Suchergebnisse

Cilj ove doktorske disertacije jeste da pruži argumente u prilog epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije. Tvrdićemo da zbog toga što čisto proceduralno opravdanje definiše autoritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, ono ne može biti adekvatno objašnjenje za sve ono do čega nam je u demokratiji istinski stalo. Ljudima je u demokratiji veoma važan i sam ishod demokratskog procesa. Legitimost demokratske procedure, dakle, zavisi i od kvaliteta odluka koje ta procedura proizvodi. Uspon epistemičkih teorija o demokratiji je u skladu sa porastom popularnosti ideje o "mudrosti gomile" koju pronalazimo u različitim oblastima istraživanja. Zbog toga ćemo se osvrnuti na razvoj i rezultate organizacione teorije i predstaviti psihološke nalaze o kapacitetima ljudskog rasuđivanja. Instrumentalne ili epistemičke teorije tvrde da je demokratija legitimna ako i samo ako ima tendenciju da nas dovede do "dobrih" ili "istinitih" političkih odluka. Tvrdićemo da ono što omogućava da demokratsko odlučivanje, pod određenim uslovima, ima veću epistemičku vrednost od alternativnih formi odlučivanja jeste postojanje kognitivne raznovrsnosti unutar grupe koja donosi političke odluke. Pružićemo teorijske i empirijske argumente u prilog epistemičke vrednosti kolektivnog, demokratkog donošenja odluka. Ukazaćemo na značaj političkih institucija koje mogu da omoguće prisustvo kognitivne raznovrsnosti i povećaju nivo pojedinačne kompetencije opšte javnosti. Takođe ćemo tvrditi da je neophodno kombinovati deliberativnu i agregativnu metodu, i to upravo tim redosledom, s obzirom da i jedna i druga imaju važne epistemičke karakteristike. ; The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to provide arguments in support of the epistemic justification of democracy. We will argue that because a purely procedural justification defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself, it can not be an adequate explanation for all the things we really care about in democracy. The outcome of the democratic process itself is very important to people in democracy. The legitimacy of a democratic procedure, therefore, depends on the quality of the decisions that this procedure produces. The rise of epistemic theories about democracy is in line with the increasing popularity of the idea of the "wisdom of the crowds" that we find in various fields of research. Therefore, we will look at the development and results of organizational theory and present psychological findings about human reasoning capacities. Instrumental or epistemic theories claim that democracy is legitimate if and only if it has a tendency to lead us to "good" or "true" political decisions. We will argue that what allows democratic decision-making, under certain conditions, to have a higher epistemic value than alternative forms of decision-making is the existence of the cognitive diversity of a group that makes political decisions. We will provide theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of the epistemic value of collective, democratic decision-making. We will point out the importance of political institutions that can enable the presence of cognitive diversity and increase the level of individual competence of the general public. We will also argue that it is necessary to combine a deliberative and aggregative method, precisely in this order, given that both of them have important epistemic characteristics.

Cilj ove doktorske disertacije jeste da pruži argumente u prilog epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije. Tvrdićemo da zbog toga što čisto proceduralno opravdanje definiše autoritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, ono ne može biti adekvatno objašnjenje za sve ono do čega nam je u demokratiji istinski stalo. Ljudima je u demokratiji veoma važan i sam ishod demokratskog procesa. Legitimost demokratske procedure, dakle, zavisi i od kvaliteta odluka koje ta procedura proizvodi. Uspon epistemičkih teorija o demokratiji je u skladu sa porastom popularnosti ideje o "mudrosti gomile" koju pronalazimo u različitim oblastima istraživanja. Zbog toga ćemo se osvrnuti na razvoj i rezultate organizacione teorije i predstaviti psihološke nalaze o kapacitetima ljudskog rasuđivanja. Instrumentalne ili epistemičke teorije tvrde da je demokratija legitimna ako i samo ako ima tendenciju da nas dovede do "dobrih" ili "istinitih" političkih odluka. Tvrdićemo da ono što omogućava da demokratsko odlučivanje, pod određenim uslovima, ima veću epistemičku vrednost od alternativnih formi odlučivanja jeste postojanje kognitivne raznovrsnosti unutar grupe koja donosi političke odluke. Pružićemo teorijske i empirijske argumente u prilog epistemičke vrednosti kolektivnog, demokratkog donošenja odluka. Ukazaćemo na značaj političkih institucija koje mogu da omoguće prisustvo kognitivne raznovrsnosti i povećaju nivo pojedinačne kompetencije opšte javnosti. Takođe ćemo tvrditi da je neophodno kombinovati deliberativnu i agregativnu metodu, i to upravo tim redosledom, s obzirom da i jedna i druga imaju važne epistemičke karakteristike. ; The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to provide arguments in support of the epistemic justification of democracy. We will argue that because a purely procedural justification defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself, it can not be an adequate explanation for all the things we really care about in democracy. The outcome of the democratic process itself is very important to people in democracy. The legitimacy of a democratic procedure, therefore, depends on the quality of the decisions that this procedure produces. The rise of epistemic theories about democracy is in line with the increasing popularity of the idea of the "wisdom of the crowds" that we find in various fields of research. Therefore, we will look at the development and results of organizational theory and present psychological findings about human reasoning capacities. Instrumental or epistemic theories claim that democracy is legitimate if and only if it has a tendency to lead us to "good" or "true" political decisions. We will argue that what allows democratic decision-making, under certain conditions, to have a higher epistemic value than alternative forms of decision-making is the existence of the cognitive diversity of a group that makes political decisions. We will provide theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of the epistemic value of collective, democratic decision-making. We will point out the importance of political institutions that can enable the presence of cognitive diversity and increase the level of individual competence of the general public. We will also argue that it is necessary to combine a deliberative and aggregative method, precisely in this order, given that both of them have important epistemic characteristics.

Husserl's concept and definition of the living world represents a sort of the pinnacle of his later philosophical works. In the form of a new universal science - transcedental phenomenology - and by defining the living world as - for us - immediate and contiguous world, the known and acknowledged inter-subjectivity, Husserl provides a critique of the modern age i.e. the domination of the paradigm of the objectivist sciences. Husserl's phenomenology also delves into the equally central political and social problems of the contemporary age; Husserl calls for the establishment of a new rationality in judging social and political issues. Particular attention i given to Husserl's vehement critique of anti-liberalism as well as his novel relation "I - We", i. e. the individual and the community or the state. (SOI : PM: S. 153)

The methodological assumptions of the rational choice theory - methodological individualism and rationality - are not generally considered suitable for analyzing nations. Nevertheless, if we accept that the political process is at least partially rational, and that nation building and change is part of that process, this will provide an opening to look at nations from the unorthodox perspective of rational choice. The club theory, as part of the rational choice theory, offers great opportunities for establishing analogies between clubs and nations, and thus for shedding new light on some features of modern polities. Establishing a polity, by the club analogy, entails two basic selections: the selection of the members and the selection of a sovereign territory, that will serve to provide physical protection and material resources for its members. The choice of membership is in general based on the choice of desirable membership characteristics (usually cultural ones). The choice of a sovereign territory is linked to the decision on the part of the members to engage in a collective action in order to acquire the sovereign territory. (SOI : PM: S. 212)