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In Hungary, during 2010-2015 the growing xenophobic attitudes are noticed in the society, and right radical extremist groups gain power. The aim of the article is to identify the most significant factors that encourage xenophobia in Hungary. The types of right organizations and their electoral performance are determined. Our hypothesis is that the activity of right extremist organizations influences the formation of xenophobic social practices in Hungary. By means of factor analysis the author identified the main directions and forms of activity of right radicals, determined the value of socio-economic dynamics of Hungary, characterized the attitudes of society, the law and the ruling elite to the problems of xenophobia and right radicalism. Among the most influential factors we should name: open propaganda of nationalist ideas; constitutional priority to the interests of ethnic Hungarians; parliamentary membership of the Movement "For a Better Hungary"; condoning by the ruling elite, the courts and the police of the right radical activity. The paper presents the trend in the contemporary Hungary: the public demonstrates intolerance to right radicalism in cases of criminal behavior, but for the most part is loyal to its ideologies. Except for oppositional human rights organizations and ethnic communities, a significant part of Hungarian society often shows nearly complete indifference to the issues of xenophobia, racial and ethnic discrimination. The author described five groups of factors that stimulate the reproduction of xenophobic attitudes and practices among various groups of the population: "historical", institutional, socioeconomic, legal and political. The paper uses empirical data of public opinion polls conducted by leading research centers in Hungary, as well as statistical data of public authorities, civil society institutions.

The article analyzes the transformation of Islamic community of the Adygheya Republic during 1990-2015, new tendencies and actors. The author reveals new trends in the 2010s updated by the dynamics of the political background of Adygheya. The main focus is the factors constraining Muslims from radicalism in the 1990s – 2010s, as well as factors that may contribute to the spread of radical version of Islam today. According to the author, the factors of radicalization of Muslims in the Adygheya can be divided into two groups – federal and regional. The first concerns the many unresolved methodological issues relating to "New Muslims". As practice shows, the state unequivocal support of the "traditional Muslim clergy" contributes to the isolation of Salafis, limits the possibilities of intraconfessional dialogue. The facts of destruction of mosques, injunction religious books, extra-judicial persecution of Muslims and ban on headscarves (hijabs) in schools in the other regions of the Russian Federation forms the protest discourse. At the regional level a crisis of ethnic ideology Adyghe Khabze, economical crisis and broken social lifts contribute to the radicalization of Muslims. Islamic radicals are very active and professional in social networks, they create the groups whose target audience is youth. The activities of the radical "Internet imams", electronic "religious authorities" are typical for Adygheya and for the whole North Caucasus outside the native region. Their influence, agitation and propaganda are destructive and will have a negative impact in the future. A new trend is the departure of the Adyghe Muslims in ISIL (about 21 people from the beginning of 2015).

Ethnocultural conflicts in the world today are rooted in the increasingly incendiary globalization in the course of which certain regions cannot cope with migrant flows (EU member countries are a pertinent example) while others (the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China, Tatarstan, Chechnia, Bashkortostan, the Stavropol Territory, Tyumen Region, Adygea, and Ingushetia in the Russian Federation) are living in the complicated context of ethnic patchwork. Societies are moving towards blending different ethnocultural elements, causing havoc in human minds, unexpected ethnocultural situations and social and ethnic deviations which, as could be expected, consolidates the positions of the Islamic State. [1] It is difficult to study different aspects of the problem in depth in the age of the contemporary digital information society and various brainwashing strategies used by ISIS agents: they present ISIS as the best place for the development of genuine human qualities, which has already brought together members of several ethnic communities. The transnational extremist groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami among them, have spread their influence to Central Asia and are gradually moving into Russian territory. Strongholds of extremism are not limited to the Northern Caucasus; they are present in the historically peaceful Volga area where Islamists have their own mosques and training courses and work hard to lure as many young people as possible to their side. Post-Soviet Islamism is a mixture of classic universalist Islamism and xenophobic fundamentalism. In Soviet times local Muslims treated the so-called Muslim world as something abstract, while Afghan mujahideen caused a lot of irritation in the Soviet Central Asian countries: Uzbeks or Tajiks, for instance, found it hard to associate the mujahideen persistent opposition with the defense of Islam. Today, the situation in the Muslim world is different. Former Soviet republics accept the universalist model of Islam as an endogenous phenomenon rooted in economic, political and ideological prerequisites. Fundamentalism/Wahhabism is seen as an exogenous phenomenon that forced some adherents of classic Islam out and drew the rest into its ranks. Political religions are never neutral. The difference between "us" and "others" is ontological. "Others" are a product of evil (ideologists of political religions do not hesitate to state that their enemies are "soulless"), therefore destruction is the only method to be employed against them. This paradoxical combination of cruelty and flexibility is typical of the post-modernist phenomena.

