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Rawls defines education as the training and development of abilities and aptitudes, a civic, constitutional teaching, as a means for making a living and developing a cooperation sense. To understand the role of education in Rawls' work we need to understand the concept of a well-ordered society. It is related to primary goods. In them political freedoms are given priority; and through them citizens —in developing their expression and meeting abilities, in enjoying freedom of thought— may get to enhance their self-esteem; guaranteeing citizens' personal and social life enrichment. From this perspective, education plays a central role in society, as it helps to develop autonomy, allowing for individuals' actions to be reflected by the principles they would accept as rational, reasonable, equal and free beings. As a consequence, education enables citizens for public debate. According to the theory of justice as fairness, differently from utilitarianism, citizenship development is a fundamental element; politics and education are intertwined aspects ; Rawls define la educación como el desarrollo y el entrenamiento de habilidades y aptitudes, como enseñanza cívica y constitucional, como medio para el sostenimiento y el sentido de cooperación. Para entender el papel que la educación tiene en la obra de Rawls es necesario entender el concepto de una sociedad bien ordenada. Dicha sociedad está relacionada con los bienes primarios. En ellos, las libertades políticas tienen prioridad, y es a través de los mismos que los ciudadanos, desarrollando sus capacidades de expresión y convocatoria, teniendo libertad de pensamiento, pueden obtener la posibilidad de levantar la autoestima; algo que garantiza un enriquecimiento de la vida personal y social de los ciudadanos. Desde esta perspectiva, la educación desempeña un papel central en la sociedad, en el sentido de desarrollar la autonomía, permitiendo que las personas tengan una acción reflexiva a partir de los principios que ellas aceptarían en la calidad de individuos racionales, razonables, iguales y libres. En consecuencia, la educación capacita los ciudadanos para un debate público. En la teoría de la justicia como equidad, a diferencia del utilitarismo, el desarrollo de la ciudadanía es elemento fundamental: política y educación forman aspectos inmiscuidos. ; Rawls define a educação como o desenvolvimento e o treinamento de habilidades e aptidões, como o ensinamento cívico, constitucional, como meio para o sustento e o senso de cooperação. Para se entender o papel que a educação possui na obra de Rawls é necessário compreender o conceito de uma sociedade bem-ordenada. Esta está relacionada aos bens primários. Nestes as liberdades políticas têm prioridade; é através deles que os cidadãos, desenvolvendo suas capacidades de expressão e reunião, tendo liberdade de pensamento, podem obter a possibilidade de elevação da auto-estima; algo que garante um enriquecimento da vida pessoal e social dos cidadãos. Nesta perspectiva, a educação desempenha um papel central na sociedade, no sentido de desenvolver a autonomia, permitindo que as pessoas tenham uma ação refletida pelos princípios que elas aceitariam na qualidade de indivíduo racional, razoável, igual e livre. Em conseqüência, a educação capacita os cidadãos para um debate público. Na teoria da justiça como eqüidade, diferentemente do utilitarismo, o desenvolvimento da cidadania é elemento fundamental; política e educação formam aspectos imiscuídos.

It is a commonplace to affirm the kantian influence in the Rawls´s work; however, the political constructivism (expose in Political Liberalism, 1993) meant an reject of universalism, that turn it is impossible to explain in kantian terms. What follows is an attempt of evaluating the overlapping consensus thesis in the light the general conception of political philosophy and practical reason in Hegel. ; Ha llegado a ser un lugar común aseverar la influencia de Kant en la obra de Rawls; sin embargo, el constructivismo político (tal como se lo expuso en Political Liberalism, 1993) significó un rechazo del universalismo que es imposible explicar en términos kantianos. Lo que sigue es un intento de evaluar la tesis del consenso superpuesto a la luz de la concepción general de la filosofía política y la razón práctica en Hegel.

The ideas of J. Rawls (A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Cambridge, Mass, 1971) concerning social justice are compared with those of Marx regarding social conflict. Rawls' criterion of social justice is the "difference principle," contending that the goal of social institutions is to maximize the life prospects of those worst off in any society. He claims that fundamental questions concerning justice can be rationally settled from the original position, through "ideal contractualism," even though one's social position or special needs & interests are unknown. Rawls contends that the difference principle is also a "principle of mutual benefit" to all classes of society. However, Marxism holds 3 propositions: (1) the reduction of inequality demands class struggle; (2) the best-off class in a society is the ruling class; & (3) typically, ruling class members have a great need for wealth, power, & status. The commitment for society to accept the difference principle regarding social justice would require, according to Marx, moderate class conflict, no ruling class, & similar basic desires across classes. In short, Marx would contend that "the desire for stability would not make a commitment to help realize the difference principle more rational than a commitment, say, to utilitarianism hedged by a social minimum." G. Schmeling.

Arguably, there have been few contemporary political theorists who have had as great an impact as John Rawls. During his lifetime his work was referred to as "epoch-making" and "cataclysmic in its effect" on the field of political theory. On numerous occasions he was proclaimed "the most important political philosopher of the twentieth century," and other titles equally celebratory. A number of individuals have gone so far as to credit Rawls with reviving political philosophy, breathing new life into what was (according to Peter Laslett's now famous 1956 declaration) a dead discipline, once again making it a valid and valuable enterprise. While the accuracy of such a claim has been questioned, one fact seems indisputable: Rawls redefined late twentieth-century political theory, altering its "premises and principles." Indeed, "political philosophy since the early 1970s has been—at least in the English-speaking world—in very substantial part a commentary on Rawls's work."

In a comprehensive assessment of the penetration of Rawls's ideas in the Netherlands since 1971 five debates are discerned in which different aspects are highlighted or play a role. Some of these debates are more or less ongoing ones, some overlap with each other, & some can be pinpointed more precisely in time. In the first 15 years following the publication of A Theory of Justice, attention was focused on the distributive implications of 'justice as fairness'. Next, the 'liberalism-communitarianism debate' came to the fore. More recently, Kantian aspects of Rawls's theory have been discussed. A fourth, also more recent debate relates to problems of multiculturalism. Finally, in recent years, & more or less in conjunction with the debate on multiculturalism, the current situation of the Dutch welfare state has been discussed. Here we get back to the core of Rawlsian theory, its distributive implications. But now it is argued that his theory focuses too much on equality at the expense of responsibility & incentives. 1 Appendix. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications Ltd.]

Rawls' primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the 'original position' and an 'overlapping consensus'. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given that it turns facts about the thoughts in our head into principles for the regulation of our political existence. Fourth, we miss some of the implications of that empiricism, including its tension with moral realism, relativism, and conservatism.

El objetivo de este artículo es realizar una crítica al concepto de razón pública de John Rawls desde una perspectiva kantiana. Creemos que una formulación de la razón pública más cercana al uso público de la razón propuesto por Kant puede proveer soluciones frente a algunos problemas del liberalismo rawlsiano. En particular, en lo tocante a la cuestión de la igualdad política. ; O objetivo deste artigo é realizar uma crítica ao conceito de razão pública de John Rawls de uma perspectiva kantiana. Acreditamos que uma formulação da razão pública mais próxima do uso público da razão proposto por Kant pode prover solução face a alguns problemas do liberalismo rawlsiano. Em particular, no tocante à questão da igualdade política. ; The aim of this article is to provide a critical reading of John Rawls' public reason from a Kantian point of view. We believe that an account of the public reason closer to Kant's public use of reason could face some problems of the Rawlsian liberalism. In particular, those regarding political equality.