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The purpose of this paper is to advance an argument that might explain the dynamics of recent political developments in Latin America. The argument is constructed as follows. First, I review the dynamics of what Raúl Zibechi (2012) has described as the new geoeconomics of capital in Latin America and the corresponding politics. The paper then elaborates on certain dynamics associated with the political economy of two types of capitalism, with reference here to the particular way in which these forms of capital are combined in the current context of capitalist development in the region. The third part of the paper provides a brief review of the economic and political dynamics that led to the pink tide of regime change in South America. Subsequently, we provide a brief review and analysis of the policy dynamics of the governments formed in the wake of this seatide of regime change and the associated progressive cycle in Latin American politics. The paper then turns towards the recent pendulum swing of electoral politics towards the hard right of neoliberal policy reform. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the forces that might be involved in what appears to be the end of the progressive cycle. The conclusion is that the answer can be found in various contradictions of extractive capitalism. ; El propósito de este artículo es presentar un argumento que pueda explicar la dinámica de los recientes desarrollos políticos en América Latina. El argumento se construye de la siguiente manera. Primero, reviso la dinámica de lo que Raúl Zibechi (2012) ha descrito como la nueva geoeconomía del capital en América Latina y la política correspondiente. Luego, el documento desarrolla ciertas dinámicas asociadas con la economía política de dos tipos de capitalismo, con referencia aquí a la forma particular en que estas formas de capital se combinan en el contexto actual del desarrollo capitalista en la región. La tercera parte del documento proporciona una breve revisión de la dinámica económica y política que condujo a la marea rosa del cambio de régimen en América del Sur. Posteriormente, proporcionamos una breve revisión y análisis de la dinámica de las políticas de los gobiernos formados a raíz de este asiento del cambio de régimen y el ciclo progresivo asociado en la política latinoamericana. Luego, el documento gira hacia el reciente movimiento pendular de la política electoral hacia la extrema derecha de la reforma de la política neoliberal. El artículo termina con una breve discusión de las fuerzas que podrían estar involucradas en lo que parece ser el final del ciclo progresivo. La conclusión es que la respuesta se puede encontrar en varias contradicciones del capitalismo extractivo. ; O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar um argumento que possa explicar a dinâmica dos recentes desenvolvimentos políticos na América Latina. O argumento é construído da seguinte maneira. Primeiro, reviso a dinâmica do que Raúl Zibechi (2012) descreveu como a nova geoeconomia do capital na América Latina e a política correspondente. O artigo elabora, então, certas dinâmicas associadas à economia política de dois tipos de capitalismo, com referência aqui à maneira particular pela qual essas formas de capital são combinadas no contexto atual do desenvolvimento capitalista na região. A terceira parte do artigo fornece uma breve revisão da dinâmica econômica e política que levou à maré rosa da mudança de regime na América do Sul. Posteriormente, fornecemos uma breve revisão e análise da dinâmica das políticas dos governos formadas na esteira dessa mudança de regime e do ciclo progressivo associado na política latino-americana. O artigo então se volta para o recente balanço pendular da política eleitoral em direção à extrema direita da reforma política neoliberal. O artigo termina com uma breve discussão das forças que podem estar envolvidas no que parece ser o fim do ciclo progressivo. A conclusão é que a resposta pode ser encontrada em várias contradições do capitalismo extrativo.

Defence date: 20 March 2015 ; Examining Board: Professor Christian Reus-Smit, University of Queensland (supervisor); Professor Jennifer Welsh, European University Institute; Professor Roland Bleiker, University of Queensland; Professor Michael Cox, London School of Economics. ; Why has regime change, defined as military intervention aimed at forcibly transforming a target state's domestic political authority structure, been a long-standing practice in US foreign policy, used roughly two dozen times since 1900 despite its limited success in producing peace, stability and/or democracy? Extant theories fail to provide sound answers. Realist approaches, for example, under-predict the recurrence of regime change if great powers should have no reason to intervene in weaker states, or over-predict it if anything goes under anarchy. Similarly, democracy promotion arguments overstate the causal importance of the US desire to expand liberty globally. This dissertation presents a novel explanation for the recurrence of regime change in US foreign policy, arguing that the practice of regime change is predicated upon what I call 'emotional frustration', an anger-arousing emotional state that is brought about by a foreign leader's obstructive behavior perceived to be rooted in implacable hatred. While obstruction is ubiquitous in interstate interactions, I claim that the combination of hegemonic expectations towards a target state and the perception of hatred shape the extent to which a foreign leader's conduct evokes an emotional response on the part of foreign policy elites. Once emotionally frustrated, regime change becomes an attractive foreign policy instrument to decision-makers who seek a way to confront and put a stop to the obstruction of a menacing target state. It enables frustrated leaders both to permanently get rid of a perceivedly hostile foreign leader and to discharge their frustration through the use of force. Illustrating the importance of emotional frustration, I conduct four historical case studies based on primary sources, spanning almost one hundred years of US history. Regime changes in Cuba (1906), Nicaragua (1909–12), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Iraq (2003) reveal overlooked patterns of emotional frustration that have time and again animated regime change decisions.

This article situates civil servants' responses to regime change in 1933 in their longer-term context. Focusing particularly on the process of 'self-coordination' – a term used by historians to describe and explain ministerial bureaucrats' voluntary adaptation to changed political circumstances by implementing the Third Reich's policy agenda – it argues that this process was far from unique, being in fact the typical response to regime change throughout the twentieth century. By examining how civil servants facilitated regime change in 1918/19 and 1933 specifically, it also argues that the central pillar of the 'self-coordination' thesis – that it was informed by civil servants' political or ideological beliefs – needs to be revisited. Indeed, the fact that many began their careers in Imperial Germany and served under both the Weimar Republic and National Socialism suggests that it was not only ideology that informed their actions. So, in conclusion, the essay looks at how bureaucratic organisations like government ministries function and, more importantly, how individuals function within them, presenting a different angle, based on organisational theory, from which to assess civil servants' propensity to 'self-coordinate'.

On 5 June 2017 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and a number of allied states broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed a partial blockade. Their stated demand was for Qatar to cease its support for "terrorist" groups and its policy of "destabilising" other countries. With Qatar rejecting the charges as baseless, the prospects for resolution appear thin. The most conceivable scenarios are forcible replacement of the Qatari leadership, peaceful resolution between the parties, or consolidation of the rift between two camps in the Gulf. Germany and other European states should avoid taking sides, but should assert three fundamental demands: the conflict parties must respect national sovereignty and the proportionality required by international law, refrain from instrumentalising the fight against terrorism, and prevent the dispute spilling over into other conflicts in the region.

Recently scholars identified a global explosion of democracy as a sharply distinctive period within Huntington's Third Wave of democratization. So far the role of modernization has not been analyzed with particular regard to this outstanding phase of democratization. Given that modernization has economic as well as cultural aspects, we test two prominent theses. First, we test Przeworski/Limongi's claim that transitions to democracy do not derive from economic modernization. Using a graded measure of regime change, we present evidence to the contrary. Second, we test Inglehart's finding that modern mass attitudes play a negligable role in promoting regime change to democracy. To the contrary again, we show that one aspect of cultural modernization, mass-level liberty aspirations, has a positive impact on democratic change' even stronger than economic modernization. Third, we unfold the concept of Human Development to establish a more general argument on the causal mechanism in the modernization- democratization nexus. Our data cover 60 societies of the World Values Surveys, representing nearly 50 per cent of all regime changes in the world since 1972. ; Jüngere Forschungsarbeiten haben eine globale Explosion der Demokratie identifiziert, die eine scharf eingegrenzte Periode innerhalb Huntingtons breiterer Definition der Dritten Demokratisierungswelle bildet. Mit Blick auf diese hervorstechende Demokratisierungsphase ist die Rolle von Modernisierungsfaktoren bisher noch nicht untersucht worden. Ausgehend davon, dass Modernisierung ökonomische und kulturelle Aspekte hat, prüfen wir zwei prominente Thesen. Zunächst testen wir Przeworski/Limongis Behauptung, dass Regimewechsel zur Demokratie nicht von ökonomischer Modernisierung befördert werden. Unter Verwendung eines kontinuierlichen Maßes für Regimewechsel kommen wir zu einem gegenteiligen Ergebnis. Zum zweiten testen wir Ingleharts Befund, dass moderne Einstellungen der Bürger ebenfalls keine positive Wirkung auf Regimewechsel zur Demokratie hätten. Im Gegensatz auch zu diesem Befund kommen wir zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein wesentlicher Aspekt kultureller Modernisierung, nämlich die Verbreitung von Freiheitsansprüchen, sehr wohl einen positiven Effekt auf Regimewechsel zur Demokratie hat - mehr noch sogar als ökonomische Modernisierung. Zum dritten entfalten wir das Konzept der Humanentwicklung, um ein generelleres Verständnis der Wirkungszusammenhänge im Modernisierungs-Demokratisierungs- Nexus zu etablieren. Unsere Daten decken 60 Gesellschaften aus den Weltwertestudien ab, auf die fast 50 Prozent aller Regimewechsel entfallen, die seit 1972 weltweit aufgetreten sind.

