Suchergebnisse

Dopo una rapida analisi delle nozioni di merito e di meritocrazia, il saggio esamina la teoria della giustizia come equità al fine di verificare la tesi di Rawls secondo cui quella teoria non condurrebbe a un assetto sociale meritocratico. Nel far ciò il saggio si sofferma in particolare a esaminare le implicazioni della teoria di Rawls per quanto riguarda la selezione delle persone cui assegnare impieghi e incarichi. Il saggio, inoltre, ricostruisce l'argomento con cui Rawls esclude che vi sia alcun dovere etico fondamentale di attribuire certi beni in un modo che tenga conto dei meriti delle persone e sostiene che un tale argomento non sia in grado di escludere l'esistenza di un dovere etico fondamentale di distribuire il prodotto del lavoro sociale in un modo che tenga conto, almeno in parte, dell'impegno delle persone e del loro contributo al benessere della collettività. ; After a brief analysis of the notions of merit and meritocracy, the paper examines the theory of justice as fairness in order to assess Rawls's claim that his theory would not lead to a meritocratic society. In doing so, the paper focuses in particular on the implications of Rawls's theory regarding the allocation of jobs. The essay also reconstructs the argument Rawls uses to justify his claim that there is no fundamental ethical duty to assign certain goods in a way that takes into account the merits of people and argues that such an argument cannot exclude the existence of a fundamental ethical duty to distribute the product of social cooperation in a way that takes into account, at least in part, people's efforts and their contribution to the welfare of the community.

In this essay I discuss one of the objections raised by David Enoch in his recent Against Public Reason. According to Enoch, public-reason theorists misinterpret the role that rea-sons for the action play in the political sphere. Treating the most deeply held beliefs as mere preferences, public-reason theorists end up supporting a paternalistic view that vio-lates people's freedom and equality. In this essay I try to dismiss this charge, without de-fending the idea of public reason. The essay is divided into six parts. §1 introduces the problem with an example. §2 lays out the general idea of public reason. §3 illustrates Enoch's objection. §4 briefly introduces standard responses to the objection and Enoch's possible counter-arguments. §5, with the help of some formalization, explains how non-public reasons work, addresses Enoch's ob-jection, and present some doubt on the idea of public reason. §6 concludes.

Negli ultimi anni il dibattito circa i metodi della filosofia politica è stato caratterizzato dal moltiplicarsi di opzioni diverse in merito al rapporto tra teoria normativa e metaetica. In particolare ha avuto successo l'idea che le teorie normative siano autonome rispetto alle questioni filosofiche di secondo ordine. In questo articolo è presentato e discusso il dibattito sul quietismo, sia nella sua versione ridotta per cui la metaetica è di per sé normativa, sia in quella ampia, per cui considerazioni metaetiche sono inutili e controproducenti alla teoria normativa. Sullo sfondo di questo dibattito è presentata e discussa la posizione metodologica di Rawls. L'obiettivo è quello di capire se la proposta rawlsiana dell'indipendenza della teoria morale e del method of avoidance sia soddisfacente. Infine, un nuovo punto di vista sui benefici della metaetica per la teoria normativa viene presentato e difeso. ; In recent years the philosophical debate about the methods of political philosophy has been characterized by an increasing number of different options concerning the relation between normative theory and metaethics. In particular, the idea that normative theories are autonomous from second-order issues has gained great attention. In this article, the debate about quietism is presented and analysed, both in its restricted version, according to which metaetichs simply is part of normative theory, and in its broad one, according to which metaethical considerations are counterproductive for normative theories. Drawing from this debate, Rawls's methodological position is presented. The aim is to understand whether the rawlsian project about the independence of moral theory and the method of avoidance is satisfactory. In conclusion, a new point of view on the benefits metaethics can offer to normative theory is defended.

Constitutionalism and Islam are the theoretical framework of An- Na'im' Islamic reformation. This proposal is possible on the herme- neutic role of the naskh for a new interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunna, based on the principle of reciprocity. Is the An-Na'im's notion of civic reason a 'friendly amendment' to Rawls'idea of public reason? Making sense of the reciprocity and the reasonable as normative and moral ideal in the two thinkers, through the necessary dimension of the constitutionalism, can overcome their differences.

