Suchergebnisse

History shows that a change of leader in Russia has almost always been accompanied not by civil strife, but by liberalization.

Guest post by Vilde Lunnan Djuve and Carl Henrik Knutsen In March 2020, COVID-19 generated a major emergency…

A lack of transparency around Australia's military exports leaves the government exposed to criticisms that Australian-exported weapons could be used in conflicts like Gaza. Without change, Australia's credibility as a sponsor of the rules-based international order is at risk.

Some military coups purport to represent the vanguard of modernisation and change. Others, such as Chile's in 1973 and Spain's failed attempt in 1981, are fuelled by nostalgia for past dictatorships. The majority of coups ...

"By adopting a nominal spending target, the Fed would embrace a regime that provides clear guidance on the required spending level during times of crisis. This shift would enhance the Fed's ability to navigate economic downturns effectively." ~ Nicolás Cachanosky

When citizens directly appeal to their government, are their concerns ignored or taken seriously? It's an important question for understanding norms around accountability, especially in authoritarian regimes.

To find some answers, University of Chicago Professor of Public Policy Shaoda Wang helped develop a clever field experiment evaluating how Chinese regulators respond to citizen appeals about companies violating pollution standards.

The experiment is fascinating on its own, but it also provides a wealth of data about the effectiveness of citizen appeals, how corporations respond when complaints are public or private, and even the incentives companies follow when it comes to adhering to pollution standards.

In his new book, Regime Change: Toward a Postliberal Future, renowned political philosopher Patrick Deneen argues that the liberal ideology that has shaped capitalism for centuries has also failed to deliver on its promises of freedom, equality, and prosperity. Is he able to offer a compelling alternative that serves the interests of the common good over those of wealthy elites?

Deneen, whose previous book "Why Liberalism Failed" was acclaimed by the likes of former U.S. President Obama, joins Bethany and Luigi to discuss his proposed 'Regime Change' and its implications for capitalism and the market economy. Can his vision of a postliberal future offer a more just and sustainable economic system, one that addresses the pressing challenges of our time? Can we have progress without progressivism?

Deutsch

By Bohyun Kim


The EU has decided to classify nuclear power as green. While the process has been transparent, its openness to civil society seems insufficient.
The EU is actively greening itself. Under the current international climate regime, the 195 signatories to the Paris Agreement are legally bound to take urgent climate action to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and

Resistance to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm is often attributed to its association with military intervention and regime change. Political friction and contestation showcased at the recent United Nations General Assembly annual R2P debate point to broader problems for atrocity prevention at the UN.

Bill and Behnam catch up on recent headlines, including the statement made by a U.S. senator pushing for regime change (spoiler: he was not talking about Iran), reports of a high-level meeting between Iranian and Hezbollah officials, the Houthis continuing their maritime attacks, and more.
The post Generation Jihad Ep. 151 — They don't pass out candy in war, but they do air-drop meals first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.

That was fast. On 8 June, only 11 days after the Polish so-called 'Lex Tusk' was signed into force, the Commission launched an infringement procedure against Poland. For the first time, the Commission is relying on the principle of democracy in Art. 10 TEU as an autonomous plea, dropping another bombshell shortly after the first direct invocation of Art. 2 TEU in infringement proceedings against Hungary earlier this year. This contribution discusses both the perks and potential perils of the direct enforcement of the principle of democracy in Art. 10 TEU. On the one hand, a shift from what is arguably better called 'militant rule of law' towards more literally EU militant democracy is a positive development, as it better captures the nature and range of the principles which are de facto under threat in several EU Member States. On the other hand, the present infringement action illustrates the principled challenge of militant democracy to preserve the possibility of democratic regime change, all whilst not lapsing into a form of institutional conservatism.

