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The author describes the spiritual climate at the time of the publication of Rawis' A Theory of Justice (1971) & describes its huge impact on the political philosophy of the 20th century. Then he analyses Rawls' acknowledgement of Kant. First he depicts Rawls' formulation of his original position along the lines of Kant's idea of the autonomy of the individual & the categorical imperative. There might be some problems with the possible convergence of Rawls' economism & Kant's moral position. According to Rawis, the original position parties may express their nature, but at the same time they belong to the intelligible world. Raws has tried to overcome this divergence from Kant's concept in his paper Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory by means of distinguishing between the rational & the full autonomy, from which the author concludes that Rawis was inclined to adopt a certain version of utilitarianism. According to the author, Rawis' attempt to bridge Kant's rigorous distinction between the law & the morality by means of his sense of justice is entirely alien to Kant. Hence there is an unbridgable chasm between Kant & Rawis, which does not mean that Rawis' attempt at using Kant's categories in the design of democratic societies is insufficiently legitimate. 71 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author reviews the interchange between Jurgen Habermas & John Rawls, published in The Journal of Philosophy in Mar 1995. Habermas's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is constructive & immanent. Habermas raises three objections against Rawls's theory. The first is that Rawls's design of original position is not adequate to clarify & secure the standpoint of impartial judgment of the principles of justice. The second is that Rawls should make a sharper distinction between the question of justification & that of acceptance of a theory of justice. The third is that Rawls does not succeed in bringing the liberties of moderns into harmony with the liberties of pre-moderns. The first two of Habermas's objections reveal the main thought of his criticism of Rawls, which is that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is substantive, not procedural, & therefore is wrong. The third of Habermas's objections refers to a consequence of Rawls's theory of a rigid boundary between the political & non-political identities of citizens. In his reply to Habermas, Rawls emphasizes two main differences between his own & Habermas's theory. The first is that Habermas's theory is "comprehensive," while Rawls's is "political." The is that Habermas uses as means of representation the situation of ideal discourse, which is a part of his theory of communicative action, while Rawls uses the original position. Rawls answers in turn Habermas' objections & defends his liberal theory of justice as fairness as substantive justice. Adapted from the source document.

The author reviews the interchange between Jurgen Habermas & John Rawls, published in The Journal of Philosophy in Mar 1995. Habermas's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is constructive & immanent. Habermas raises three objections against Rawls's theory. The first is that Rawls's design of original position is not adequate to clarify & secure the standpoint of impartial judgment of the principles of justice. The second is that Rawls should make a sharper distinction between the question of justification & that of acceptance of a theory of justice. The third is that Rawls does not succeed in bringing the liberties of moderns into harmony with the liberties of pre-moderns. The first two of Habermas's objections reveal the main thought of his criticism of Rawls, which is that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is substantive, not procedural, & therefore is wrong. The third of Habermas's objections refers to a consequence of Rawls's theory of a rigid boundary between the political & non-political identities of citizens. In his reply to Habermas, Rawls emphasizes two main differences between his own & Habermas's theory. The first is that Habermas's theory is "comprehensive," while Rawls's is "political." The is that Habermas uses as means of representation the situation of ideal discourse, which is a part of his theory of communicative action, while Rawls uses the original position. Rawls answers in turn Habermas' objections & defends his liberal theory of justice as fairness as substantive justice. Adapted from the source document.

The author describes the communitarian critique of John Rawls, mostly that by Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice (1983). The main communitarian objection to Rawls's theory of justice is that it is objectivistic & thus a modern variant of Platonism. Contrary to this attitude, Walzer insists on the theory of justice which takes as its starting point particular values of a society or culture & tries to formulate a critique of the American society as a community subject to "market imperialism." The response by Rawls & other liberals to the communitarian critique has proved that his theory is neither Platonic, transcendentally Kantian, nor abstractly objectivistic. Rawls & liberals are aware that their principles of justice have come into being within a specific European tradition of democratic constitutionalism, but that those principles aspire toward achieving universality, at least in those communities that are willing to accept a democratic constitutional system. Adapted from the source document.