In recent years the Hungarian administration of justice trialed some of the most famous murder cases of the 1990's which were contract killing between organized crime groups. These trials brought up many new information about the life of organized crime gangs and given a better opportunity to criminologist to understand the recent activity of the organized crime gangs. I wrote my thesis about how organized crime successfully survived the crisis of the regime change. The following research based on a tight cooperation with Pest County Police Headquarters where I analyzed criminal files about organized crime gangs after the regime change. The main question of the research was: what sociological and economical factors contributed to the strengthening of organized crime In Hungary? Where can we discover the responsibility of the state? How state regulation affected organized crime? The present days organized crime roots from illegal criminal groups existed in the socialist period. Thanks to the liberal economic reforms in 1981 the second economy had a great economic potential during the socialist period. Organized criminal groups often invested in private sector thus corporate crime became linked to organized crime. Due to their better economic conditions the criminal networks could establish different kind of private ventures, like restaurants, pubs or tobacco shops. After the declaration of democracy many organized crime networks took advantage of regulatory gaps. They preserved their status and informal capital from the second economy. Due to the economical change the new entrepreneurs informally forced to borrow capital from organized crime groups, or they used these group's money to recover their debts. They could not turn to court because of their illegal transactions. Other organized crime networks misused government subsidies and created semi-firms, which could operate successfully due to the problems of state control. My research seeks to show that during the third Hungarian Republic from the 1990's organized crime groups have worked with the help of entrepreneurs. Due to the economic crisis of 2008 and the emergence of political extremism the organized crime groups became number one public enemies, who are again using the same methods what were successful during early 1990's. A kind of semi-legal market and entrepreneurship has developed since 2008. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n2s2p219

We develop a continuous time dynamic game to provide with a benchmark theory of Arab Spring-type events. We consider a resource-dependent economy with two interacting groups, the elite vs. the citizens, and two political regimes, dictatorship vs. a freer regime. Transition to the freer regime can only be achieved if citizens decide to revolt given the concession/repression policy of the elite. Departing from the related literature, the revolution optimal timing is an explicit control variable in the hands of citizens. The elite is the strategic leader: she ultimately chooses her policy knowing the reaction function of citizens. In this framework, we provide with a full equilibrium analysis of the political regime switching game and notably emphasize the role of the direct switching cost of the citizens and of the elite's self-preservation options. In particular, we show how the incorporation of explicit revolution timing may change the conventional wisdom in the related institutional change literature. Finally, we emphasize how the theory may help explaining some key features of the Arab Spring.

The collapse of communism two decades ago — and the subsequent political and economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe — has raised new questions about the ability of citizens to adapt to changing institutional orders. This dissertation project starts with a large and fundamental puzzle: over the past twenty years, post-communist nations have shown improved convergence toward Western standards of economic and political performance, yet public opinion has grown increasingly disapproving of the changes that have taken place. Why? While rational-choice theories expect individuals to engage in simple cost-benefit analyses of altering realities, psychological accounts suggest impediments to such practicable adjustments; theories of socialization and attitude "persistence," in particular, emphasize the perseverance and continuing influence of values acquired earlier in life. This dissertation seeks to integrate these various insights and provide a more comprehensive understanding of transition at the individual- level. Utilizing a unique mix of (a) cross-sectional, repeated survey data (European Values Study/World Values Study, 1990-2005), (b) longitudinal survey data (German Socioeconomic Panel, 1999-2010), and (c) macro indicators of economic and political outputs, it investigates the relative importance of early ("primacy") experiences, (re-)learning procedures, and contemporary societal factors for the development of post-communist beliefs. Incorporating a range of statistical techniques, it also probes related mechanisms of change, including within-person attitude stability, alterations in cohort composition over time, migration, and the intergenerational transmission of values, so as to better address the prospects for convergence. The findings reveal numerous challenges to the task of attitudinal adaptation. Although post-communists are found to partially respond to changing circumstances — and to move some way toward the norms espoused by their Western counterparts — these shifts are shown to be neither linear over time, nor symmetrical for all involved. Rather, even decades after regime change, significant (leftist) biases remain, particularly for members of older cohorts. Supplementary analyses unearth additional evidence of resistance, illustrating how these stable, socialist distinctions might linger further into the long-term, defying physical relocation and potentially even population replacement. Such an inquiry is hoped to illuminate transitions beyond Europe (e.g., China, Middle East), where citizen adaptation to post-authoritarian climates will be critical for democratic consolidation.

