Suchergebnisse

by Yves Chapel This is both a detailed account and a brief comment on the rules governing foreign trade in France. The author first comments on the three guiding principles of the relevant French legislation: 1) the individual has a right to import goods, within known procedures, 2) in the procedure of examination of applications, use is made of the services of organs which do not belong to the State as such, 3) there is a strong link with the control of currencies, and the administrative execution is markedly centralised. Monsieur CHAPEL goes on to study the two fundamental legal provisions, and the agencies entrusted with their practical enforcement: Technical Directorates in the Ministries and « Technical Committees », the Office of Currency Control (« Office des Changes »), and finally delineates the actual working of this administrative machinery. His conclusion is that the « Office des Changes » possibly enjoys excessive powers, even though they are indirect, and that this may point to a regrettable tendency towards « dirigism », but he adds that the French legislation is imbued with the principle that such concentration of powers in the hands of the State must be balanced by provisions enabling the individual to defend his interests. This hopeful attitude was justified by a recent liberation of some specified imports, a provision which is commented on in an additional note.

SOVIET economic policy in the few years since Stalin's death has been characterized by flamboyance and ferment. In an attempt to free economic growth from the bottleneck of stagnation in agriculture, Khrushchev has sponsored some extravagant gambles in corn-growing and in expansion of the sown acreage. Policy toward the consumer has gone through two complete reversals: the regime at first experimented with offering the population an improvement in the standard of living, but is now once again asserting that abundance in the future requires austerity today. Perhaps the most startling innovation of all emerged in the past year when the regime began to develop a program of foreign economic assistance as a weapon in its economic competition with the capitalist part of the world. Because of their spectacular nature, these shifts of policy have attracted considerable attention in the West and have been commented on at length. Aware diat the Soviet Union is expanding her economic power at a more rapid rate than are the capitalist countries, Western students of the Soviet economy have sought in these policy changes-some clue as to whether its rate of growth is likely to decline or to be maintained in the future. The early indications of a rise in standards of living that would cause a reduced growth of heavy industry and so a decline in investment and in the rate of growth have now been dispelled. The inability of Soviet agriculture to provide an expanding food supply for a growing work force certainly appears to be a real threat to industrial growth, and with die failure of Khrushchev's gambles, this threat remains. Thus the evidence as to the over-all effect of these changes on the rate of expansion of die Soviet economy is still inconclusive.

Address before the Royal institute of international affairs, London, Nov. 6, 1952.

Address before the Royal institute of international affairs, London, Nov. 6, 1952.

The Russian Old Believer and sectarian movement, as it appears in history, can be thought of, in anthropological terms, as a nativistic movement: that is, a movement of resistance to outside (in this case Western) cultural influence, and a reaffirmation and renewal of the native culture. In this sense, the movement comprised Old Believers, with or without priests, and an assemblage of sects of indigenous origin—Dukhobors, Subbotniki, Molokans, Skoptsy, and others. During the first period of its existence, the Old Believer and sectarian movement, besides being a nativistic movement, was at the same time a focus of resistance to the regime, as any form of religious dissidence must be under an essentially theocratic state.

The seizure of power in Cuba by Fulgencio Batista on March 10, 1952, is a classic example of a complex method of organizing and changing governments in Latin America known as the cuartelazo. The classic pattern is: (1) the treason of a single barracks; (2) the pronunciamiento, manifesto, or grito; (3) the march on centers of communication, sites of military supplies and government headquarters; (4) announcement to the public of the change of government; and (5) appointment of a patriotic junta to govern in the interim period. The cuartelazo requires great skill in execution. It depends upon the support of important segments of public opinion. Force and violence as instruments of political policy in Latin America are derived from the institutional traditions of Iberian culture. E. Scott.

An examination of the question of whether the past still has a place in history or whether modern scholars should concentrate on the present above all. 3 postulates are formulated: (1) all human history is recent; (2) we live at the end of a small fragment of time in which change has been very rapid; (3) since 1945, the nature of this accelerated evolution may itself have been so altered as to inspire hope that almost 2 cent's of revolution in Europe are coming to a close. The pol'al aspects of this revolutionary change during the past 2 cent's are discussed. A further acceleration of pol'al developments occurred in the 1950's with the formation of the European Econ Community. While 100 yrs ago, in the age of O. Bismarck, C. B. Cavour, & M. de Robespierre, revolutionary violence increased but no order emerged, the new Western European revolution has sought to discipline rather than liberate. It has substituted plans for manifestos, conferences for barricades. It has been peaceful. It is concluded that the revolution goes on, but instead of destroying first & then worrying about alternatives, it now begins by constructing & only then proceeds to abolish instit's for which replacements have already been found. If & when the nat'l gov's of Western Europe decide to abdicate their sovereignty, the structure for a federal gov will be there. At last there is a viable alternative to the ancien regime & order will finally return to modern civilization. M. Maxfield.

The dynamics & strategy of politics is related to the use of conflict as an instrument of power & a way of promoting the growth & the unity of the pol'al system. The basic policy of any regime is related to the management & use of conflict because no regime is ever fully neutral concerning all conflicts. It is necessary to rid ourselves of simplistic concepts of conflict, especially the notion that conflict is merely a test of the strength of the opposing forces. Instead, the pol'al system is sensitive to changes in the dimension & nature of conflict. More especially what happens in politics is related to relatively slight changes in the intensity, visibility, direction, & scope & conflict. AA-IPSA.

The cardinal feature of traditional Confucian society was the division of the populace into a literary elite & the illiterate mass of peasants. It could be maintained only if adherence to the rules was nearly universal & if the pattern of life remained constant. Progress was frowned on. When the regime collapsed after meeting the superior technology of the West, an era of indiscriminate imitation of the West set in. The most far-reaching reform was in educ. The new intellectual class which emerged stood in contrast to the old literati in almost every respect; they were no longer acquainted with China's cultural background; they knew nothing of peasant problems; there was little inter-group mobility. This new class had a definite impact on the Chinese body politic & on local politics. Local gov deteriorated in the mid-1930's, due to the absence of educated men in Ru areas. By adapting themselves to the situation the Communists became invincible & a ready substitute for the traditional Confucian faith. They grasped China's tradition more than China's intellectuals in their pilgrimage to the West. IPSA.

American experience with the ill-fated governments of the newer nations—most recently Turkey, South Korea, and Cuba—raises the question whether we can ever select a policy generally suited to the growth of stable, effective government among the developing nations. In all three of the cases mentioned, the United States followed the canons of conventional diplomacy while contributing substantially to monumental economic and social changes. Our commitment meant reliance on and support for the regime in office, although our own actions were gradually creating forces and sentiments favoring radical change in the internal political system. Whenever the pressures for political change were sufficient, adjustments were made with an abruptness that may well have left the United States in a worse position than if we had done little or nothing to assist long-term development.