The article explores the ideological origins of Ukrainian radical nationalism, the formation and evolution of far-right political forces in post-Communist Ukraine, and the ideology of contemporary radical right-wing Ukrainian parties. Ukrainian far-right nationalism originated in the 1920s-30s. Its political embodiment was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which operated in Eastern Poland. Ideological foundation of the OUN was the concept of integral nationalism elaborated by Dmytro Dontsov. The OUN proclaimed the creation of Ukrainian sovereign state as its most important goal. The characteristic features of the ideology of Ukrainian radical far-right nationalism of that era were the priority of the interests of the Ukrainian nation, Russophobia, anti-communism, anti-liberalism, and the cult of power. Modern Ukrainian radical nationalists have adopted many of these concepts. In the 1990s, a number of extreme right-wing organizations emerged in Ukraine that declared themselves heirs of the traditions of Ukrainian nationalists of the first half of the XXth century. Some of the newly created parties tend towards integral nationalism, while others tend towards social nationalism, which combines ethnic nationalism with the idea of social justice. At the same time, all Ukrainian radical nationalists are characterized by an ethnic interpretation of the nation, a desire to create a mono-ethnic Ukrainian state, a negative attitude towards Russia and Russians, anti-communism, and commitment to the "third way" in economy. Critical of European liberal values, the Ukrainian far-right radicals are nonetheless in favor of Ukraine joining the EU and NATO, hoping that Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration will distance it from Russia. Ukrainian radical nationalists actively participated in Euromaidan 2013-2014 and the overthrow of Victor Yanukovych's regime. However, they have never (with the exception of the 2012 parliamentary elections) achieved any significant success in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada. Only a part of the population of Galicia votes for them. At the same time, some ideas previously put forward by the Ukrainian far right have in recent years to a certain extent entered the ideological baggage of respectable pro-European right-wing parties in Ukraine. Thus, the ideological and political influence of the Ukrainian far-right nationalists is more significant than it would be possible to assume based only on their electoral support. ; В статье исследуются идейные истоки украинского радикального национализма, становление и эволюция праворадикальных политических сил на посткоммунистической Украине, идеология современных украинских крайне правых организаций. Украинский праворадикальный национализм зародился в 1920-е - 30-е годы. Его политическим воплощением являлась Организация украинских националистов (ОУН), действовавшая на территории Восточной Польши. Идеологическим фундаментом ОУН был интегральный национализм Д.Донцова, а своей важнейшей целью ОУН провозглашала создание Украинского суверенного государства. Характерными чертами идеологии украинского праворадикального национализма той эпохи были приоритет интересов украинской нации, русофобия, антикоммунизм, антилиберализм, культ силы. Современные украинские радикальные националисты заимствовали многие из этих концептов. В 1990-е годы на Украине возник целый ряд крайне правых организаций, которые провозгласили себя наследниками традиций украинских националистов первой половины XX века. Одни из вновь созданных партий тяготеют к интегральному национализму, другие — к социал-национализму, объединяющему этнический национализм с идеей социальной справедливости. При этом для всех украинских радикал-националистов характерны этническая трактовка нации, стремление к созданию моноэтничного Украинского государства, негативное отношение к России и русским, антикоммунизм, отстаивание «третьего пути» в экономике. Критически относясь к европейским либеральным ценностям, украинские крайне правые все же выступают за вступление Украины в ЕС и НАТО, рассчитывая, что евроатлантическая интеграция Украины отдалит ее от России. Украинские радикальные националисты активно участвовали в Евромайдане 2013-2014 гг. и свержении режима В. Януковича. Однако они никогда (за исключением парламентских выборов 2012 г.) не достигали сколько-нибудь значительных успехов на выборах в Верховную Раду. За них голосует только часть населения Галиции. В то же время некоторые идеи, ранее выдвигавшиеся ультранационалистами, в последние годы до определенной степени вошли в идеологический багаж респектабельных правых проевропейских партий Украины. Таким образом, идейно-политическое влияние украинских крайне правых является более значительным, чем это можно было бы предположить, исходя только из их электоральной поддержки.

