Suchergebnisse

An analysis of the psychol'al meaning of `rationality' to provide 'a framework within which the bases of internat'l att's can be more meaningfully interpreted than by recourse to superficial labels.' Rational act's are those that develop as logical consequences of the perceived relation of the event to one's values. Rationality implies both cognitive consistency & empirical validity. Non-rational att's, on the other hand, result from influences outside the individual's cognitive system. Thus, rather than 2 distinct types of people, two ideal types of thought process are seen. 2 pressures operate in the direction of the rationality of att structures: (1) those arising from the person's intimate contact with the event system to which the attitude structure refers, & (2) soc pressures toward cognitive consistency within Western culture. Influences toward nonrationality stem from: (a) the unconscious personality structure, & (b) soc systems in which the individual interacts. Thus, 'it would appear quite plausible that att's toward internat'l events maintained by the average citizen carry a strong flavor of non-rationality' because: (i) it is virtually impossible for the average individual to test empirically the applicability of his att's to the events themselves, & (ii) the realm of foreign affairs is generally remote from the most pressing concerns of individuals. I. Taviss.

The experience of modern totalitarian regimes suggests that they are not likely to perish through internal revolt unless that occurs at a time when the totalitarian regime is in mortal danger from an external challenge, as in the marginal Italian case, or these the totalitarian movement in power is about to undertake decisive measures to turn the country into a totalitarian system, as in the case of the counter-revolution against Peron in Argentina. Other than that, and even considering the succession crises, modern totalitarian regimes have shown themselves capable of maintaining their totalitarian character in spite of domestic and foreign opposition. More recently it has been argued (e.g., by I. Deutscher, Russia: What Next) that modern totalitarian regimes, if not overthrown by external forces, will nevertheless in the end be quietly and inevitably transformed into more democratic states by the subtler but irresistible influence of rationality inherent in the bureaucratic and managerial apparatus that no modern state can do without. This proposition will be developed more fully and given critical consideration in subsequent pages in order to test whether rationality, regarded in this context as a certain mode of thought and behavior induced by the requirements of modern industrialized and bureaucratized societies, is in fact incompatible with modern totalitarianism.

The distinctive quality of totalitarianism is its institutionalized revolutionary zeal. It is this feature which distinguishes it from other dictatorial systems. It can be defined as a system where technologically advanced instruments of pol'al power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total soc revolution, including the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire pop. The totalitarian qualities of the system manifest themselves some time after the seizure of power, when the regime proceeds to engage in soc engineering according to its ideological predispositions. It is then that some of the 'irrational' aberrations of totalitarianism, such as terror, manifest themselves. Nonetheless, these 'irrational' qualities are not inherent in all phases of totalitarian development & a 'rational' totalitarianism can be conceived, without the 'rational' features produced for instance by technocratic considerations leading inevitably towards a democratic development. The factors which would prevent such an evolution are the party, the ideology & the goal-oriented & centrally directed economy. Furthermore, the pol'al process itself cannot be fully made subject to technocratic rationality. (AA-IPSA). Adapted from the source document.

It is a truism that all action within the international system can be reduced to the action of individuals. It is also true, however, that international relations cannot be adequately understood in terms of individual attitudes and behaviors. Models of the international system usually deal with larger units, nation-states, as prime actors. To what extent can such models give us adequate explanations of international relations without some built-in variables to deal with individual decision-making?It may be that some processes in international relations can be adequately explained on the level of social structure without explicit consideration of the personality, predispositions, attitudes, and behavior of the individual decision-maker. In that case, the introduction of variables dealing with individual behavior would complicate the model without commensurate payoff in terms of increased understanding and prediction. This would be true if the impact of individual decision-making on the behavior of nations in their relations with other nations were slight, or if the impact varied randomly (because, for instance, of idiosyncratic factors) among the population of international events that one was trying to explain. If, on the other hand, models of the international system that either ignore or make grossly simplifying assumptions about individual decision-making can explain international relations only very imperfectly, it may well be worth the additional effort to build variables about individual decision-making into them.

How to carry forward a rational and progressive encyclopedism while preserving the intellectual heri tage of the past is the primary question raised by the author, now Senior Political Scientist at Stanford Re search Institute and formerly Assistant to the Chair man of the Board of Editors of Encyclopaedia Bri tannica.