Suchergebnisse

The Accra Agenda for Action contains a commitment to increase aid effectiveness by 'addressing the issue of countries with insufficient aid.' This paper highlights the difficulties in identifying such countries unequivocally, given the limited theoretical and empirical knowledge on optimal aid allocations. Actual aid receipts by low income countries are compared to several benchmarks derived from different aid allocation models. These models differ primarily with regard to the weights assigned to country needs and performance. The analysis shows that different aid allocation models identify different sets of countries as receiving insufficient aid. The paper does not find a greater tendency for fragile states to receive insufficient aid compared to non-fragile states. However, there appears a greater tendency for bilateral aid to leave countries with insufficient aid compared to multi-lateral aid, which in fact in many cases partly compensates for under-funding from bilateral donors. The potential aggregate cost of increasing aid to countries with insufficient aid varies significantly depending on which aid allocation model is used, but could be as high as US$ 7 billion annually. Enhanced coordination of donors' aid allocation decisions to ensure that no low income country ends up inadvertently as an aid orphan will be an important step in addressing 'the issue of countries with insufficient aid.'

This paper investigates what motivates four dimensions of Euroscepticism in 28 member states of the European Union. The sample is split between net-payer and receiver countries with respect to the EU budget. All dimensions of scepticism are found to be heavily concentrated among the political left in receiver countries, while both political extremes are more instrumentally eurosceptic and dissatisfied with the current EU in payer countries. There is, however, an increased probability that the political right in receiver countries will become more eurosceptic based on their opposition to immigration.

The 48 least-developed countries (LDCs), most of them in sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Asia, need foreign direct investment (FDI) to help meet their development targets. The FDI they now receive, although inadequate, is enough to demonstrate that investors see potential in them. It is therefore realistic for LDCs to seek more FDI, but they need to enhance their investment environments to attract it in the much greater quantities required. Donors can help by targeting official development assistance (ODA) on investment in human capital and supporting governance improvements. Meanwhile, LDCs should establish effective investment promotion agencies (IPAs).

"Jose Zamora symbolizes the democratic crossroads that Guatemala and other Latin American countries are currently facing"

Despite official discourses of donors, the most corrupt countries receive the highest amounts of foreign aid. The most corrupt countries are however also the poorest, and this is why they may receive more aid. This paper provides the first theoretical and empirical grounds for this rationale. The key is that corruption is not exogenous but, instead, an equilibrium phenomenon. We build a multi-country model of optimal aid in which we disentangle the correlation between aid and corruption into two components: the first reflects variations in the quality of institutions and the second variations in productivity levels. The data suggest that both components of the correlation are significant; however the effect of variations in productivity levels is stronger. Because the cross-country heterogeneity in productivity is more important than the heterogeneity in institutional quality, it is optimal to give more foreign aid to more corrupt countries.

In this paper we argue that if the cross-country heterogeneity in productivity is more important than the heterogeneity in government quality, it can be optimal to give more foreign aid to more corrupt countries. We build a multi-country model of optimal aid in which we disentangle the correlation between aid and equilibrium corruption into two components: the first one reflects variations in the quality of institutions and the second encompasses variations in productivity levels. The data suggest that both components of the correlation are significant, however the effect of variations in productivity levels is stronger. This implies that most corrupt countries, since they are also the poorest, receive higher amounts of foreign aid.

In this paper we argue that if the cross-country heterogeneity in productivity is more important than the heterogeneity in government quality, it can be optimal to give more foreign aid to more corrupt countries. We build a multi-country model of optimal aid in which we disentangle the correlation between aid and equilibrium corruption into two components: the first one reflects variations in the quality of institutions and the second encompasses variations in productivity levels. The data suggest that both components of the correlation are significant, however the effect of variations in productivity levels is stronger. This implies that most corrupt countries, since they are also the poorest, receive higher amounts of foreign aid.

The tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 was the biggest peacetime accident to affect the Scandinavian countries. The region hit by the tsunami is one of the most popular holiday destinations for Scandinavians. One hundred-and-seventy-nine Finnish lives were lost, and several hundreds injured. The immediate media coverage and reception were as expected. The volume of the coverage was huge, audiences rose by one-third, as did the use of web material. However, the main type of media used immediately after the catastrophe were the mobile phone and amateur-run discussion groups on the web, allowing for individual expression. But on closer examination, the overall picture is quite a traditional one. The media and public institutions were also providing top-down information via the web, both the media and the receivers focused on Finns alone, and the welfare state was seen as the culprit for not ensuring the security of its citizens.