The author's starting point is the argument that Rawls cannot be a Kantian, because he -- unlike Kant -- was faced with the pluralism of the contemporary innovative society, in which individuals are not divided into the existential winners & losers solely on the basis of different traditions but also of different innovations. Rawls thinks that this fact of pluralism may only be a posteriori politically regulated in a way that it is permanently cultivated to the level of political, moral, & legal order, acceptable for citizens, which gives legitimacy to the inequalities among them. Individuals are thus linked into a political community by means of justice understood as fairness. In this type of justice, citizens allow for the inequalities because they live in uncertainty or vagueness, which the author considers to be conditio humana in the innovative society. Under such circumstances. the author concludes, fairness is an ability to cope with ail unfamiliar injustice. 7 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author outlines the chief features of the constructivist moral conception in its Kantian variant & argues that such a moral conception had been unjustifiably looked over in relation to the traditional moral conceptions such as utilitariarism, intuitionism & perfectionism. The central idea of Kantian constructivism is linking certain notions of the person & principles of justice that should regulate basic social institutions by means of the constructivist procedure. The author's starting point is the conception of moral persons as free & equal. He claims that an appropriate connection among thus perceived persons & the first principles of justice is established in such a way that the first principles are chosen under reasonable conditions in which individuals possess solely such qualities. The reasonable conditions consist of the symmetrical situatedness of the "choosers," the veil of ignorance (which obscures the morally irrelevant features of persons' attributes) & the publicity condition. The author's goal is to reach a proper viewpoint on the basis of which citizens are to judge their fundamental social institutions & in that way achieve consensus on the need for & the direction of their reform. Adapted from the source document.

The author compares Hobbes' state of nature & Rawls' original position in an attempt to answer the question: How to arrive at a community starting from individualistic premises? The comparison shows a striking similarity between Hobbes' & Rawls' initial positions showing itself in the radical equality of the denizens in both "states of nature" & the insistence on the part of both authors to secure recognition of such equality. The essentially similar conditions in the state of nature suggest that the difference between their "social contracts" should lie in the other parts of their theories. The decisive differences lie in Rawls' assumption that individuals are motivated by a sense of justice (much stronger than in Hobbes' theory) that enables a choice of principles of justice in Rawls' state of nature. The agreement on principles is an expression of human sociability, while an agreement on a sovereign is a concession to human unsociability. 17 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author compares Hobbes' state of nature & Rawls' original position in an attempt to answer the question: How to arrive at a community starting from individualistic premises? The comparison shows a striking similarity between Hobbes' & Rawls' initial positions showing itself in the radical equality of the denizens in both "states of nature" & the insistence on the part of both authors to secure recognition of such equality. The essentially similar conditions in the state of nature suggest that the difference between their "social contracts" should lie in the other parts of their theories. The decisive differences lie in Rawls' assumption that individuals are motivated by a sense of justice (much stronger than in Hobbes' theory) that enables a choice of principles of justice in Rawls' state of nature. The agreement on principles is an expression of human sociability, while an agreement on a sovereign is a concession to human unsociability. 17 References. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper, the author has tried to describe the relationship between Rawls's concept of the person, social cooperation, & political education. Rawls precisely links political education with the liberal political outlook & not to life in general. Hence, the importance for his theory of the notion of "reasonable pluralism" & the reasonably disagreeing conceptions of a good life. The author has tried to show that, for Rawls, it is the concept of the reasonable individual that is the goal of political education, ie, the ability of a person to adopt the fundamental principles of justice as the conditions for social cooperation, while the "burdens of judgment" are the source & the framework of fundamental political virtues (toleration, respect, reciprocity, politeness, etc) that Rawls promotes & considers important for the idea of the public reason, ie, a sort of deliberative democracy, as well as for the very existence & stability of a political system. Thus, Rawls got involved in the debate on the conception of liberal virtues & the possibility of their political socialization & education. 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author presents MacIntyre's thematization of modernity within the frame of moral theory. His thesis is that in modern times -- the "after virtue" age, (understood from the Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective) -- emotivism remains the only way to establish morality. Rorty thinks that the Platonic way of thinking has exhausted itself & pleads for flexible hermeneutics as a mediator among different philosophical orientations without any pretension to reconcile them, as "commensurabilism" does. In spite of these thematic similarities, MacIntyre's emotivism, which ends in communitarianism & the thesis of the primacy of community in human existence, is contrary to Rorty's liberalism, which emphasizes society built on individuals. Rorty makes a step further & looks for the interspace that he finds in what John Rawls calls, in his later works, "liberal community.". Adapted from the source document.

