Suchergebnisse

Due to its borderless nature, COVID-19 has been a matter of common European interest since its very first detection on the continent. Yet this pandemic outbreak has largely been handled as an essentially national matter. Member States adopted their own different, uncoordinated and at times competing national responses according to their distinctive risk analysis frameworks, with little regard1 for the scientific and management advice provided by the European Union (EU), notably its dedicated legal framework for action on cross-border health threats.2 To justify such an outcome as the inevitable consequence of the EU's limited competence in public health is a well-rehearsed yet largely inaccurate argument3 that calls for closer scrutiny.

We know that European regulatory networks tend to broaden the gap between regulators and executives in the member states. But what is their impact on inter-agencies relationship at the national level? The scope of issues addressed by European regulatory networks may cover the competences of several independent regulatory agencies in the domestic arena. Who is competent to participate in the European regulatory network? What happens with the independent regulatory agency that cannot participate? This can trigger confusion, competence conflicts, but can also be an opportunity to develop coordination among the concerned independent regulatory agency. This situation is particularly delicate in federal states when the concerned independent regulatory agencies are located on different governmental levels. Against the background of interdependent regulatory competences across levels, this article examines the conditions for the rise of inter-independent regulatory agencies coordination regarding their participation in European regulatory networks. Theoretically, we engage with the literature on coordination between federal and subnational governmental actors for European Union affairs and extend its application to regulatory actors. Based on a longitudinal case study on energy regulation in Belgium, we bring three key findings. First, the federal regulator's acceptance to coordinate is explained by the rising interdependencies between regulators across levels. Second, the regional regulator's move from a contentious strategy to a more cooperative one is explained by learning. Third, bilateral coordination arrangements may pre-empt the emergence of multilateral ones.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the role and functioning of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, focusing on: (1) whether the issues listed for consideration by the Working Group in Executive Order 12631 have been considered; (2) what additional issues have been considered by the Working Group and how they were identified; and (3) the nature of coordination and cooperation within the Working Group and the views of members of Congress and Working Group participants about whether it needs to be formalized in statute."

This Article argues that inter-agency coordination is one of the great challenges of modern governance. It explains why lawmakers frequently assign overlapping and fragmented delegations that require agencies to "share regulatory space," why these delegations are so pervasive and stubborn, and why consolidating or eliminating agency functions will not solve the problems they create. The Article describes a variety of tools that Congress, the President and the agencies can use to manage coordination challenges effectively, including agency interaction requirements, formal inter-agency agreements, and joint policymaking. The Article assesses the relative costs and benefits of these coordination tools, using the normative criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, and concludes that the benefits of coordination will frequently justify its costs. To varying extents, these instruments can reduce regulatory costs for both government and the private sector, improve expertise, and ameliorate the risk of bureaucratic drift without compromising transparency. Coordination can also help to preserve the functional aspects of shared or overlapping authority, which include promoting inter-agency competition and accountability, while minimizing its dysfunctions in terms of discordant policy. While burdensome, shared regulatory space should also provide an important opportunity for the President to extend his reach. The Article argues that the President is uniquely positioned and motivated to manage the problems of shared regulatory space, and that coordination tools afford him the chance to put his stamp on policy. The Article recommends a comprehensive executive branch effort to promote stronger inter-agency coordination and improve coordination instruments. Of course, any presidential exercise of centralized supervision must operate within legal bounds, and often will be politically contentious. On balance, however, presidential leadership will be crucial to managing the serious coordination challenges ...

This study discusses important aspects of policy modeling based on a leader-follower game of policymakers. We specifically investigate non-cooperation between policymakers and the jurisdictional scope of regulation via bi-level programming. Performance-based environmental policy under the Clean Power Plan in the United States is chosen for our analysis. We argue that the cooperation of policymakers is welfare enhancing. Somewhat counterintuitively, full coordination among policymakers renders performance-based environmental policy redundant. We also find that distinct state-by-state regulation yields higher social welfare than broader regional regulation. This is because power producers can participate in a single power market even under state-by-state environmental regulation and arbitrage away the CO2 price differences by adjusting their generation across states. Numerical examples implemented for a stylized test network illustrate the theoretical findings. ; Peer reviewed

La gestión pública del ambiente y del territorio en Argentina, y en particular en la Provincia de Mendoza, presenta regulaciones jurídicas sectoriales con diversos puntos de conexión, con instituciones y procedimientos legislados desde ambas especialidades en base a marcos conceptuales y herramientas provenientes de distintos enfoques paradigmáticos. Se procura un análisis comparativo entre ambos regímenes, atendiendo a la posibilidad de una coordinación reglamentaria que integre las instituciones propias de cada una de dichas especialidades en un sistema armónico que potencie la consecución del interés general. ; Environment and land public management in Argentina, and, particularly, in the Province of Mendoza, shows sectorial legal regulations with various connection points with institutions and legislated procedures from both specialties, based on conceptual frameworks and tools from different paradigmatic approaches. A comparative analyses between the two regimes is sought, responding to the possibility of a regulatory coordination, integrating their own institutions of each of these specialties in a harmonious system that enhances the achievement of the general interest. ; Fil: Pinto, Mauricio. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Ciencias Agrarias

Changes in the abundance of protein and RNA molecules can impair the formation of complexes in the cell leading to toxicity and death. Here we exploit the information contained in protein, RNA and DNA interaction networks to provide a comprehensive view of the regulation layers controlling the concentration-dependent formation of assemblies in the cell. We present the emerging concept that RNAs can act as scaffolds to promote the formation ribonucleoprotein complexes and coordinate the post-transcriptional layer of gene regulation. We describe the structural and interaction network properties that characterize the ability of protein and RNA molecules to interact and phase separate in liquid-like compartments. Finally, we show that presence of structurally disordered regions in proteins correlate with the propensity to undergo liquid-to-solid phase transitions and cause human diseases. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/kfpqibsNfS0. ; The research leading to these results has been supported by European Research Council (RIBOMYLOME_309545 and ASTRA_855923), the H2020 projects IASIS_727658 and INFORE_825080, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness BFU2017‐86970‐P, the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska‐Curie grant agreement No 754490 within the MINDED project.We also acknowledge support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation to the EMBL partnership, the Centro de Excelencia Severo Ochoa and the CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya