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Introduction. The article is devoted to the epistemology of communicative knowledge. It is argued that the central problem in the analysis of such knowledge is the question of the status of testimony. The author discusses reductionism and non-reductionism as two traditional approaches to the problem of trust to testimony. The aim of the article is to describe the arguments of both approaches and to carry out their critique.Methodology and sources. The author uses the method of conceptual analysis to address the task at hand. The primary sources of the paper include the works of the classics of the theory of knowledge – D. Hume and T. Reid. The secondary sources include works of modern authors, belonging to the Anglo-American philosophical tradition.Results and discussion. Reductionism argues that although testimonial beliefs can be accepted on the basis of the reliability of the informant, the testimony itself does not provide justification. Ultimately, reductionism reduces testimony to another source of justification, such as perception or memory. The article explains that reductionism's weakness is to account for normal social interactions when the reliability of the speaker is unknown. Non-reductionism argues that testimony does not provide justification by reduction to other sources. Testimony itself is a valid form of social proof. The informant does not need additional positive reasons to accept the speaker's claims as valid. Testimony is justified by default unless it is proven false or unreliable. However, the weakness of non-reductionism is the relativistic implication in cases of cognitive asymmetry between the informant and the informant.Conclusion. The article concludes that reductionism and non-reductionism are equally unsatisfactory theories. The author believes that the formation of communicative knowledge does not depend on trust in the informant's testimony. It is proposed to consider the issue of trust in the informant himself as an epistemic agent. It is suggested that such an analysis should start from an virtue epistemology.

While Marxism's greatest strengths are its holism & its awareness of the dialectical relation between individuals & society, its concern with economics as primary has tended toward reductionism. Four distinct types of reductionism are contrasted -- agent-agent, agent-structure, structure-agent, & structure-structure; all four deprive Marxism of its holistic character, which is its most valuable characteristic. If this is to be regained, a sytematic theory is needed of such areas of life as law, culture, politics, & the family, which will neither reduce them to economics nor accept a purely empiricist treatment. W. H. Stoddard.

Martin van Hees presents a new approach to the study of law - legal reductionism - which combines elements of legal positivism, new institutionalism and decision theory. From legal positivism Van Hees derives some fundamental insights into the nature of legal systems, but he also revises some of its key tenets. He argues that law can be reduced to facts; moreover, he re-establishes the relation between law and morality by arguing that law and positive morality are inherently related. He subsequently uses decision-theoretic tools to develop and defend his reductionist methodology. The second part of the study applies the resulting approach to an analysis of legal freedom. By showing that legal reductionism allows us to analyse the value of liberal legal systems, Van Hees makes a forceful case for including the study of law in moral and political philosophy. The book is accessible to a wide readership, including legal and moral philosophers, political theorists and social scientists

George Homans' numerous claims that sociological propositions could be reduced to psychological propositions are examined in terms of the various ways Homans has used the word "reduction" and in terms of the development of Homans' reductionist position over the course of his career. Attempts to answer Homans" reductionism are reviewed and Homans" challenge to his critics is presented. A general sociological proposition is then presented as an answer to Homans' reductionism and to his challenge. It is then shown that the sociological proposition is not less general than psychological propositions, cannot be deduced from psychological propositions, and cannot be analyzed without residue into the behavior of individual men. It is shown that psychological variables may be used as independent or intervening variables in such a proposition but that such an inclusion of psychological variables would not constitute psychological reduction. Some implications of a distinctive sociology are then discussed.