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Title Page -- Table of Contents -- PREFATORY NOTE. -- KANT'S INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC. -- I. - CONCEPTION OF LOGIC. -- II. - CHIEF DIVISIONS OF LOGIC-TREATMENT-USE OF THIS SCIENCE-SKETCH OF A HISTORY OF LOGIC. -- III. - CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL-PHILOSOPHY CONSIDERED ACCORDING TO THE SCHOLASTIC CONCEPTION AND ACCORDING TO THE COSMICAL CONCEPTION-ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS AND OBJECTS OF PHILOSOPHIZING-THE MOST GENERAL AND HIGHEST PROBLEMS OF THIS SCIENCE. -- IV. - SHORT SKETCH OF A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. -- V. - KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL-INTUITIVE AND DISCURSIVE KNOWLEDGE-INTUITION AND CONCEPT, AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM-LOGICAL AND AESTHETICAL PERFECTION OF KNOWLEDGE. -- VI. - SPECIAL LOGICAL PERFECTIONS OF COGNITION. -- VII. -- VIII. -- IX. -- X. - PROBABILITY-DEFINITION OF PROBABILITY-DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROBABILITY AND VERISIMILITUDE-MATHEMATICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBABILITY-DOUBT, SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE-SCEPTICAL, DOGMATICAL, AND CRITICAL METHOD OF PHILOSOPHIZING-HYPOTHESES. -- APPENDIX. - OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE. -- THE MISTAKEN SUBTILTY OF THE FOUR SYLLOGISTIC FIGURES. - (FIRST PUBLISHED, 1762.) -- SECTION I. - General Conception of the Nature of Ratiocination. -- SECTION II. - Of the Supreme Rules of all Ratiocination. -- SECTION III. - Of Pure and Mixed Ratiocination. -- SECTION IV. - In the so-called First Figure Pure Ratiocinations only are possible, in the remaining Figures only mixed. -- SECTION V. - The Logical Division of the Four Figures is a Mistaken Subtilty. -- SECTION VI. - Concluding Observation. -- NOTES BY COLERIDGE. -- Notes -- Copyright Page

This paper demonstrates how Mary Astell's version of Cartesian dualism supports her disavowal of female subordination and traditional gender roles, her rejection of Locke's notion of "thinking matter" as a major premise for rejecting his political philosophy of "social contracts" between men and women, and, finally, her claim that there is no intrinsic difference between genders in terms of ratiocination, the primary assertion that grants her the title of the first female English feminist.

AbstractWhy is someone enduringly prized as a philosopher? To answer this question, this historical case study examines the intersecting careers of John Rawls and R. M. Hare. It looks at their writings, a complex chain of disagreements, the argumentative dimension. The essay moreover explores the clash of differing temperaments. Finally, themes in addition to ratiocination and personality are factored in: the leanings of the institutions that control access to intellectual endeavor; the public square—politics widely conceived—into which the two men were thrown; and the cultural rivalry between England and America after World War Two.

" Our world's cultural circles are permeated by the philosophical influences of existentialism and phenomenology. Two contemporary quests to elucidate rationality - took their inspirations from Kierkegaard's existentialism plumbing the subterranean source of subjective experience and Husserl's phenomenology focusing on the constitutive aspect of rationality. Yet, both contrary directions mingled readily in common vindication of full reality. In the inquisitive minds (Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Stein, Merleau-Ponty, et al.), a fruitful cross-pollination of insights, ideas, approaches, fused in one powerful wave disseminating throughout all domains of thought. Existentialist rejection of ratiocination and speculation together with Husserl's shift to the genesis of rapproches philosophy and literature (Wahl, Marcel, Berdyaev, Wojtyla, Tischner, etc.), while the foundational underpinnings of language (Wittgenstein, Derrida, etc.) opened the ""hidden"" behind the ""veils"" (Sezgin and Dominguez-Rey)."

