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Abstract: Habermas believes that the foundation of democracy is to be found in the discourse principle. Also, some cognitive and experimental studies have suggested that democratic procedures can promote a debate between different opinions and ideas, thus improving the decision-making performance of public authorities. However, Habermas believes that, while, on the one hand, the democratic community is based on the premise that participants in the discourse collectively strive to find the best solutions, on the other, the democratic process allows citizens to irrationally misuse their political rights. If, therefore, reasoned decision and dialogue have an important role in the justification of democracy, but it is a limited role, we propose the idea of an imperfect dialogic democracy.Keywords: Jürgen Habermas; Collective Reasoning; Cognitive and Experimental Studies; Democracy; Decision Making La democrazia dialogica imperfetta: il principio discorsivo di Habermas e gli studi sperimentali sul ragionamento collettivoRiassunto: Secondo Habermas il fondamento della democrazia risiede nel principio del discorso. Alcuni studi cognitivi e sperimentali suggeriscono che le procedure tipiche delle democrazia siano in grado di promuovere un dibattito fra opinioni e idee diverse, capace di migliorare le performances decisionali delle autorità pubbliche. Tuttavia, da un lato Habermas ritiene che la comunità democratica sia basata sulla presupposto che chi partecipa a un pubblico discorso si impegni a trovare la migliore soluzione, dall'altro le procedure democratiche non impediscono che i cittadini utilizzino in maniera irrazionale i loro diritti politici. Se le decisioni ragionate e il dialogo hanno un ruolo importante nella legittimazione della demcocrazia, un ruolo che tuttavia resta limitato, allora suggeriamo l'idea di una democrazia dialogica imperfetta.Parole chiave: Jürgen Habermas; Ragionamento collettivo; Studi cognitivi e sperimentali; Democrazia; Processi decisionali

The reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Schrems judgment places this decision in the wake of the judicial saga commenced with the Digital Rights Ireland and Google Spain cases. Also in this decision, in fact, the Court of Luxembourg has taken it seriously the right to privacy, in light of the threats and risks arising from the broader and broader circulation of personal data, especially through the Internet. When invalidating the decision of the Commission concerning the adequacy of the safe harbour principles, the Court of Justice has once again enforced in a very extensive manner the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and particularly Articles 7 and 8. This has led the Court, indeed, to convert the adequacy standard for personal data to be transferred to non-EU countries in the requirement of equivalent protection. This decision, however, this decision is likely to bring unprecedented consequences and global effects which cannot be limited to the European Union territory. ; The reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Schrems judgment places this decision in the wake of the judicial saga commenced with the Digital Rights Ireland and Google Spain cases. Also in this decision, in fact, the Court of Luxembourg has taken it seriously the right to privacy, in light of the threats and risks arising from the broader and broader circulation of personal data, especially through the Internet. When invalidating the decision of the Commission concerning the adequacy of the safe harbour principles, the Court of Justice has once again enforced in a very extensive manner the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and particularly Articles 7 and 8. This has led the Court, indeed, to convert the adequacy standard for personal data to be transferred to non-EU countries in the requirement of equivalent protection. This decision, however, this decision is likely to bring unprecedented consequences and global effects which cannot be limited to the European Union territory.

