REFUTING REIMAN AND NATHANSON
In: Philosophy & public affairs, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 165-176
ISSN: 0048-3915
THE AUTHOR CONSIDERS JEFFREY REIMAN'S VIEW OF THE PUNISHMENT OFFENDERS DESERVE BEFORE TURNING TO HIS MORAL SCRUPLES, ALLEGED TO JUSTIFY LESSER PUNISHMENTS, AND TO THE DISCRIMINATORY DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY WHICH STEPHEN NATHANSON STRESSES. REIMAN BELIEVES THE DEATH PENALTY IS DESERVED BY SOME MURDERERS, BUT SHOULD NEVER BE IMPOSED. MORAL SCRUPLES SHOULD PRECLUDE IT. IF THE PUNISHMENT DESERVED ACCORDING TO THE LEX TALIONIS IS MORALLY REPUGNANT, WE MAY IMPOSE LESS, PROVIDED THE SUFFERING IMPOSED IN LIEU OF WHAT IS DESERVED IS PROPORTIONAL TO THE SUFFERING INFLICTED ON THE CRIME VICTIM. HOWEVER, SUFFERING EXCEEDING THAT OF HIS VICTIM CAN NEVER BE DESERVED BY THE OFFENDER; TO IMPOSE IT WOULD BE "UNJUST FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT MAKE PUNISHMENT OF THE INNOCENT UNJUST."