Suchergebnisse

ABSTRACTSecond‐order stochastic dominance is used to determine preferences among various investments for any risk‐averse decision maker. On the other hand, when faced with choosing between different insurance policies or disaster plans, a risk‐averse decision maker should use a type of stochastic dominance called variability ordering. In this situation, second‐order stochastic dominance has been used in previous research and is incorrect.

This article makes the hypothesis that the European Union (EU) is a political actor whose identity and strategy on the international field are based on a strong aversion towards risk. In order to follow this hypothesis, we will define the exact meaning of a Risk Averse Power (RAP). Roughly speaking, an RAP can be defined as an international actor that defines and responds to the political stakes of a given identified risk in terms of a will to reduce its uncertainties and uncontrollable effects. Then, in the absence of any existing composite index, we propose five criteria for measuring this risk aversion: job loss risk, biotechnology risks, climate change risk, financial risks, and risk of war. In the next section, we attempt to explain why Europe is risk averse, through various factors: Europe's non-state construction, the existence of a deliberative European political space, Europe's social model aiming towards market risk minimization, and, finally, the end of the need for an Empire. Finally, we determine the broader implications of risk aversion for Europe as a global actor.

This article makes the hypothesis that the European Union (EU) is a political actor whose identity and strategy on the international fi eld are based on a strong aversion towards risk. In order to follow this hypothesis, we will defi ne the exact meaning of a Risk Averse Power (RAP). Roughly speaking, an RAP can be defi ned as an international actor that defi nes and responds to the political stakes of a given identifi ed risk in terms of a will to reduce its uncertainties and uncontrollable effects. Then, in the absence of any existing composite index, we propose fi ve criteria for measuring this risk aversion: job loss risk, biotechnology risks, climate change risk, fi nancial risks, and risk of war. In the next section, we attempt to explain why Europe is risk averse, through various factors: Europe's non-state construction, the existence of a deliberative European political space, Europe's social model aiming towards market risk minimization, and, fi nally, the end of the need for an Empire. Finally, we determine the broader implications of risk aversion for Europe as a global actor.

This article makes the hypothesis that the European Union (EU) is a political actor whose identity and strategy on the international fi eld are based on a strong aversion towards risk. In order to follow this hypothesis, we will defi ne the exact meaning of a Risk Averse Power (RAP). Roughly speaking, an RAP can be defi ned as an international actor that defi nes and responds to the political stakes of a given identifi ed risk in terms of a will to reduce its uncertainties and uncontrollable effects. Then, in the absence of any existing composite index, we propose fi ve criteria for measuring this risk aversion: job loss risk, biotechnology risks, climate change risk, fi nancial risks, and risk of war. In the next section, we attempt to explain why Europe is risk averse, through various factors: Europe's non-state construction, the existence of a deliberative European political space, Europe's social model aiming towards market risk minimization, and, fi nally, the end of the need for an Empire. Finally, we determine the broader implications of risk aversion for Europe as a global actor.

AbstractThe innovation contest is well organized to provide solutions or ideas for companies. In the existing innovation contest literature, several articles assume that the contestants are risk neutral and show that a single‐winner award scheme is optimal. In this article, we assume that the contestants are risk averse and show that the risk aversion of contestants can explain the popularity of the multiple‐winner, convex (unequal) allocation scheme, which generalizes the findings of a prior study and coincides with practical observations. This result also possesses a certain robustness in several cases.

Individuals' preferences for risk and inequality are measured through choices between imagined societies and lotteries. The median relative risk aversion, which is often seen to reflect social inequality aversion, is between 2 and 3. Most people are also found to be individually inequality‐averse, reflecting a willingness to pay for living in a more equal society. Left‐wing voters and women are both more risk and inequality‐averse than others. The model allows for non‐monotonic SWFs, implying that welfare may decrease with an individual's income at high‐income levels, which is illustrated in simulations based on the empirical results.

This paper studies the effects of principal's risk aversion on principal-agent relationship under hidden information. It finds that the agent's equilibrium effort increases and approaches the efficient level as the principal's risk aversion increases and tends to infinity. Allowing for random participation by the agent, his effort can be efficient even when the principal's risk aversion is finite. For the case of common agency with random participation, it is optimal for the principals to make the agent the residual claimant on profits and the principals' net profits monotonically decrease to zero when their risk aversion tends to infinity.