Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i EØS-avtalens relative anonymitet i samfunnet fra dag til dag. Avtalens fundamentale innvirkning på regeldannelsen er lite synlig. Forfatterne trekker paralleller til integrasjonen av romerretten i europeisk rett på 1100-tallet og til dagens moderne, digitaliserte samfunn der løpende oppdatering av programvare er mer er en nødvendighet enn et reelt valg.
Abstract in English:The EEA Agreement's Significance for Norwegian Lawmaking – Passive Reception of Foreign Law or Pro-active European Policy?The article's starting point is the relative anonymity of the EEA Agreement in day to day society. This renders its fundamental impact on the legislation partially occluded. The authors draw on parallels both to the reception of Roman law into European law in the 12th century and to the digitalisation of modern society, where the decision to update software is a virtual rather than a real choice.
Denne artikkelens hovedargument er at det i overveldende grad er økonomien som har vært den drivende faktor bak Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen, inkludert da invasjonsforsvar ble forlatt som forsvarskonsept i 2001. De sikkerhetspolitiske endringene har først og fremst vært utnyttet retorisk for å begrunne nedbygging av forsvarsstrukturen, når den økonomiske nødvendigheten ikke lenger lot seg skjule. Kostnader forbundet med økt deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner har kun i svært beskjeden grad bidratt til reduksjonen i forsvarsstrukturen – kostnadene var her alt for lave til å kunne gi noen troverdig årsaksforklaring alene. Årsaken er i stedet at forsvarsbudsjettene etter den kalde krigen ikke kompenserte for den reelle kostnadsutviklingen i sektoren. Det resulterte i et kjøpekrafttap som gradvis tæret på Forsvaret.
Abstract in English:Economy – the Driving Force behind Norwegian Defence Transformation after the Cold WarThe main conclusion of this article is that to an overwhelming degree, economic factors have been the driving force behind the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces following the end of the Cold War, including the discontinuation of anti-invasion defence as a level of ambition in 2001. The changes in international affairs have been used rhetorically to justify the downsizing of the force structure, when the financial necessity could no longer be concealed or ignored. Additional costs caused by participation in international operations overseas have only to a very limited extent contributed to the sweeping reduction of the armed forces, since these costs were far too small to explain the cutbacks. The actual financial reason is that the defence budgets throughout the 1990s and 2000s did not compensate for the growth in real term costs in the defence sector, particularly those pertaining to the acquisition and operation of modern weapon platforms and systems. This resulted in a loss of purchasing power which gradually wore down the force structure.
FNs totalforbud mot atomvåpen er innlysende riktig. Forpliktelsene går neppe lenger enn Ikkespredningsavtalen, som Norge sluttet seg til allerede i 1970. Avskrekking med atomvåpen forutsetter at de må være klare til bruk for å bli umulige å bruke. Særlig i kriser blir en slik tankegang lett farlig fordi den kan utløse atomkrig ved misforståelser. Likevel er den norske regjeringens motstand mot FNs totalforbud rasjonell fordi hensikten er å forebygge en endring i oppfatning om maktbalanse som kunne undergrave Norges selvstendighet. Spørsmålet blir derfor om risiko for atomkrig kan reduseres uten å øke fare for press, og i verste fall angrep? Artikkelen presenterer egen forskning om hvordan konfrontasjonen i første halvdel av 1980-tallet mellom de to tyske stater førte til risiko for storkrig utløst av gjensidige misforståelser på begge sider av det daværende jernteppet. Teorier om tankeprosesser forklarer misforståelsene som universelle kognitive begrensninger. Forholdene i dag er på vesentlige punkter sammenliknbare med første halvdel av 1980-årene, da det på tross av spenninger likevel var rom for initiativ til felles sikkerhet. Artikkelen konkluderer derfor med at Norge bør slutte seg til FNs totalforbud mot atomvåpen, og sammen med Sverige ta initiativ til en felleseuropeisk dialog med Russland om en europeisk sikkerhetsordning bygd på forestillinger om felles sikkerhet.