Re-reading Rawls' Introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism for an understanding of the "kantian turn". Difference between the "political conception of justice"and the pluralism of rea- sonable comprehensive doctrines. The relation between the criterion of reciprocity, reasonable (as intrinsic normative and moral ideal) and categorical imperative. This problem refers to the possibility of an interpretation of the original position in light of the reasonable. Primary goods and the "conception of free personality" as normative connotations of a constitutional democracy. Beginning with Ra- wls'teaching on categorical imperative in the Lectures at Harvard University.

In this review of Rawls' last publication two aims are pursued. First, an attempt is made to clarify how this new work makes the deep structure of the theory emerge, thus indicating the way the different arguments, assumptions and conceptions are strictly intertwined. The main point is to show that the overlapping consensus does not bear a foundational role, since justification rests on the combined work of reflective equilibrium and of the original position. The possibility of an overlapping consensus simply shows that the theory is neither utopian nor pointless. Second, an assessment is made about the supposed new features of the book. It is argued that, rather than real novelties, improvements and clarifications are to be found. Moreover, some interesting topics never thoroughly explored before are not satisfyingly developed. The conclusion is that the book may be of some help to the interpretation of the scope and frame of Rawls' political liberalism, but however it does not add any particularly significant development or novelty to his theory.

The article goes through the critical analysis of the rawlsian concept of origi- nal position, expressed by Habermas in 1995. Habermasian remarks on the original posi- tion aims to undermine the justifiability of such a concept as fundamental to the whole political theory. In fact, it is supposed to substitute the procedures of democratic de- liberation with a well thought-out construction belonging uniquely to the theoretician. According to Habermas, substantive outcomes of procedures must be left out from po- litical theory, whose task is to set a standard for the best possible procedures, meaning a democratic framework in which all opinions and beliefs take part to the decision. Rawls approves the critique since from his point of view, no procedure is able to avoid the in- clusion of some substantive contents. On such assumption he twists to habermasian the- ory the same remarks, observing that it avoids substantive assumptions at political level, embodying them at the epistemic one. As a result, the article raises some issues about the desirability and feasibility of both theories, even considering which interpretation of the role of political philosophy they imply.

The idea of public reason — as well as the contraposition among public reason and private reasons — is strictly linked to the rise of pluralistic societies, societies in which the main problem is probably that of finding a lowest common denominator between different and often conflicting reasons. In a nutshell, the public reason is (or should be) just the core of principles and values shared by all the different philosophical and political doctrines. This paper is mainly focused on the very well-known conception of public reason developed by John Rawls as from the publishing of Political Liberalism. The aim of the first half of this paper is that of pointing out some serious difficulties connected with Rawls' originary defence of public reason. In particular, in Political Liberalism Rawls assumes, without looking after to find some compelling evidence, that in pluralistic societies like ours the only way for understanding each other is that of constraining public debates and deliberations within the boundaries fixed by public reason, renouncing to deploy the whole truth. In this way, Rawls lays himself open to the critics of not taking seriously the freedom of speech. Furthermore, I argue that public reason is not able to ban comprehensive doctrines, either philosophical or religious, from public debates. In the second half of the paper, it will be argued for a "soft", more convincing, idea of public reason. In brief, the conception of public reason as "barrage" against all the reasons exceeding a political conception of justice will be replaced by the conception of public reason as "common denominator" or "translator" of these reasons.

The point of this essay is that the arguments advanced by thinkers like John Rawls e Michael Ignatieff in favour of a core rights to life and liberty are not consistent with their positions in favour of human rights minimalism. Just the fact that human rights minimalism implies the right to physical security and to basic freedom of movement should lead these philosophers not only to recognize both the importance and the value of other rights, but also to include certain aspects of the sphere of private life and of cultural practice in the field of international law. Human rights, that are going to become popular through international debates, compell us first to reconsider the dichotomy between public and private sphere; second, the dichotomy between social and political interests; third, the necessity of subordinating politics of human right, with no exception, either to prudential and historical convenience (see Ignatieff), or to the observance of pluralism (see Rawls).

