toutes obédiences se sont eux-mêmes volontiers qualifiés d'athées. Ils ont évoqué le problème de l'athéisme et se sont appropriés les références philosophiques, politiques et théologiques portant sur cette question. Cette appropriation a-t-elle aboutit à la formation d'une notion restreinte et psychanalytique d'athéisme ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous avons recensé les usages du terme athéisme dans les écrits psychanalytiques. Nous nous sommes penchée sur la manière dont les psychanalystes ont constitué des savoirs à propos de l'athéisme.Notre lecture précise des publications nous a permis de mettre en évidence l'absence d'une acception proprement psychanalytique de l'athéisme. Toutefois, nous avons pu extraire au moins deux acceptions principales. La première concerne la pensée athée. Les psychanalystes ont couramment pointé ses incohérences et l'ont analysé comme résultant de conflits psychiques. La seconde acception se réfère à la perspective athée de la psychanalyse, c'est-à-dire à la séparation inaugurale entre la psychanalyse et le théisme.

Qu'est‑ce qu'être "non‑croyant"? Il est relativement complexe de brosser un panorama de la religiosité et donc de l'irréligion en France et en Europe de l'Ouest: en effet les deux sont de plus en plus mêlées. Très récemment, dans un tweet remarqué, la présidente de la région Île‑de‑France, Valérie Pécresse, avait souhaité à ses lecteurs une "joyeuse fête de l'Assomption". Son message se voulait un hommage à la Vierge Marie, une figure biblique qui inspirerait aussi bien croyants que non‑croyants, expliquait‑elle. Si la phrase a pu fâcher certains, elle ne paraît pas anodine: qui sont exactement ces "non‑croyants" que la politique cherche ici à fédérer?

International audience ; On 9 February 1619, the philosopher Giulio Cesare Vanini was sentenced by the parliament of Toulouse to have his tongue torn out and to be burned at the stake for blasphemy and atheism. In this article, we analyze the apparatus of his exemplary punishment, reserved for thebody of the enemy within, convinced of "lese-majesty divine and human". In light of the interpretation of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish), we analyze this terrible punishment as a spectacular restoration of the monarchic "sovereignty," which establishes itself by the appropriationof the jurisdiction of religious crimes, and which is part of a "right to punish" considered as a form of the right to wage war on his enemies. In the spectacle of the punishment, the body of the enemy occupies the center of the scene, and submits to a very meticulous ritual, aimed at the reintegration of the impure body in the order of the city and in the bosom of the Church, culminating in the amends and the execution. But in the interaction of the condemned with the crowd, there is also a subversive economy of punishment that Vanini performs by refusing to make amends and by proclaiming that he wanted to "die as a philosopher." Through this revolutionary gesture, he claims that atheism is not in itself a political rebellion and denounces the injustice of his sentence. ; Le 9 février 1619, le philosophe Jules-César Vanini est condamné à avoir la langue arrachée et au bûcher par le parlement de Toulouse pour blasphème et athéisme. Nous analysons l'apparat du supplice exemplaire, auquel est soumis le corps de l'ennemi intérieur, convaincu de "crime de lèse majesté divine et humaine". En nous appuyant sur l'interprétation de Foucault (Surveiller et punir), nous analysons ce supplice, où se joue le rétablissement spectaculaire de la "souveraineté" monarchique, qui s'impose aussi et peut-être d'abord par l'appropriation de la juridiction des crimes de religion et relève d'un "droit de punir" considéré comme une forme du droit de faire la ...

International audience ; On 9 February 1619, the philosopher Giulio Cesare Vanini was sentenced by the parliament of Toulouse to have his tongue torn out and to be burned at the stake for blasphemy and atheism. In this article, we analyze the apparatus of his exemplary punishment, reserved for thebody of the enemy within, convinced of "lese-majesty divine and human". In light of the interpretation of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish), we analyze this terrible punishment as a spectacular restoration of the monarchic "sovereignty," which establishes itself by the appropriationof the jurisdiction of religious crimes, and which is part of a "right to punish" considered as a form of the right to wage war on his enemies. In the spectacle of the punishment, the body of the enemy occupies the center of the scene, and submits to a very meticulous ritual, aimed at the reintegration of the impure body in the order of the city and in the bosom of the Church, culminating in the amends and the execution. But in the interaction of the condemned with the crowd, there is also a subversive economy of punishment that Vanini performs by refusing to make amends and by proclaiming that he wanted to "die as a philosopher." Through this revolutionary gesture, he claims that atheism is not in itself a political rebellion and denounces the injustice of his sentence. ; Le 9 février 1619, le philosophe Jules-César Vanini est condamné à avoir la langue arrachée et au bûcher par le parlement de Toulouse pour blasphème et athéisme. Nous analysons l'apparat du supplice exemplaire, auquel est soumis le corps de l'ennemi intérieur, convaincu de "crime de lèse majesté divine et humaine". En nous appuyant sur l'interprétation de Foucault (Surveiller et punir), nous analysons ce supplice, où se joue le rétablissement spectaculaire de la "souveraineté" monarchique, qui s'impose aussi et peut-être d'abord par l'appropriation de la juridiction des crimes de religion et relève d'un "droit de punir" considéré comme une forme du droit de faire la ...

The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. That noun became established only belatedly, under the third Republic, with the policy of secularisation conducted by the republican. Since then, secularism has remained a subject of debate and controversy between citizens and between savers 1, and its very definition remains problematic. As Jean-Pierre Rioux points out, secularism is 'neither a concept, a substance, a concept, nor a principle of positive law', and its 'definition is not given in any code, law or constitution 2'. However, it is necessary to agree on a provisional meaning, if only in order to be able to define its contours: secularism is not a spiritual option (unlike Catholicism, atheism, etc.), but a game rule designed to enable citizens to live together with different beliefs. More specifically, it is a set of rules (legal and case-law) and practices (political, administrative, symbolic) designed to administer the place of religion in the State and in society, while respecting freedom of conscience and the freedom to exercise religion. I propose to examine here how this complex set of rules and practices evolved between 1 June 1958 and 28 April 1969, when General de Gaulle exercised power as head of the last government of the fourth Republic and then as President of the Fifth Republic. This is not the topic that attracted most attention from the historians of the period. Many works place this aspect of history in a secondary place, traditionally favouring the strengthening of executive power, the Gaullian theme of France's 'size', and decolonisation. At present, historiography is very attentive to political staff and Gaullist networks, particularly in the context of the GAULHORE research programme (Gaullists: men and Networks) launched in 2008 under the leadership of Bernard Lachaise ; International audience ; The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. ...