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There is a place for education in the fight against racism, but we shouldn't confuse it for the fight itself.

The racial injustice that continues to plague the United States couldn't be a clearer challenge to the country's idea of itself as a liberal and democratic society, where all citizens have a chance at a decent life. So what must a liberal society do to address the legacies of its past, and how should we aim to reconceive liberalism in order to do so? In this work, Andrew Valls takes issue with solutions from both the left and the right, and therefore with the constricted ways in which racial justice is debated in the United States today

According to this commentary, the UK coalition government's 2012 proposals to restrict judicial review and to abolish measures which safeguard race equality amount to a further assault on migrants, asylum seekers and BME communities, in the guise of promoting economic growth. The arguments against judicial review – their number, their length, their cost – are contested here. The author argues that judicial review is a necessary protection for human rights, especially when legal aid is being withdrawn.

"Racial justice refers to the goal of eliminating hierarchies and inequalities that exist on account of race. In a racially just world, bias would not impact anyone's ability to be safe or successful. But bias looks differently today than it has in the past. Of course, actual hate groups still exist, and overt racism is unfortunately still a reality. Perhaps now more than ever, Americans exhausted of bitter realities are ready for a reckoning on race"--

This article discusses the adequacy of Rawls' theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the Rawlsian framework. The article has two main parts spread out over several different sections. The first is concerned with whether the Rawlsian framework suffices to prevent racial injustice. It is argued that there are reasons to doubt whether it does. The second part is concerned with whether a Rawlsian framework has the resources to rectify past racial injustice. It is argued that it has more resources to do this than Mills allows. This second part of the article centers on two Rawlsian ideas: ideal theory and the fair equality of opportunity (FEO) principle. It is argued that ideal theory is essential for the kind of rectificatory work that Mills wants nonideal theory to do, and that where there is a socioeconomic legacy of past injustice, it is hard to see how FEO could be implemented if it did no rectificatory work, a result which means that there is less need to turn to nonideal theory at all.

In the US today, there remain many unresolved issues related to race, in particular issues that are legacies of past injustices toward African Americans. This article argues that, in addressing these issues, we have much to learn from other societies that have undergone political transformations from regimes that systematically abuse human rights to regimes that respect, or at least purport to respect, human rights. These transitions have given rise to the idea of transitional justice, & to well-developed debates about what justice requires during such periods of transition. I argue (in the first section) that transitional justice usually requires the backward-looking measures of prosecution, reparation, & acknowledgement, & I further argue (in the following section) that by this standard the transformation that took place during the civil rights era in the US was unjust, or, at least, remains incomplete. In the final section of the article, I discuss measures that should be considered as ways of completing our transition to a racially just society. Adapted from the source document.