Il saggio propone qualche riflessione intorno alla figura che il contributo teorico di Davide Tarizzo prova a definire, per aprire uno spazio che possa conservare all'Europa e alla sua trama istituzionale una soggettività politica, per quanto debole: quella dell'ospite. Tarizzo sembra però proporre il tema dell'ospitalità europea come invenzione politica da attivare per parare i contraccolpi dell'inevitabile fine della moneta unica. Nel saggio, si apprezza in generale l'idea e la si sostiene, nella convinzione che essa si collochi lungo la linea principale della costruzione comunitaria, e che contenga un motivo di erosione del peso politico delle soggettività nazionali, ma si avanza un motivo di dubbio: che la proposta di definire il profilo giuridico dell'ospite europeo –in quanto distinto dalla cittadinanza nazionale– debba essere legata allo scenario post-euro. Il dubbio cioè che, qualora questo scenario si verificasse, la proposta possa poi essere effettivamente percorsa. ; The essay proposes some reflections upon the figure of the "guest", a figure that Davide Tarizzo's theoretical contribution tries to define in order to open a space that could conserve political subjectivity, however weak, for Europe and its institutional structures. Tarizzo seems to be proposing the theme of European hospitality as a political invention to be activated in order to contain the repercussions of the inevitable end of the single currency. The idea is, in general, appreciated and supported in this paper, with the conviction that it follows the main course of the construction of the European Union and that it contains a reason of erosion of the political weight of the single national subjectivities. However, there is reason to doubt that the proposal of defining the juridical profile of the European guest – as separated from national citizenship – is to be linked to the post-euro scenario. In other words, the doubt is that, if this scenario should occur, the proposal could not eventually be put de facto into practice.

Quali sono i confini del sindacato di legittimità in rapporto alla discrezionalità legislativa? E quale, quindi, l'ampiezza della giurisdizione costituzionale in relazione alla sfera del politico? Il saggio che riflette sull'argomento attraverso la lente della giurisprudenza costituzionale, ed in particolare alla luce delle diverse tecniche decisorie di cui nel corso del tempo i giudici costituzionali si sono serviti al fine di riparare omissioni le gislative pregne di conseguenze, si sofferma specificamente sul peculiare modus procedenti utilizzato dalla Corte nella definizione del giudizio di legittimità promosso nel l'ambito del processo sul c.d. caso Cappato . L'iter processuale seguito nell'occasio ne, dapprima scandito da un'ordinanza di "incostituzionalità prospettata", e quindi da una sentenza che, in ragione della perdurante inerzia legislativa, accoglie la questione nelle forme dell'additiva di principio, offre infatti non pochi spunti di rifles sione utili a ripensare il tema in una chiave che, ad oggi certamente inedita, si palesa al tempo stesso non meno problematica. ; What are the limits of the legitimacy judgment in relation to legislative discretion? And what, then, the extent of the constitutional jurisdiction in relation to the sphere of politics? The article that analyzes the iussue throught the lens of constitutional jurisprudence, and in particular in consideration of the various decision making techniques wich the constit utional judges have used over time to repair legislative omissions full of consequences, focuses specifically on the peculiar modus proceed used by the Court indefining the constitutional legitimacy judgment promoted in the context of the so called proces s Cappato case . The procedure used on the occasion, first characterized by an order of "unconstitutional envisaged", and then by a rulin wich, due to the persistent legislative inertia, accepts the issue with an additive ruling of principle, infact offers many ideas for useful reflection to rethink the theme in a perspective that, undoubtedly unpublished to date, is at the sa me time non less problematic

The persuasive power of metaphor is often seen in opposition to rational procedures in argumentation, which should guarantee deliberative democracy in the public sphere. Against this view, referable to the classic theory of argumentation, we adopt the argumentative theory of reasoning (MERCIER, SPERBER 2011) and present the results of an experimental study on the role of metaphors in a specific argumentative fallacy, the quaternio terminorum (ERVAS, LEDDA 2014; ERVAS, GOLA, LEDDA, SERGIOLI 2015). In light of the experimental evidence, we argue that (1) it is no longer possible to evaluate the role of metaphors in argumentation without distinguishing different kinds of metaphors (in the experimental study the distinction between dead and live metaphors is analysed); (2) it is possible to identify different argumentative styles (i.e. argumentative persuasion and reflective argumentation). Connecting different kinds of metaphors with different argumentative styles, we propose an interpretative framework able to integrate persuasion and argumentation.

The judgment of 5 May 2020 of the Zweiter Senat of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is manifestly inappropriate from a legal point of view as it expresses the German constitutional judge's claim to assess the legality of the ECB's decisions and the correctness of reasoning of the CJEU in Weiss. The German judges are using the principle of proportionality to assess the correct application of the principle of conferral in a way that is "simply completely unintelligible and thus objectively arbitrary" — to use their own qualification of the CJEU's reasoning. Furthermore, the judges make a very questionable use of the principle of democracy and of economic analysis in assessing the correctness of the ECB's PSPP program. The judgement is extremely dangerous by ultimately questioning the application of EU law in a Member State and it encourages other courts and Member States' governments to do the same. The German judges' reasoning is the glaring demonstration of a form of "cultural dominance" which particularly emerges in the reasoning carried out on proportionality.