Article retractedAbstract: In Hungary and Slovakia during 2010-2015 there has been an increase in xenophobic attitudes in society; rightwing and extremist groups are activating there as well. The purpose of this article is to compare the most signifi cant factors which encourage xenophobia. Previously we have identifi ed the types of right-wing organizations and found out their electoral characteristics. We assume that the activities of right-wing extremist organizations infl uence the formation of xenophobic social practices in Hungary and Slovakia, which arise from the range of factors. In this article we used empirical data gained as a result of public opinion polls conducted by the leading research centers in Hungary and Slovakia, by international organizations, as well as statistics of public authorities and civil society institutions. By means of factor analysis, we identifi ed the main directions and forms of activity of right-wing radicals; determined the value of socio-economic dynamics of the country's development; characterized the attitude of society, the law and the ruling elite to the problems of xenophobia and right-wing radicalism. Among the most infl uential factors we identifi ed: open propaganda of nationalist ideas; constitutional priority of the ethnic majority interests; parliamentary status of rightwing parties; condoning the activities of right-wing radicals by the ruling elite, the courts and the police. The comparison of factors stimulating xenophobic practices in Hungary and Slovakia didn't confi rm the hypothesis of common signifi cant infl uence of the economic crisis, lack of education and political passivity on the formation of xenophobic practices among young people. The professional frustration of provincial youth discovered itself as a cumulative socioeconomic factor. ; Статья отозванаАннотация: В Венгрии и Словакии на протяжении 2010-2015 гг. отмечается рост ксенофобских настроений в обществе, активизируются праворадикальные и экстремистские группировки. Цель статьи заключается в сопоставлении наиболее существенных факторов, стимулирующих ксенофобию в двух странах. Предварительно мы предприняли попытку типологизировать праворадикальные организации и выяснить их электоральные характеристики. Наше предположение состоит в том, что деятельность праворадикальных и экстремистских организаций оказывает влияние на формирование ксенофобских социальных практик в Венгрии и Словакии, которое обусловлено рядом факторов. В работе использованы эмпирические данные, полученные в ходе социологических опросов, проведенных ведущими исследовательскими центрами Венгрии и Словакии, международными организациями, а также статистические данные органов государственной власти, институтов гражданского общества. Средствами факторного анализа нами определены основные направления и формы деятельности правых радикалов; определено значение социально-экономической динамики развития стран; охарактеризовано отношение общества, закона и правящей элиты к проблемам ксенофобии и правому радикализму. К числу наиболее влиятельных факторов можно отнести: открытую пропаганду националистических идей; конституционный приоритет интересов этнического большинства; парламентский статус праворадикальных партий; попустительство деятельности правых радикалов со стороны правящей элиты, судов и полиции. Сопоставление фактор стимулирующих ксенофобские практики в Венгрии и Словакии отчасти не подтвердило распространенную гипотезу о существенном влиянии экономического кризиса, дефицита образования и политической пассивности на формирование ксенофобских практик в молодежной среде. Кумулятивным социально-экономическим фактором обнаружила себя профессиональная фрустрация провинциальной молодежи.

The essay seeks to evaluate the pertinence of the inquiry laid out in Il Regno e la Gloria to a radical critique of contemporary politics and economics, in particular its relationship to a Marxian communism, which Agamben appears to consider incapable of a truly radical or total critique of the status quo. To do this, the paper is divided into three sections. In the first part the question of what is meant by the "theological genealogy of the economy and government", as announced by the book's subtitle, is elaborated. This involves subjecting to scrutiny Agamben's reliance on a certain understanding of secularization, of the kind that permits him to declare that modernity merely brings to completion the Christian 'economy' of providence, or indeed that Marx's notion of praxis 'basically is only the secularization of the theological conception of the being of creatures as divine operation'. The paper tries to show that Agamben's work relies on a type of historical substantialism that clashes with his claim to be engaging in a genealogy. In the second part Agamben's suggestions about the genealogical thread running from Trinitarian oikonomia all the way to Smith's invisible hand, and implicitly all the way up to the present, are contrasted to understandings of the (modem) economy which, being premised on the limitlessness of monetary accumulation, transcends any absorption by a theological genealogy. In the third and final part certain aspects of Agamben's archaeological excavations -- in particular his delineation of the economic-theological notion of administration -- are examined, and the question is posed whether they might permit a deconstruction of the Marxist reference to communism as the withering away of the state and the shift towards an 'administration of things'. Adapted from the source document.