This paper deals with the major concepts of Scanlon's moral contractualism. It is possible to describe moral contractualism as the ability to identify priorities and moral reasons in deliberative action, that no one could reasonably reject. These capabilities require us to take into account the interests of others in our moral judgments. The result is that Scanlon overthrow the philosophy of Hobbes: morality is not originated from politics; on the contrary, politics is a function of morality. His answer to the dilemma of Prichard is particularly persuasive, though the proof of the falsity of the skeptical position can only be dialectic and persuasive is its intellectualistic position on relations between reasons and desires, too.

In this article we will attempt to highlight the dialectic link between transpecific domain relationships and our anthropocentric interpretation of the world. Starting from this hypotesis we asked ouserlves about a possible remit of political philosophy: is it possible to consider and establish non-unidirectional power relationships with non-human animals? We critically picked up on theories by Rawls, Okin, Honneth and Derrida to vouch and give a partial and non-exhaustive answer to the above question.

The paper discusses Paul Ricoeur's thought, in different moments of his work, on the question of justice. It focuses on Ricoeur's reading of Rawls's Theory of justice in several articles written in the nineties. From there he moves to Soi-même comme un autre, to Le Juste (1995), to Le Juste 2 (2001). The goal of my study is note a tension, which in the very tension that Ricoeur calls "stadium of pratical wisdom" and which stands in a dialectical relation to the field of law. But there being a "paradox" whitin the "political" brings Ricoeur to raise his attention at a higher level. In Parcours de la reconnaissance (2004), a text that I have not treated intentionality, he offers the reader further stimuli for reflection.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the possibility to find a shared basis of agreement among comprehensive religious doctrines, when actors neither agree about which goals are reasonable nor think that a cooperative behaviour is worthy. Taking into account recent case studies, I will compare two of the most influential theories about consensus: Habermas's position about "reaching understanding" and Rawls's model of "overlapping consensus". Whereas several well known political theories about consensus seem to reside at a distance from the world, failing to place normative claims within historical contexts, Max Weber argues that opposed value's spheres interlace because of the "superficiality" of quotidian life. The still open problem pertains to conditions for political consensus and justice when there is no reason to expect that religious individuals and organizations will converge in their views on what constitutes a just way of life and on where are the reasonable limits of reciprocity to be drawn.

This paper engages an elaborate critique that Prijić-Samaržija uses to disqualify moderate epistemic proceduralism as a proper approach to political legitimacy. The paper offers an alternative interpretation of Estlund's position, arguing that his position (contrary to Prijić-Samaržija's reading) represents a veritist account that locates procedure's epistemic value in its ability to produce the correct outcome. Furthermore, by introducing the distinction between collective decision-making procedures and collective decision-authorization procedures, it argues that moderate epistemic proceduralism can accommodate the special role of experts in its theoretical framework.

Il presente lavoro, che ha ad oggetto il dibattito tra paternalismo giuridico e antipaternalismo, prende avvio dalla lettura della principale opera di John Finnis, Legge naturale e diritti naturali, come paradigmatica del perfezionismo, e di Una teoria della giustizia di John Rawls, come esempio del liberalismo, con il fine di riflettere sul ruolo garantito all'autonomia dell'individuo nella scelta pubblica dello Stato. Lo scopo è quello di riuscire ad individuare il pensiero che riesce maggiormente a rispondere all'esigenza di bilanciamento tra il bene dell'autonomia dell'individuo e quello della collettività e a definire così i margini della possibilità di intervento pubblico del 'tutto politico'. Viste le contrastanti opinioni sul tema della contemperazione tra morale e diritto è impossibile ricercare una risposta assoluta che metta d'accordo tutti, ma è auspicabile stimolare il confronto su un tema che coinvolge uno dei beni fondamentali dell'uomo: l'autonomia individuale.