Abstract: The global emergency caused by the spread of COVID-19 raises critical challenges for individuals and communities on many different levels. In particular, politicians, scientists, physicians, and other professionals may face new ethical dilemmas and cognitive constraints as they make critical decisions in extraordinary circumstances. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have long analyzed and discussed such issues. An example is the debate on moral decision making in imaginary scenarios, such as the famous "Trolley Problem". Similarly, dramatic and consequential decisions are realized daily in the current crisis. Focusing on Italy, we discuss the clinical ethical guidelines proposed by the Italian Society of Anesthesiology, Analgesia, Resuscitation and Intensive Care (SIAARTI), highlighting some crucial ethical and cognitive concerns surrounding emergency decision making in the current situation.Keywords: Moral Dilemmas; Cognition; Rationality; Bias; Clinical Decision Making; COVID-19 Problemi etici e cognitivi nell'emergenza COVID-19Riassunto: L'emergenza globale causata dal COVID-19 solleva problemi cruciali, sia per gli individui sia per le comunità, a molti livelli diversi. In particolare, politici, scienziati, medici e altri professionisti si trovano ad affrontare dilemmi etici e limitazioni cognitive legate a decisioni critiche in circostanze straordinarie. Sia i filosofi sia gli scienziati cognitivi hanno a lungo analizzato e discusso questi problemi. Un esempio è il dibattito sul ragionamento e le decisioni morali in scenari immaginari, come il famoso "problema del carrello". Nella crisi attuale, dilemmi drammatici di questo tipo sono all'ordine del giorno. Concentrandoci sull'Italia, discutiamo le linee guida proposte dalla Società Italiana di Anestesiologia, Analgesia, Rianimazione e Terapia Intensiva (SIAARTI), evidenziando alcuni aspetti critici, sia etici sia cognitivi, del processo decisionale in una situazione di emergenza come quella attuale.Parole chiave: Dilemmi morali; Cognizione; Razionalità; Bias; Decisioni cliniche; COVID-19

It is common for courts and interpreters to refer to legislative intent to justify a particular interpretation of a statute. Although the nature of legislative intent has raised vigorous theoretical debates, the reference to what the legislature meant, wanted, implied or aimed to realize is usually accepted as an argument to solve questions and doubts concerning the meaning of legal texts. In this thesis I claim that the reference to legislative intent is not as innocuous as it may seem. On the contrary, justificatory reasoning based on this interpretative technique can be extremely misleading and therefore unable to count as a good reason in favor of interpretative conclusions. I maintain that the deceiving role of legislative intent in legal argumentation is due to the inevitable influence that figurative language has on they way in which speakers perceive and conceptualize the world. By using expressions like 'legislative intent', 'intentions of the legislature' and similar, in fact, we tend to consider a collective body (the legislature) as a single legislator capable of having intentions. In other words, language allows its speakers to personify a group and to confer to it features, intentions, and behaviors that belongs to single individuals only. Because of this personification I argue that, when used as if it designated a single legislator, the term 'legislature' works as a metaphor, i.e. a linguistic shorthand to imply an entire network of allusions, suggestions and connections by saying little. The first part of the thesis is dedicated to the examination and critique of some of the most significant and remarkable theories of metaphors. In particular, I examine the theories offered by Aristotle, I. A. Richards, M. Black, P. Grice, J. Searle and G. Lakoff. I conclude the evaluation of these theories claiming that through metaphors an undefined number of associations between two conceptual domains are created. For this system of association remains implicit and speakers may infer different conclusions from it, metaphors are a deceptive tool and cannot stand for a premise in justificatory reasoning. The first part of the thesis thus offers the theoretical means to turn to the examination of the 'legislature' as a metaphor, which is the topic of the second part. The first section of the second part is devoted to the nature of intentions. After presenting intentions as peculiar state of mind of single individuals, I illustrate the difficulties connected to the alleged possibility of retrieving the intentions of the legislature. Then I examine the role of legislative intent in legal reasoning and I illustrate how this argument indirectly influences and affects many others. After criticizing five theoretical models that offer different solutions to the identification of the legislature and its relevant intentions, I claim that the consideration of the retrieval of legislative intentions as a key moment of the interpretative process is rooted in the legal positivism developed in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century that had wrongly been considered overtaken. I close this first section claiming that the retrieval of the author's intentions in neither necessary nor appropriate to confer meaning to the text. In the second section I analyze the outcomes of this conclusion. Claiming that no retrieval of the intentions of the author of the statute would help justifying its interpretations, in fact, the authority of the legislature is inevitably questioned as well. I analyze the connection between authorship and authority through the works of J. Raz who claims that the justification to legislative intent comes directly from the authority of the legislature. After criticizing this position I conclude the thesis with a possible solution to separate authorship and authority.