The author presents MacIntyre's thematization of modernity within the frame of moral theory. His thesis is that in modern times -- the "after virtue" age, (understood from the Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective) -- emotivism remains the only way to establish morality. Rorty thinks that the Platonic way of thinking has exhausted itself & pleads for flexible hermeneutics as a mediator among different philosophical orientations without any pretension to reconcile them, as "commensurabilism" does. In spite of these thematic similarities, MacIntyre's emotivism, which ends in communitarianism & the thesis of the primacy of community in human existence, is contrary to Rorty's liberalism, which emphasizes society built on individuals. Rorty makes a step further & looks for the interspace that he finds in what John Rawls calls, in his later works, "liberal community.". Adapted from the source document.

A number of interpreters & critics have often complained that Rawls's concept of the individual contains an element of schizophrenia. How is it possible that privately a person is a staunch believer in a moral doctrine, while publicly adopting the principles of political liberalism? The author tries to show how Rawls's concept of the overlapping consensus might avoid this objection. The paper brings two major critiques of Rawls's overlapping consensus: Gray's & Barry's. John Gray claims that the very pursuit of such a consensus is illusory; instead, he advocates a modus vivendi. According to him, the consensus promoted by Rawls is unfeasible even in the US due to the emergence of the so-called "moral majority," & the fact that a huge portion of the population practices rather bigoted variants of Christianity. Brian Barry criticizes Rawls because of his renunciation of his original position, which is apparent in his problematic search for the support from comprehensive doctrines. This maneuver is ill-advised, as it is hard to believe that those citizens who are ardent partisans of a comprehensive doctrine might simply "graft" political liberalism upon it & then, in case of a conflict between their concepts of the good & the justice that political liberalism requires, accept the primacy of justice. The author claims that these criticisms could not be refuted had Rawls believed that the overlapping consensus might be realized in the near future. Rawls, however, is not unrealistic; he only provides arguments why such a consensus might be possible. Rawls finds the grounds for his optimism in the belief that just institutions drastically advance the sense of justice. This means that those who would in the future embrace the overlapping consensus would not have to be schizophrenic after all. 6 References. Adapted from the source document.

John Rawls has revised his theory of justice in recent works & turned it into a theory of political liberalism. This article analyzes three basic aspects of that theory as the theory of (political) fairness & attempts to document the consequences of the application of Rawls's concept of political liberalism as a transcendental framework for a rational political debate within the Croatian political context. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the design of Rawls's liberal project via his idea of justice as the primary virtue of social institutions. Rawls thinks that what is just must have primacy over what is good, by which he has revitalized the deontological ethics. Rawls's deontological liberalism is based on the conviction that a plural society is possible if we stick to the principle of the primacy of what is just & by this limit the various concepts of the good. In his critique, Sandet highlights the pro & contra arguments of the deontological ethics, but concludes that it is impossible to save Rawls's deontological liberalism since it cannot be consistently derived. John Gray's criticism of Rawls is threefold: first, Gray claims that Rawls's concept of the individual is taken out of its cultural-historical context & thus represents a vestige of the Enlightenment project fallacy; second, Gray argues that Rawls fell for the misconception of the primacy of the law over the good, because law without substance provided by a concept of the good would be hollow; & third, Gray says that Rawls substituted the sphere of the political by law, which makes his political liberalism essentially antipolitical. The author concludes that it is not essential for the idea of justice to occupy a privileged position as the ultimate valorization of a society, & in that sense it cannot be imperative & obligatory. 14 References. Adapted from the source document.