Suchergebnisse

Brennan and Hamlin provide a normative justification for dispositional conservatism based on the concave value functions which give rise to quasi-risk aversion. This note modifies this argument for "analytic conservatism" by allowing jurisdictional exit i

As an issue of complexity, radicalism does not stand alone. It has a political and ideological basis. Like an ideology that continues to bind, radicalism takes the path of religion to be able to justify all actions of anarchy. The case of today's Islam as being synonymous with radicalism is apart of the complexcity of the issue. Religious radicalism is a prevalent phenomenon in the history religions. Radicalism is closely related to fundamentalism, which is marked by the return of society to the fundamentals of religion. Fundamentalism is a kind of ideology that makes religion the principle of life by society and individuals. Fundamentalism usually comes along with radicalism and violence when the freedom to return to religion is hindered by social and political circumstances surrounding the society. Islam recognizes jihad that is in some cases misunderstood. Jihad is different from radicalism and its derivatives of terrorism. Radicalism and terrorism tend to be destructive, uncompromising and closely related to violent behavior in the name of religion. Meanwhile jihad is a form of the totality of a Muslim's devotion to God, which is concerned not only with self-defense efforts, but a battle that has a theological legitimacy in which the martyrs are promised by God with various virtues and advantages. The association of jihad with terrorism today cannot be justified due to the fact that jihad in the sense of war (Qitâl) involves elements of violence that can be categorized as terrorism. It is the case that the use of violence in the name of religion in contemporary times is, in fact, due to political factors, which then seeks its legitimacy in religious teachings.

This riset proves that communicative da'wah (Islamic communication) is the most effective way in combating radicalism since it prioritizes the persuasive, rational, and dialogical approaches. The Western and Muslim scholars propose several methods in combating radicalism in religion. Karen Armstrong in his book "The Battle for God; Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam" states that radicalism in religion can be reduced by attending equal distribution of economy and broader access to politic. Bernard Lewis in "What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East" states that radicalism in religion can be neutralized by promoting democratic attitude among religious followers. Yüsuf Qard{awî in "al-S{ahwat al-Islãmiyah bayn al-Juhüd wa al-Tat{arruf"concludes that facing individual or group who commit radicalism should be through dakwah. Azyumardi Azra in "Konflik Baru Peradaban: Globalisasi, Pluralitas, dan Radikalisme " states that all efforts in combating terrorism in whatever form should be away from violence, since all acts of violence often yield in suffering innocent people. Petrus Reinhard Golose in "Deradikalisasi Terorisme: Humanis, Soul Approach dan menyentuh Akar Rumput" offers a deradicalization program applied by the Indonesian Police force using Soul and Humanistic approach by involving various parties in eradicating terrorism till its root. This riset support the concept of Yüsuf Qardhawî by emphasizing idea that communicative dakwah is the most effective approach in combating radicalism in Islam.

Summary Islam has assumed a decisive role in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet system. However, the religious comeback has produced adverse effects, particularly the rise of religious radicalism. The Hanafi School, the main conventional school of Islamic interpretation in Central Asia, which greatly contributed to the Islamic underpinnings of Central Asian nomadic and settled Islamic civilization, employs a rational approach and cherishes local customs and traditions. However, the narrow, literal perceptions of Islam lack these features and render Islam a static, frozen system of teachings. Those literalist perceptions of Islam constitute the ontological and intellectual foundation of radicalism in the world, in general, and in contemporary Central Asia, in particular. Religious literalism flourishes in Muslim communities that lack vibrant intellectual life and dynamic religious education. Despite the decades-long systematic and forceful anti-religious campaign during Soviet rule, Central Asian Muslims consider themselves no less Muslims than others. However, the region has been seriously deprived of a formal Islamic education system and Islamic intellectual life. Consequently, at the time of independence the Central Asian Muslim community was characterized by a ubiquitously low level of Islamic education, 'broken tradition,' and concomitant 'shaken identity', all of which gave rise to distorted and radical understandings of Islam. The abrupt politicization of post-Soviet Muslims in the early 1990s led to the instrumentalization of Islam in politics, which produced disastrous results in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In recent years, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan embarked on comprehensive anti-terrorist activities and adopted complex measures at the official level in fighting radical (depicted as "non-traditional") interpretations of Islam, since the very liberal attitude of these countries towards all religious groups, which had been adopted earlier, and the lack of state support to the Muftiyat (the civil ...