The value of "precedent" in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the attempt to identify its characteristics within the European Union legal framework cannot be proceeded without the preemptive analysis of the legal reasoning and of the creative role of the judge. The role of the precedent in the legal reasoning and in the interpretation of the European Union law, as well as the unanimously accepted capacity of the judge to "create" law, are to be indented as the pivotal conditions allowing the development of a stare decisis system. The second part of the present thesis is focused on the peculiar features of the judicial precedent in the case law of the Court of Justice. In particular, we could notice, firstly, the absence of a clear definition and distinction between the concept of ratio decidendi and obiter dicta; secondly, we underline the need to overcome the classical distinction between persuasive precedent and binding precedent, in order to properly evaluate the scale of value that the precedent can take following the use and the function that is playing from time to time. Moreover, the analysis of the efficacy of the precedent will be confined, in this second part of the work, to the "self-precedent" of the Court, meaning to the obligation for the judge to follow his own precedent. The analysis will then highlight the role of precedent in case it is overruled or distinguished by the Court: practice that, ultimately, has to be conceived as a confirmation, as well as a recognition, of the precedent's value. Furthermore, in spite of the absence of a doctrine of precedent in the European Union legal system, we recall two circumstances in which the judicial precedent assumes a de facto binding value. Firstly, we analyse the use of precedent in the decision-making activity of the judge, and then those norms of the rules of procedure that required the Court of Justice to decide by explicit reference to the previous judgment. Lastly, the analysis will be focus on the efficacy of the Court's precedent with respect to the Tribunal is the evaluation of the impact of the vertical relationship between the two judges and the extension to which the Tribunal is bound by the Court's as well as in the relationship between the Court and the national judge.

"Logic", as understood in this volume, is the set of knowledge at the basis of man's reasoning faculties: understanding, analysing, arguing. The text presents a review of topics which are useful to strengthen the skills related to reasoning faculties through a brief introduction to the theoretical aspects and exercises intended to assess the understanding. The volume is divided into parts, which are organised in teaching units. The parts and units are presented in such a way that, following the thread in the order in which they are proposed, we move from one topic to the next, acquiring the prerequisites necessary for to what comes after. The text therefore lends itself to a "systematic" use, aimed at an extensive study. However, nothing prevents the reader from adapting the material to other needs, choosing only a few topics that they consider useful to integrate their knowledge, to do a "review" or to further practice on already known topics.

L'Autore discute del libro di Paolo Evangelisti e sottolinea rispetto a un percorso di scuola (Ovidio Capitani, Giacomo Todeschini) l'evoluzione in chiave eminentemente politica del suo approccio al discorso dei Francescani riguardo la costruzione dello Stato. ; This essay debates Paolo Evangelisti's book, and emphasizes – in comparison with the opinions of Ovidio Capitani and Giacomo Todeschini – his political approach to the reasoning of the Franciscans about the State building in kingdom of Aragon.