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This paper addresses the efficient management of natural resource revenues in capitalscarce developing economies. We depart from usual prescriptions based on the permanent income hypothesis and argue that capital-scarce countries should prioritise domestic investment. Since revenue streams are highly volatile governments should protect consumption from shocks by increasing it only cautiously. Volatility in domestic investment can be moderated by a buffer of international liquidity, but it is also important to structure investment processes to be able to cope efficiently with substantial fluctuations. To date, most of the resource-rich countries of Africa have not had investment rates commensurate with their rate of resource extraction.

This paper addresses the efficient management of natural resource revenues in capitalscarce developing economies. We depart from usual prescriptions based on the permanent income hypothesis and argue that capital-scarce countries should prioritise domestic investment. Since revenue streams are highly volatile governments should protect consumption from shocks by increasing it only cautiously. Volatility in domestic investment can be moderated by a buffer of international liquidity, but it is also important to structure investment processes to be able to cope efficiently with substantial fluctuations. To date, most of the resource-rich countries of Africa have not had investment rates commensurate with their rate of resource extraction.

This paper addresses the efficient management of natural resource revenues in capital-scarce developing economies. We depart from usual prescriptions based on the permanent income hypothesis, since for capital-scarce countries it is preferable to invest domestically. Since revenue streams are highly volatile, governments should protect consumption from shocks by increasing it only cautiously. Volatility in domestic investment can to an extent be moderated by a buffer of international liquidity, but it is also important to structure investment processes to be able to cope efficiently with substantial fluctuations. To date, most of the resource-rich countries of Africa have not had investment rates commensurate with their rate of resource extraction.

This study analyzes the effects on poverty incidence and other variables resulting from government expenditures associated with natural resource revenues, using Laos as a case study. The analysis uses a multi-sector/multi-household general equilibrium model of the Lao economy. The conceptual framework emphasizes the distinction between official and marginal expenditures financed by project revenues. A range of assumptions is considered regarding the direct distributional impact of the true marginal expenditures and their implications are compared. Poverty incidence declines under the entire range of distributional assumptions, but the most important determinant of these impacts is the degree of pro-rural bias.

This study analyzes the effects on poverty incidence and other variables resulting from government expenditures associated with natural resource revenues, using Laos as a case study. The analysis uses a multi-sector/multi-household general equilibrium model of the Lao economy. The conceptual framework emphasizes the distinction between official and marginal expenditures financed by project revenues. A range of assumptions is considered regarding the direct distributional impact of the true marginal expenditures and their implications are compared. Poverty incidence declines under the entire range of distributional assumptions, but the most important determinant of these impacts is the degree of pro-rural bias.

Intro -- Contents -- The British Columbia Institute of Economic Policy Analysis -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Acknowledgments -- Who Should Get Natural Resource Revenues? -- The Constitution: A Basis for Bargaining -- The Political Context of Resource Development in Canada -- Equalization Payments and Energy Royalties -- Note on Equalization and Resource Rents -- Natural Resource Revenue Sharing: A Dissenting View -- Resource Rent: How Much and for Whom? -- Static Redistributive and Welfare Effects of an Export Tax -- Taxes, Royalties, and Equity Participation as Alternative Methods of Dividing Resource Revenues: The Syncrude Example -- A Comment on Natural Resource Revenue Sharing: The Links between Revenue Sharing and Energy Policy -- Rent vs. Revenue Maximization as an Objective of Environmental Management -- Ontario Mining Profit Tax: An Evaluation -- Governments and Mineral Resource Earnings: Taxation with Over Simplification? -- Note on Federations and Risk Aversion -- A Note on the Economics of Oil-Financed Recovery Projects -- The Concept of a Nation and Entitlements to Economic Rents -- The Volatility of Rents -- A Comment on Decentralized Resource Control -- Biographical Notes -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- W -- Z.

Who benefits from oil revenues? The bitter struggles for oil nationalisation through the twentieth century bear witness to the sensitivity of this question. Now that the principle of national sovereignty over natural resources has been established, the debate has moved on from which countries should benefit from resource revenues, to who within the resource-exporting countries will benefit. Political upheavals in Venezuela and Bolivia are two dramatic examples of what can happen when a majority feel that they are not getting their fair share of their national patrimony. This question became all the more pressing during a decade of rising commodity prices, leading to record oil prices, which the global financial crisis appears to have slowed only temporarily.

AbstractNatural resource revenues are an important financing source for public investment in many developing economies. Investing volatile resource revenues, however, may subject an economy to macroeconomic instability. This paper studies fiscal approaches to investing resource revenues, using Angola as an example. With spend‐as‐you‐go, resource revenues are spent as received, resulting in little external saving; public investment can be interrupted, driving up the capital depreciation rate and undermining stability. Gradual scaling‐up, instead, allows countries to build up external saving to shield investment from revenue volatility. The framework adopted here can be used as a planning tool to define a medium‐term fiscal strategy.

Debate on the question of who should receive the surplus revenue generated by natural-resource exploitation -- Ottawa or the provinces -- is usually carried on in terms of history, politics custom, law, social values, and environmental considerations. This collection of essays presents analyses of the question from the economist's point of view. The essays fall into three groups. In the first of these, the authors examine the taxation of the mining and energy industries and show how the method of taxation chosen by different levels of government -- federal or provincial -- may be "non-neutral," distorting private output and timing decisions. The second group consists of careful case studies of the effects of particular natural resource taxation measures; the third focuses directly on the question of provincial and federal entitlement to resource revenues. Although arguments are advanced for linking the right to tax to the responsibility for management and control (at present vested in the provinces), most of the contributors would agree that the provinces should be regarded as stewards and bailiffs, not landlords; as rent collectors and managers, not "rentiers" and owners