This article was written aims to explore why been up to lately rife with Islamic radicalism in the perspective of behavioral psychology. The events of shootings, suicide bombings, the destruction of economic resources has been a lot happened at the local and global level. Such events always identified with radical and terrorist behavior. More details such behavior was stigmatized by Islamic radicalism or Islamic terrorists. This article examines the problem of Islamic radicalism in the psychological perspective. There are some reasons why an individual or religious group do radical behavior. First there is the cultural acculturation and enculturation. Second there is the interpretation of verses of scripture with a radical interpretation by the actors and considered legitimate. Thirdly there is the role of the media who preach with unbalanced and give labeling. Fifth behavior is not political social economic equity in a particular religion and the state. Sixth is no imposition liberal capitalist ideology incompatible with religious ideology. Seventh existing emotional instability of the perpetrators, radicals or terrorists.

The radicalism is the name of religion in Indonesia neer to be watched out of as Indonesia today is known as a diverse country and any conflicts may easily rise due to differences in ethnicity, raca and region, especially if combined with the religious theology. The reformation in 1998 changed many things in Indonesia, including the evolution of Islam. The freedom of speech and to assemble are being used by those Islamic fundamentalist groups by teaching their thought/doctrines.The educated people is suspected to be the targert of radicalism. And why they become the targets? It's because they have resources and accses to information. They are people who are open and seek for information because it has become a necescity . They ha are scholars who forged in higher educational institutions. Therefore the educated people are vehicle of change.The most important in this research is about how to describe the relationship between religion and state within the mind of educated people. Indonesia is a great coutry of various ethnic, cultural dan religious diversity, with Muslims as the majority population. Base in the theory put forward by Islamic politic sosiologist, the relationship theory of religion and state are gruped into 3 namely : unified paradigm, symbolic paradigm, and secularistic paradigm.The conclusion in this research is penetration of the thought of intolerance with anti-Pancasila and NKRI among educated people goes through religious studies that conducted in workplace, or in the campus trhrough da'wah institution, and also through religious activitivies in schools.

Maintes fois sa disparition a été annoncée. Pourtant, le monde agricole résiste et les mobilisations qu'il déclenche bouleversent régulièrement l'agenda poli-tique des gouvernants. Que l'enjeu soit la distribution des terres ou le mode de production, ces mouvements de protestation prennent parfois un tour radical : une représentation partisane, située à un extrême de l'échiquier politique ; le recours à des moyens d'action pouvant déboucher sur la violence. Certains s'inscrivent dans la ligne d'une extrême droite nationaliste, nostalgique d'un âge d'or mythique ; d'autres, héritiers de la révolution sociale, luttent pour un monde plus égalitaire. Parfois encore, on réactive les mythes de libération nationale. Quelle est l'origine de ces protestations paysannes ? Tantôt des politiques de développement fondées sur des principes technocratiques de production-ces politiques susciteraient alors des résistances à une modernisation peu respectueuse des traditions de sociabilité et des modes de vie ancestraux ; tantôt le retrait de l'État et l'abandon de la question agricole, notamment foncière, aux seules lois du marché. Pareil immobilisme-même assorti de promesses de réformes dans un but de justice sociale-nourrit des attentes.