The title of this post alludes to a paper written by Tom Sargent and Neil Wallace 40 years ago "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic." The startling conclusion of this paper is that a central bank (limited to interest rate policy and/or open market operations) does not have unilateral control over the long-run rate of inflation. The result is made all the more powerful by the fact that it relies mostly on arithmetic and only minimally on theory. So, what's the basic idea? First, begin with the fact that monetary and fiscal policy are inextricably linked via a consolidated government budget constraint. This implies that monetary policy will have fiscal consequences. In particular, interest-rate policy affects the interest expense associated with rolling over any given amount of government debt. The question is how the fiscal authority intends to finance interest expense. There are two basic ways it can to do this: (1) use primary surplus (increase taxes and/or cut spending); (2) issue debt. The first option is associated with what economists call a Ricardian fiscal policy; the second option is associated with a Non-Ricardian fiscal policy.  A central bank has no control over (1) or (2); these are determined by the tax and spend decisions made by the fiscal authority. Suppose the fiscal authority chooses (2). If so, then what is accomplished by increasing the policy rate? Ceteris paribus, it increases the rate at which nominal debt is issued. This is arithmetic. If nominal debt is money (and it is), then this must lead to higher inflation, not lower inflation.  The corollary here is that a central bank has no unilateral control over the long-run rate of inflation. A central bank may be permitted to choose a long-run inflation target, but only with the blessing of the fiscal authority. Canadians know this: the Bank of Canada and the Government of Canada meet every five years to review their joint inflation-control agreement. In other jurisdictions, the central bank simply assumes that fiscal policy will be conducted in a "responsible" manner (i.e., a manner that will not un-anchor long-run inflation expectations).  If the primary deficit is managed in a manner to anchor long-run inflation, then the central bank is left free to use interest rate policy for the purpose of stabilizing shocks to aggregate demand. To stabilize the inflation rate around target requires, in this context, that the central bank raises its policy rate aggressively against above-target inflation. (Hopefully, even the threat of such a response keeps inflation close to target. This is the so-called Taylor principle.)  The question monetary policymakers might want to mull over these days is whether this standard policy prescription is appropriate in an environment where the traditional fiscal support for inflation-targeting seems to be waning? I want to be clear here: I am not saying this is happening today or that it will happen in the future. I'm saying that it might happen and that if it does, monetary policy makers should have a contingency plan in place. What should this contingency plan look like?  So, to take a concrete example, suppose that the tax and spend decisions coming from Congress imply an elevated primary deficit for the foreseeable future. Perhaps there's been a "regime change" in thinking that transcends political parties so, no matter who controls Congress, the expectation is for elevated primary deficits for as long as we can see. (I am not suggesting this is good or bad, I'm just saying suppose.) Next, suppose the economy is humming along at or near what anyone would call "full employment." And then suppose inflation rises to 3, 4, 5% or higher and stays there with no sign of ever wanting to return to the Fed's official 2% long-run inflation target. What should the FOMC do in this hypothetical scenario? (Again, consider this as the type of thought-experiment that is necessary to form a contingency plan -- I do not mean to suggest that this scenario is likely, only that it is possible--and not in a Dumb and Dumber way).  The monetary policy advice coming from a model like Sargent and Wallace (1981) might suggest something like this: For as long as Congress remains in a regime of high primary deficits, [1] Keep policy rate low, or even lower it, if possible; and [2] Announce a temporarily higher inflation target (consistent with the new fiscal regime). Recommendation [1] comes from Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Increasing the interest rate in this fiscal regime will only lead to higher inflation. Lowering the interest rate has the opposite effect. If recommendation [2] is not adopted, the monetary authority would have to explain (after every meeting) why it is missing its 2% inflation target. They might, of course, just say it's "temporary," but this would wear thin after a few years. This advice is based on the assumption that everyone knows there's been a change in fiscal regime and that it will be persistent. What if no one is really sure of regime change or, if regime change, how long it might last?  The prudent thing to do in this more realistic case is to hedge your bets. In terms of [1], one might recommend raising the policy rate, but not by as much as would normally be done given the observed inflationary pressure. In terms of [2], one could probably get away with maintaining the long-run inflation target at 2% and legitimately explaining away deviations from target as "transitory."  Probably the last thing monetary policy should do under these circumstances is to raise the policy rate aggressively against inflationary pressure (as recommended by the Taylor principle). The Taylor rule works fine under a Ricardian fiscal policy. But it may backfire un a Non-Ricardian fiscal policy--this was the whole point of Sargent and Wallace (1981).  Tightening monetary policy might have the effect of bringing inflation down temporarily (this is consistent with the Sargent and Wallace model). But in reality (and in some models, like here and here), this would come at the cost of economic recession.  I can see no rationale for creating a recession to bring inflation down temporarily. But there may be a political-economy rationale for the threat of such a policy. That is, a Congress that does not trust future Congresses may want to create an independent (but accountable) central bank to pursue a low-inflation mandate and to do whatever it can with interest rate policy to achieve that mandate, even at the cost of recession. Future Congresses are in this manner obliged to behave in a Ricardian manner (so only temporary deficits permitted), which has the effect of anchoring long-run inflation. Well, maybe. But I can't help but think of Dr. Strangelove here.  PS. I recently gave a talk on this that you can view here beginning at the 3 hour 12 minute mark.