Abstract in English:Norwegian Support for the UN's Total Ban on Nuclear Weapons?The article argues that while the UN ban on nuclear arms is obviously sensible, the Norwegian Government's objections are still rational. Rejecting the US nuclear arms umbrella undermines deterrence to the degree that is the perception. The article sets out how cognitive processes determine perceptions of deterrence and risks of war. Shifting nuclear strategies are attempts to cope with the contradiction between deterrence and the inherent impossible choice of nuclear war. The Cold War in the first half of the 1980s shows how nuclear arms, though intended as deterrence, in a confrontation may be misperceived as a looming attack. This misperception almost caused nuclear war by inadvertence, as it could again. The fear of attack may prompt a compelling sense of urgency for a preemptive strike. This is the only real risk of large-scale war in Europe. Therefore, the Norwegian Government should join the UN ban on nuclear arms to reduce tensions in Europe. In a joint initiative with Sweden, which has already endorsed the ban, Norway should persuade other European states to enable a political process with Russia towards a European common security without the looming threat of nuclear arms. Military force should not exceed the minimum required to block intimidation, coercion, and low-intensity aggression.
Folkemordet i Srebrenica i juli 1995 opprørte en hel verden. Siden 1992, da krigen brøt ut, hadde Bosnia-Hercegovina vært under internasjonalt oppsyn. Artikkelen drøfter hvordan folkemord og grove krigsforbrytelser kunne foregå i årevis uten å bli stanset. Fokus er på den rolle de internasjonale faktorene spilte – FN, EU, Nato og stormaktene. Hvorfor var det så stor motstand mot bruk av makt? Delvis kan det ha vært på grunn av manglende forståelse av hva som skjedde, en oppfatning av at Balkan var preget av århundregammelt hat. Noen vestlige land hadde sine egne interesser i området. For vestlige politikere var det enkleste ikke å gjøre noe. FN sendte fredsbevarende styrker til et land i krig, noe som var katastrofalt for styrkene selv og for FNs prestisje. De tiltakene som ble satt i verk, som Sikkerhetsrådets resolusjoner, økonomiske sanksjoner, våpenembargo, FN-sikrede områder og flyforbud, førte ikke til at krigshandlingene avtok. Også mange norske politikere var sterkt imot militær inngripen. Den serbiske hæren var for sterk, en militær løsning var ikke mulig. Dette viste seg å være feil. Folkemordet i Srebrenica fikk FN og Nato til å gå inn for maktbruk i september 1995. En begrenset militær aksjon var nok til å få slutt på krigen, og reelle fredsforhandlinger kunne begynne.
Abstract in English: Srebrenica 25 Years After – How Could the Genocide Happen?
The genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995 shocked the world. Since 1992, when the war broke out, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been supervised by the international community. The article discusses why genocide and crimes against humanity could happen without being stopped. Focus is on the role of the relevant international participants, the UN, the EU, NATO and the great powers. Why was there a strong opposition against use of force? It was partly due to weak understanding of what was going on, a concept of the Balkans as a region of inherent centuries-old hatred. Some Western states had their own interests in the region. For Western politicians the easiest way was to do nothing. The UN sent peacekeepers to a country at war, which turned out to be a catastrophe for the peacekeepers and for the prestige of the UN. Measures like Security Council resolutions, economic sanctions, arms embargo, safe havens and no-fly zones did not work. Many Norwegian politicians were strongly opposed to military intervention. The Serbian army was too strong, a military solution was not possible. This turned out to be wrong. The genocide in Srebrenica triggered the use of force by the UN and NATO in September 1995. A limited military action was enough to end the war, after which real peace talks could start.
In: Mandrup , T 2009 , ' South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force ' , Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , bind 37 , nr. 2 , s. 1-24 .
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.
Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.