Maintes fois sa disparition a été annoncée. Pourtant, le monde agricole résiste et les mobilisations qu'il déclenche bouleversent régulièrement l'agenda poli-tique des gouvernants. Que l'enjeu soit la distribution des terres ou le mode de production, ces mouvements de protestation prennent parfois un tour radical : une représentation partisane, située à un extrême de l'échiquier politique ; le recours à des moyens d'action pouvant déboucher sur la violence. Certains s'inscrivent dans la ligne d'une extrême droite nationaliste, nostalgique d'un âge d'or mythique ; d'autres, héritiers de la révolution sociale, luttent pour un monde plus égalitaire. Parfois encore, on réactive les mythes de libération nationale. Quelle est l'origine de ces protestations paysannes ? Tantôt des politiques de développement fondées sur des principes technocratiques de production-ces politiques susciteraient alors des résistances à une modernisation peu respectueuse des traditions de sociabilité et des modes de vie ancestraux ; tantôt le retrait de l'État et l'abandon de la question agricole, notamment foncière, aux seules lois du marché. Pareil immobilisme-même assorti de promesses de réformes dans un but de justice sociale-nourrit des attentes.

Maintes fois sa disparition a été annoncée. Pourtant, le monde agricole résiste et les mobilisations qu'il déclenche bouleversent régulièrement l'agenda poli-tique des gouvernants. Que l'enjeu soit la distribution des terres ou le mode de production, ces mouvements de protestation prennent parfois un tour radical : une représentation partisane, située à un extrême de l'échiquier politique ; le recours à des moyens d'action pouvant déboucher sur la violence. Certains s'inscrivent dans la ligne d'une extrême droite nationaliste, nostalgique d'un âge d'or mythique ; d'autres, héritiers de la révolution sociale, luttent pour un monde plus égalitaire. Parfois encore, on réactive les mythes de libération nationale. Quelle est l'origine de ces protestations paysannes ? Tantôt des politiques de développement fondées sur des principes technocratiques de production-ces politiques susciteraient alors des résistances à une modernisation peu respectueuse des traditions de sociabilité et des modes de vie ancestraux ; tantôt le retrait de l'État et l'abandon de la question agricole, notamment foncière, aux seules lois du marché. Pareil immobilisme-même assorti de promesses de réformes dans un but de justice sociale-nourrit des attentes.

The clash between radicalism and loyalism in the early industrial revolution period created the basic progressive-conservative political divide that was to structure British politics until the fall of communism. This is the perspective of Gareth Stedman Jones in his recent book An End to Poverty, which for a landmark work by a major historian has received surprisingly little notice.(1) Discussing it at a seminar in Manchester, Stedman Jones remarked that he couldn't really fathom pre-Chartist popular radicalism – a disarming confession from the author of Languages of Class. He was talking about the early 19th-century generation, between the Paineites and the Chartists, and he had put his finger on something: the popular politics of the early industrial revolution just don't fit progressive models. This is particularly true (oddly enough) in Lancashire, the home of the factory system.

International audience "In 1995, the Presses universitaires de France re-published (for the very first time in French) Elie Halévy's classic book La formation du radicalisme philosophique (first edition 1901–4). Startlingly, in the afterword of volume 1, Jean-Pierre Dupuy explained that even if this book on Bentham and his school of thought has been considered a classic and one of the first serious historical studies in any language, Halévy had been a "bad interpreter" of utilitarianism. (.)"

Historians of Haiti have tended to focus on the Haitian Revolution, the U.S. occupation and the Duvalier regime, leaving room for Matthew Smith to pioneer a study of turbulent politics and conflict in post-occupation Haiti. The complexity of the political changes in post-occupation Haiti from 1934-1957 led Smith to interrogate new sources in order to provide a more complete history of this period, building upon works such as David Nicholls' From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour, and National Independence in Haiti and Michel-Rolph Trouillot's Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism. Smith's book provides a broader perspective on Haitian politics by arguing that these radical movements were more complex than color differences that David Nicholls noted. Smith's methodology successfully employs the use of archival research, audio-visual sources, and interviews with participants in radical political movements of this era, demonstrating the thorough research the author has conducted to complete this book. The colors red and black in Smith's title refer to the Marxist and noiriste movements respectively and Smith's book examines how they transformed Haiti's political culture. Although these radical movements had a great impact on Haitian politics, they failed to move beyond their own internal rivalries to establish a strong independent future for post-occupied Haiti.