It's been a tumultuous two weeks in Venezuela. First, the Biden administration and the Maduro government signed a deal exchanging democratic guarantees for sanctions relief on oil, natural gas, and gold mining — some of Venezuela's largest industries. With the sanctions lifted, Maduro allowed the opposition's primary election to go ahead. María Corina Machado, a classical liberal who calls herself the "Iron Lady of Venezuela" and went through the same Yale program as Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, won the election with an astounding 93 percent of the vote. Venezuelans overwhelmingly showed up to vote, doubling the expected turnout of 1 million ballots. Maduro quickly declared the election illegitimate and labeled Machado a puppet of U.S. interests, going directly against the sanctions relief deal.The U.S. and Machado have expressed little intention beyond rhetoric to reinstate sanctions. After all, the U.S. is in desperate need of oil, and Venezuela has plenty to offer. Unless the U.S. can establish direct incentives for Maduro and his regime to make democratic reforms, a peaceful path to democratization is highly unlikely. If anything, Maduro has shown his willingness to keep sanctions on to push for specific geopolitical demands while maintaining his domestic anti-U.S. message. In 2021, Maduro suspended all negotiations with the U.S. over the imprisonment of Colombian financier Alex Saab. Despite that, the U.S. went ahead with some sanctions relief soon after. Maduro has created an alternative economy for Venezuela, where illicit markets make up for over one fifth of all of the country's GDP. With oil revenues currently standing at $9.3 billion annually, sanctions relief would only lead to "a moderate increase in Venezuelan oil production," according to Dr. Francisco Monaldi of the Baker Institute. Alternatively, the Maduro regime has increasingly looked to other economic opportunities to ensure its permanency. After being pushed out of the international financial system, Venezuela has grown its commercial, financial, diplomatic, political, and security relationship with other sanctioned regimes, including Iran, China, Russia, Nicaragua, and Cuba, which have themselves contested the results of the opposition election and reiterated support for Maduro. More states with a nominally anti-Western posture, such as Bolivia, South Africa, Turkey, and Ethiopia, are also providing some support given that some of their interests align with Maduro's. These relationships lead to a circle of mutual assistance wherein the leaders' political survival is ensured through a permanent flow of commerce and cash between these regimes.These states now have a vested interest in preventing an adversary to their interests from entering the Palacio de Miraflores, and Maduro knows it. Sanctions are much less harmful to the regime than they were years ago. Maduro's calculation is simple: Whether he decides to hold a fully democratic election against Machado, a sham election like in 2018, or to fully overtake the country through military force, Maduro will have sufficient support on his side. Credible polls show Maduro has the backingt of 58 percent of voting intentions (compared to Machado's 23 percent), with many in the resistance, particularly those with the financial capability to organize contestation efforts, having already left the country. Whether the U.S. foreign policy establishment likes it or not, Maduro, like his predecessor Hugo Chávez, will use any foreign pressure the U.S. decides to undertake to his political advantage. If sanctions are lifted, Maduro will keep attacking the opposition while boasting about his negotiating genius. If sanctions are put back on, Maduro will parade as a martyr again to his crowd of adoring supporters, meanwhile using the tried-and-tested alternative global order offered by sanctioned regimes to ensure the regime's security.Some left-wing governments in the region are also offering rhetorical and material support to Maduro, heightening the regional cost of regime change. With this deal and other domestic political wins — including slashing the poverty rate by a quarter in two years, regaining international recognition, and raising oil production — Maduro's support will likely consolidate. The regime also has the added benefit of violent support from the colectivos (pro-Maduro thugs who intimidate the opposition), the military and intelligence services, drug cartels, the state media apparatus, and a number of foreign governments. On the off-chance that Maduro ultimately loses the election, these interests might collectively ensure that a peaceful transition of power is impossible without significant military involvement from the West — cooperation that the West is likely unwilling or unable to offer. Maduro's rise to power demonstrates how difficult he will be to unseat. Illiberal and dictatorial regimes do not simply relinquish power under popular and external pressure, and Maduro has proven his ability to disregard opposition in favor of his interests. To foster democratic reforms, regime change must start from within the regime itself.In the non-Western world, some dictatorships have survived domestic and foreign coup attempts, debilitating sanctions, continuous opposition, and meager political support. If those conditions were sufficient for a transition to popular rule, democracy would have blossomed in countries with dictatorships facing heavy internal and external pressure, like Belarus, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Egypt. In these cases, we can see how immense pressure, instead of spurring democratic reforms, can lead to further repression from the regime. Unfortunately, it may take a conflict for Maduro to leave power, and such a conflict would leave thousands or millions dead and displaced, with only a failed state in its wake. However, there is a better, less bloody option. Instead of imposing foreign military power over Maduro's regime, Western allies can privately encourage democratic ideals within the regime itself by creating incentives and providing the regime a nonviolent alternative.There is precedent for this. During the Cold War, authoritarian dictators ruled with support from either the West or the rest. Right-wing dictatorships in Latin America enjoyed the support of the U.S. In Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay, there were intense debates among the military government about how and when the military would cede power back to the people. Ultimately, due to the prevalent view that holding onto power too harshly and lengthily could result in a failed state, the countries all held elections on their own accord a few years later, with the military progressively regaining a relatively apolitical role in their countries.After long attempts at reform from various political and military groups outside the countries, the Central Intelligence Agency and its allies, which helped put many of these dictatorships in power in the first place, encouraged democratic reforms through private pressure and dialogue by ensuring the regime leaders would not face persecution.To prevent a return to dictatorship or conflict, Western powers or the new democratic regimes offered some protection to political and military leaders associated with dictatorship. Without some kind of civil or internationalized conflict, it is ultimately up to the regimes themselves to decide when democracy is restored, and they will only do so if they believe they will still hold some power and their interests protected. Unless his own security is guaranteed, Maduro will have no impulse to leave power. Reform won't happen until the regime, or Maduro himself, is willing to change. Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