This research note contributes to the emerging debate on the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for democracy, autocracy and regime change. Following a review of the literature on the short-term impact of the pandemic on citizen freedoms, I conduct a preliminary test showing that COVID-19 has widened the freedom divide between democracy and autocracy. I propose a prudential interpretation of this new finding and of its implications for medium- to long-term regime change dynamics. In an age of advancing autocratization, regaining awareness that democracies and autocracies treat citizens differently could help marginalize antisystem political forces in democratic countries. However, increased levels of repression in regimes that are already authoritarian are no good news in terms of prospective democratization. Moreover, the management of the social and economic consequences of the pandemic is likely to represent a key driver of future regime change, duo to its impact on the legitimacy and stability of both democracies and autocracies.

Senior Project submitted to The Division of Social Studies of Bard College.

The paper proposes a model to examine the effect of the 2010 fiscal regime changes on investment climate of Malaysia's marginal oil fields.It proposes the use of investment appraisal tools, such as Net Present Value, Internal Rate of Return, Profitability Index, Saving Index and Access to Gross Revenue, for the study.Two scenarios would be considered using the fiscal terms of Production Sharing Contract (PSC) and Risk Service Contract (RSC), respectively.Each scenario would be of a fifteen-year simulation. Sensitivity analysis will also be conducted for both the scenarios under different prices and reserves levels.The study, when undertaken, will be beneficial to both industry and the government.

Este estudio se centra en tres paradojas políticas que caracterizan el sangriento cambio de régimen de 1989 en Rumania y el período de treinta años que transcurrió, es decir, 1989-2019. Estas tres paradojas políticas dicen lo siguiente: Paradoja # 1: La sangrienta revolución anticomunista de 1989 llevó al poder a los miembros de segundo y tercer rango de la élite del poder comunista y a varios tecnócratas que habían estado cerca de las estructuras de poder del difunto Partido Comunista Rumano (RCP); Paradoja # 2: El número de víctimas registradas después del colapso del régimen comunista el 22 de diciembre de 1989 supera el número de víctimas registradas durante el período del 16 al 22 de diciembre de 1989 en una proporción de aproximadamente 7 a 1; y Paradoja # 3: Aunque Rumania pasó por una de las transiciones más largas y dolorosas a la democracia en la Europa Centro-Oriental, el país no ha experimentado hasta ahora un retroceso autoritario después del año 2010 siguiendo el modelo centroeuropeo (especialmente los casos de Hungría y Polonia). El presente estudio aborda estas paradojas y explica por qué el colapso violento del régimen comunista en Rumania ha llevado al nacimiento de una cultura política de contestación, que provocó varias olas de movilización de abajo hacia arriba en favor de la consolidación democrática y, hasta ahora, obstaculizó el auge del autoritarismo en este país. ; de junio de 2020 / Aceptado: 15 de julio 2020 Abstract. This study focuses on three political paradoxes which characterize the bloody 1989 regime change in Romania and the thirty-year period which elapsed, that is, 1989–2019. These three political paradoxes read as follows: Paradox #1: The bloody anti-communist revolution of 1989 brought to power the second- and third-rank members of the communist power elite and a number of technocrats who had been close to the power structures of the defunct Romanian Communist Party (RCP); Paradox #2: The number of registered victims after the collapse of the communist regime on 22 December 1989 surpasses the number of registered victims during the period 16-22 December 1989 by a ratio of about 7 to 1; and Paradox #3: Although Romania went through one of the longest and most painful transitions to democracy in East-Central Europe (ECE), the country has not experienced so far an authoritarian backsliding after the year 2010 on the Central European model (especially the cases of Hungary and Poland). The present study addresses these paradoxes and explains why the violent collapse of the communist regime in Romania has led to the birth of a political culture of contestation, which prompted several waves of bottom=up mobilization in favor of democratic consolidation and, so far, hampered the rise of authoritarianism in this country.