That politics should not be a matter either of impulse and whim or of pure ratiocination, hardly anyone will dispute. But there is no settled agreement on the precise role that reason should play in political decisions. Disagreement is aggravated because those who have written on the question usually intended to correct some prevalent error and in their fervor have often fostered other, equally pernicious, errors. As a result, discussion about the nature of political reasoning has tended to oscillate between extreme positions that hardly anyone would uphold consistently. This tendency is illustrated once again in the recent attacks on Rationalism, where the authors, in criticizing the Rationalist misuse of reason, seem to identify all abstract reasoning with Rationalism and appear to distrust all general principles.

The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is rightly considered as marking the end of one era in political theory and the beginning of a new one. Formerly, men had sought and found a guide to political conduct in a basic principle upon which the order of well-being of the state depended. Hobbes broke with the past by postulating the state as simply a rationalization of the needs of men. He analyzed man's psychology and relied on his own observation and ratiocination to establish the best possible state commensurate with mankind's situation, but his supreme emphasis on force and authority left no room for the older constitutional, religious, and traditional safeguards of the citizen. This was the price that Hobbes willingly paid to achieve a secure state during the English Civil War.

Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Overview of the argument -- Methodology -- 1 The Trouble with Force -- A first origin -- A second origin -- A third origin -- 2 Tracing the Logic of Force: Roger Bacon's De Multiplicatione specierum -- Bacon's logic of force -- The metaphysics of species -- Tracing the logic of force -- 3 Creation, Order and Violence in Thomas Aquinas -- Aquinas on violent causation -- Divine power, divine violence -- The order of the universe and the overcoming of force -- Conclusion -- 4 Albertus Magnus and Nicole Oresme on Force and Nature -- Albertus Magnus on place and force -- Oresme and the primacy of force -- The force of nature -- 5 Knowledge and Power in the Thought of Pierre d'Ailly -- Knowing what we can -- Sensation and evidence -- The power of God -- Conclusion -- 6 Hobbes' Logic of Force: The Phenomenon of Motion and the Capacities of Ratiocination -- Introduction -- Hobbes and phenomena -- The task of reason -- Reason, phenomenality, politics -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.

This article attempts to uncover a foundational drive in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and its importance in steeping the tension of the philosophical link of culture and African Philosophy. In his work Gadamer presents culture as the foundation of philosophy. Okere rising from the latter posits that hermeneutics is the mediator between culture and African philosophy. The polemical argument of the rationality of African philosophy though interwoven with skeptical epistemological assumptions which increasingly emphasizes in the ethno decade-long debate is aggregated in mediating stance of hermeneutics as adduced by Okere and other notable African scholars. This article shows that in his most popularity oriented epistemological work, Gadamer did not mute the obstacles that epistemic uncertainty poses to the quest for mere ethno dimension in the light of critical ratiocination in order to avoid acceptance of views without examination .This article pursues this mediating strategy not just for rhetorical but also for a substantive reason on the rational foundation of African Philosophy against the nauseating position that African philosophy is mere cultural beliefs.
Keywords: Hermeneutics, Culture and Mediation

Post-normal science (PNS) is presented by its proponents as a new way of doing science that deals with uncertainties, value diversity or antagonism, and high decision stakes and urgency, with the ultimate goal of remedying the pathologies of the global industrial system for which, according to Funtowicz and Ravetz, existing science forms the basis. The authors critically examine whether PNS can fulfill this claim in the light of empirical and theoretical work on politics and policy making. The authors credit PNS as an innovative frontrunner in raising important issues regarding the limited problem-solving capacity of ''normal science'' and ''professional consultancy.'' Yet, the authors notice that PNS lacks important considerations about the governance of problems and aspects of participatory and deliberative democracy. PNS in effect implies that methodological ''ratiocination'' would prevail over political deliberation and democratic interaction and that merely changing scientific input in public policy making would have the power to change its outcomes. This scientistic hubris can be traced back to PNS's origin in concerned scientists' activism, which in effect accessed the political arena through the scientific entrance. The authors conclude that the art of politics needs to come back into the discussion on environmental problems if societal change is to occur.