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The ideas of J. Rawls (A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Cambridge, Mass, 1971) concerning social justice are compared with those of Marx regarding social conflict. Rawls' criterion of social justice is the "difference principle," contending that the goal of social institutions is to maximize the life prospects of those worst off in any society. He claims that fundamental questions concerning justice can be rationally settled from the original position, through "ideal contractualism," even though one's social position or special needs & interests are unknown. Rawls contends that the difference principle is also a "principle of mutual benefit" to all classes of society. However, Marxism holds 3 propositions: (1) the reduction of inequality demands class struggle; (2) the best-off class in a society is the ruling class; & (3) typically, ruling class members have a great need for wealth, power, & status. The commitment for society to accept the difference principle regarding social justice would require, according to Marx, moderate class conflict, no ruling class, & similar basic desires across classes. In short, Marx would contend that "the desire for stability would not make a commitment to help realize the difference principle more rational than a commitment, say, to utilitarianism hedged by a social minimum." G. Schmeling.

In dem Beitrag wird John Rawls' Maximinprinzip intertemporal interpretiert. Die Doktrin, die sich daraus ergibt, wird als eigenständige bewertet und füllt eine Lücke im Theoriegebäude von Rawls. Es werden Gründe angegeben, warum die Theorie wohl eher als eine nachträgliche Rechtfertigung für bereits existierende Institutionen, also als eine ex post-Legitimation aufzufassen ist, dann als ex ante-Legitimation jener Art, die durch den Begriff der "original situation" angedeutet ist. Mit diesem Theorievorschlag wird ein Beispiel vorgelegt von der Anwendung des auf Freiheiten bezogenen Maximinprinzips im Rawls'schen Test. Das Maximinprinzip, auch Differenzprinzip genannt, wird erklärt, um dann zwei mögliche Anwendungen dieses Prinzips zu untersuchen, und zwar zum einen die Unterscheidung zwischen der ökonomischen und der politischen Sphäre und zum anderen zwischen dem interpersonellen und dem intertemporalen Rechtsproblem. Einige Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede in den Anwendungsbereichen des Differenzierungsprinzips werden deutlich gemacht. Dann wird die intertemporale Verteilung politischer Freiheiten analysiert. Die Überlegungen zusammenfassend werden zwei Behauptungen über den Begriff der politischen Vorverpflichtung aufgestellt: (1) Nach der Exegese des Rawl'schen Buches füllt die Theorie eine Lücke in dem Gesamtgebäude. (2) Sie wird innerhalb dieses Gebäudes als ein plausibelste Teil angesehen. (RW)

THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND RAWLS AGAINST LEFT CRITICS BY MAINTAINING THAT RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE IS ESSENTIALLY COMPATIBLE WITH SOCIALIST THOUGHT AND IDEAS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE. THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE OF RAWLS IS INTERPRETED AS RULING OUT CAPITALISM AS JUST WHILE ADMITTING THE POSSIBILITY OF A JUST SOCIALISM. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARX AND RAWLS IS SEEN TO BE THAT THE FORMER IS FULLY PREPARED TO SACRIFICE JUSTICE AND THE MARKET TO COMMUNITY, THE LATTER BELIEVES THAT THE TWO CAN PEACEFULLY COEXIST.

Abstract
This is an examination of some Left critiques of Rawls. Stress is put, not on his underlying moral methodology, including his contractarianism, though surely there is need for such a critique as well, but on an examination of his principles of justice, particularly his equal liberty principle and his difference principle. This is often thought to be the heart of his theory. It is argued that Rawls' asociological and ahistorical approach and his ignoring of questions of power and of ideology and his lack of an adequate conceptualization of liberty lead to major distortions in his account. Both principles are shown to be problematic and the equal liberty principle is shown to be in conflict with the difference principle.