The paper proposes a model to examine the effect of the 2010 fiscal regime changes on investment climate of Malaysia's marginal oil fields.It proposes the use of investment appraisal tools, such as Net Present Value, Internal Rate of Return, Profitability Index, Saving Index and Access to Gross Revenue, for the study.Two scenarios would be considered using the fiscal terms of Production Sharing Contract (PSC) and Risk Service Contract (RSC), respectively.Each scenario would be of a fifteen-year simulation. Sensitivity analysis will also be conducted for both the scenarios under different prices and reserves levels. The study, when undertaken, will be beneficial to both industry and the government.

Malaysia is a product of a post-colonial plural society. However, under the influences of development, migration and technological changes, the plural society characters of the nation have undergone social transformation from one of a compartmentalized society by language, culture, religion and economic vocation into a diverse society. However, the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the tradition of Furnivall's plural society may not be able to explain the fluidity and dynamism of contemporary Malaysia. Ethnic and religious dimensions may define the ethnicised society but to argue that such a society is a plural society may not do justice to explain the shift from ethno-religious concerned are being embedded with civic spaces of justice, inclusivity and participative democracy of the Malaysian diverse society. This article grapples with the constraints of the Furnivall tradition by introducing the conceptual framework of ethnic boundary in the tradition of Barth and the theoretical framework of the sociology of modernization and development in understanding and explaining the social changes taking place in Malaysia. Ethnic identity still prevails but it has thinned as an influence on social action. Studies show that social cohesion dominates the relationship of the diverse ethnic groups that shared a common norm, showing greater similarities rather than differences and under such social differentiation in the society, they relate to one another horizontally and least vertically.

Defence date: 16 April 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Dr. rer. Pol. Dr. h.c. Hans-Peter Blossfeld, European University Institute; Professor Dr. Dmitry Kurakin, Higher School of Economics; Professor Dr. David Bills, University of Iowa, Professor Dr. Klarita Gërxhani, European University Institute. ; The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent rapid shifts in economic, political, and social institutional arrangements – labeled here as a regime change – offer a unique opportunity to explore how patterns of social inequality vary across broader institutional contexts and over time. How the stratification order between different social groups has changed in the aftermath of the regime change in Russia is a central question I raise in this thesis. In contrast to prior research, I draw on a life-course perspective and address several rather untouched aspects of social inequalities in Soviet and post-Soviet societies and investigate them in terms of school-to-work and work-to-school transitions in the earlier and later life courses. Empirically, I employ powerful longitudinal data from the Education and Employment Survey for Russia (EES) linked to the Russian Gender and Generation Survey (GGS), which cover life trajectories in a time-frame between 1965 and 2005. Compared with previous studies, that data enable me to utilize a much larger observation window to scrutinize long-term consequence of the regime change in Russia. First, I tackle social inequality in terms of horizontal gender differences and vertical gender inequalities upon labor market entry. My findings reveal that despite proclaimed equality principles, the school-to-work transition was by no means gender-neutral in Soviet Russia, with women facing a net vertical disadvantage in job authority. This inequality has increased even more since the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly due to worsening chances for female entrants. Second, I explore inequality of adult-educational opportunity due to initial educational level and occupational position. My results suggest that selective participation in adult education might lessen or exacerbate inequality of adult-educational opportunity depending on type of adult education and analyzed group of participants. Nonetheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union has contributed to inequality of adult-educational opportunity, thereby strengthening the exacerbation effects of adult education on social inequalities. Third, I investigate whether participation in adult education may improve career opportunities, thereby mitigating social inequalities that emerged in the earlier life course. My findings show that adult education either benefits all participants or those who are already advantaged. Overall, the results point to a mechanism of persistence or reinforcement of social inequalities. Furthermore, returns to adult education have decreased or been not offset since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, throughout my thesis I put a particular focus on gender. Altogether, my findings unravel noteworthy gender inequalities arising in the initial career stages. These initial (dis-)advantages cumulate over men's and women's life courses, thereby contributing to overall social inequality in Russia, and specifically during the post- Soviet period. I conclude that the regime change was accompanied by a widening of preexisting social distances and an effective amplification of the Russian society's stratification order.