Suchergebnisse

Past examples of reconciliation in Afghanistan -- The post-2001 conflict -- An assessment of post-2001 reconciliation efforts -- The politics of reconciliation -- Recent reconciliation initiatives -- Reflections on reconciliation -- International support for reconciliation -- The Musa Qala accord -- Key findings and recommendations

Early 2005 diplomatic gatherings of 68 leaders have not led to a return to pre-2003 US-European relations. At this point, Europeans and Americans hold two different Weltanschaaung, especially on Iran's nuclear ambitions and the China arms embargo. Relations within the Europe, Russia, and the US triangle are discussed. Despite their agreements on security issues, UN Security Council reforms are likely to complicate relations.

The purpose of this article is to question some basic assumptions regarding reconciliation after wars and mass atrocities. Indeed, how can numerous policy-makers, practitioners, and scholars contend that reconciliation is necessary while it is often distrusted and rejected by victims? Are there not cases where calls for reconciliation would prove to be fruitless and even detrimental for peace and/or democracy? To answer these questions, it is worth looking at the interactions between reconciliation and negotiation. Beyond a theoretical interest, this question has a direct impact for practitioners; a better understanding of the issue is actually a sine qua non condition for more efficient interventions. In terms of methodology, this study refers to various examples as illustrative cases (Afghanistan, Rwanda, South-Africa, and the Franco-German case). Its objective is not to capture the complexity of each case study but to determine to what extent reconciliation can be considered as negotiable. Adapted from the source document.