Iran-USA-Krieg?



Strikes on Iran Approved by Trump, Then Abruptly Pulled Back (The New York Times) hatr (Twitter) What We Know About Iran Shooting Down a U.S. Drone (The New York Time) The U.S. Has Turned Up Pressure on Iran. See the Timeline of Events. (The New York Times) Trump Adds Troops After Iran Says It Will Breach Nuclear Deal (The New York Times) U.S. Navy Says Mine Fragments Point to Iran in Tanker Attack (The New York Times) "Trumps Appetit auf einen Krieg ist begrenzt" (Süddeutsche Zeitung) Iran handelt, als hätte das Land nichts mehr zu verlieren (Süddeutsche Zeitung)Iran goes for "maximum counter-pressure" (Strategic Culture Foundation) Here`s John Bolton Promising Regime Change in Iran by the End of 2018 (The Intercept) Why Trump now wants talks with Iran (Asia Times) "Wir müssen uns an die Weltsicht Trumps gewöhnen" (Deutschlandfunk) DGAP Jahresbericht 2018/19 (DGAP)Arend Oetker (Wikipedia)



Berliner Mietendeckel



Fragen und Antworten zum "Mietendeckel" (Berlin.de)



Sprach-Regulierung im Netz



Statt Klarnamen: Digitales Gewaltschutzgesetz (Tagesspiegel)Verfassungsschutz: Akte noch da, aber gesperrt (hessenschau.de) "Wir müssen uns wehren" (Deutschlandfunk)



e-evidence: EU-weite Datenabfrage



An der deut­schen Justiz vorbei (LTO)e-evidence (Netzpolitik.org)



PKW-Maut



Verkehrsminister Scheuer erklärt Pkw-Maut für gescheitert (Der Tagesspiegel) Andreas Scheuer (Twitter) Kosten der Pkw-Maut steigen auf 128 Millionen Euro (Der Tagesspiegel) Verkehrsminister Scheuer bedauert Urteil gegen PKW-Maut: "Ja, es ist bedauerlich" (YouTube)



Verabschiedung



Overcast Newsletter abonnieren



Bildnachweise



Iran-Karte: Open Street Map Verkehrsminister Scheuer



Hausmitteilung



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Martin Lockman (Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School) has posted Climate Entrenchment in Unstable Legal Regimes (Northwestern University Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: American climate law is the subject of serious and...