Dr Kehinde Andrews has appeared on BBC Newsnight (from 32 mins) to discuss his forthcoming book Back to Black: Retelling Black Radicalism. In a conversation with presenter Emily Maitlis, Dr Andrews explains the radical significance of the Haitian revolution, pan-Africanism and the politics of civil rights leader Malcolm X.

Eritrea's long liberation war and today the Kivu war provide two illustrations of what may be an explanation of the extreme violence observed in many contemporary conflicts, including (but not limited to) Africa: on the one hand, the disconnection between local rationalities and the goals expressed by "national" leaders; on the other hand, a weak or destabilising state experience among those involved in armed movements who have often switched into war for perfectly 'rational' motivations and then, as the conflict proceeds, struggle to build a political goal that is easily deciphable. However, the societies or groups that are at the heart of the deadly conflicts rarely choose the anomaly and try, with various and often extremely fragile successes, to rebuild a social bond that war has dissolved. ; [The atomization of ends and the radicalism of means. On certain African conflicts] The long war of liberation in Eritrea and today's war in Kivu provide two illustrations of a possible explanation for the extreme violence that occurs in numerous contemporary conflicts, most notably (but not only) in Africa. This involves, on the one hand, the disparity between local rationalities and the stated aims of "national" leaders and, on the other, a weak or destabilizing experience of the state among those involved in armed movements. Thus combatants often engage in war for perfectly "rational" reasons; however, as the conflict drags on, they find it difficult to construct clear political objectives. Societies or groups living in the midst of the most murderous conflicts rarely remain inert; they attempt, with varying and extremely fragile success rates, to reconstitute social bonds that war has destroyed. ; Eritrea's long liberation war and today the Kivu war provide two illustrations of what may be an explanation of the extreme violence observed in many contemporary conflicts, including (but not limited to) Africa: on the one hand, the disconnection between local rationalities and the goals expressed by "national" leaders; ...

[The atomization of ends and the radicalism of means. On certain African conflicts] The long war of liberation in Eritrea and today's war in Kivu provide two illustrations of a possible explanation for the extreme violence that occurs in numerous contemporary conflicts, most notably (but not only) in Africa. This involves, on the one hand, the disparity between local rationalities and the stated aims of "national" leaders and, on the other, a weak or destabilizing experience of the state among those involved in armed movements. Thus combatants often engage in war for perfectly "rational" reasons; however, as the conflict drags on, they find it difficult to construct clear political objectives. Societies or groups living in the midst of the most murderous conflicts rarely remain inert; they attempt, with varying and extremely fragile success rates, to reconstitute social bonds that war has destroyed. ; La longue guerre de libération de l'Érythrée et celle, aujourd'hui, du Kivu fournissent deux illustrations de ce qui est peut-être une explication de la violence extrême observée dans maints conflits contemporains, notamment (mais pas seulement) africains : d'une part, la déconnexion entre des rationalités locales et les buts affichés par les leaders "nationaux" ; d'autre part, une expérience de l'État faible ou déstabilisante chez les acteurs des mouvements armés qui, souvent, ont basculé dans la guerre pour des motivations parfaitement "rationnelles" pour ensuite, au fil du conflit, peiner à construire un objectif politique aisément déchiffrable. Reste que les sociétés ou les groupes qui sont au cœur des conflits les plus meurtriers font rarement le choix de l'anomie et essaient, avec des succès divers et le plus souvent extrêmement fragiles, de reconstituer un lien social que la guerre a dissous.