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The beginning of XXI century was marked by few events that had influence on international relations in the whole world. Terror attacks in the United States of America in September 11, 2001, were the first such high a big range attacks against the USA. It had shown that the USA – the most powerful state of the world – is vulnerable to more danger, than nuclear weapons alone. After September 11 the USA started war against terrorism in Afghanistan, and many states supported it. However, in spring 2003 the USA unilaterally, without international support, decided to use military power in Iraq, arguing that Iraq possessed potential threat – weapons of mass destruction. Unilateralism, and military and technological differences between the USA and its allies have brought to light a presumption that in the international system there is a single pole, a superpower (hyperpower), the United States of America. The existence of one pole only can have different consequences on international system and international security. The aim of this article was to determine specific features of the unipolar world, influence of polarity of international system upon international security, and specific threats to security that emerge only in unipolar international systems. Another aim was to try to predict the end of the unipolar system: what could be the next poles and when could it come to the end. After analysing a number of articles concerning this topic, few conclusions were drawn. Contemporary international system is unipolar and the single pole is the USA; the USA is superior in military, economic, geopolitical, and political spheres at the same time. Increasing military power and unilateralism of the USA may be treated as a threat to international security. Great powers are trying to balance unipolar power, however, the creation of balance to unipolar power is complicated for several reasons.[.].

The beginning of XXI century was marked by few events that had influence on international relations in the whole world. Terror attacks in the United States of America in September 11, 2001, were the first such high a big range attacks against the USA. It had shown that the USA – the most powerful state of the world – is vulnerable to more danger, than nuclear weapons alone. After September 11 the USA started war against terrorism in Afghanistan, and many states supported it. However, in spring 2003 the USA unilaterally, without international support, decided to use military power in Iraq, arguing that Iraq possessed potential threat – weapons of mass destruction. Unilateralism, and military and technological differences between the USA and its allies have brought to light a presumption that in the international system there is a single pole, a superpower (hyperpower), the United States of America. The existence of one pole only can have different consequences on international system and international security. The aim of this article was to determine specific features of the unipolar world, influence of polarity of international system upon international security, and specific threats to security that emerge only in unipolar international systems. Another aim was to try to predict the end of the unipolar system: what could be the next poles and when could it come to the end. After analysing a number of articles concerning this topic, few conclusions were drawn. Contemporary international system is unipolar and the single pole is the USA; the USA is superior in military, economic, geopolitical, and political spheres at the same time. Increasing military power and unilateralism of the USA may be treated as a threat to international security. Great powers are trying to balance unipolar power, however, the creation of balance to unipolar power is complicated for several reasons.[.].

The beginning of XXI century was marked by few events that had influence on international relations in the whole world. Terror attacks in the United States of America in September 11, 2001, were the first such high a big range attacks against the USA. It had shown that the USA – the most powerful state of the world – is vulnerable to more danger, than nuclear weapons alone. After September 11 the USA started war against terrorism in Afghanistan, and many states supported it. However, in spring 2003 the USA unilaterally, without international support, decided to use military power in Iraq, arguing that Iraq possessed potential threat – weapons of mass destruction. Unilateralism, and military and technological differences between the USA and its allies have brought to light a presumption that in the international system there is a single pole, a superpower (hyperpower), the United States of America. The existence of one pole only can have different consequences on international system and international security. The aim of this article was to determine specific features of the unipolar world, influence of polarity of international system upon international security, and specific threats to security that emerge only in unipolar international systems. Another aim was to try to predict the end of the unipolar system: what could be the next poles and when could it come to the end. After analysing a number of articles concerning this topic, few conclusions were drawn. Contemporary international system is unipolar and the single pole is the USA; the USA is superior in military, economic, geopolitical, and political spheres at the same time. Increasing military power and unilateralism of the USA may be treated as a threat to international security. Great powers are trying to balance unipolar power, however, the creation of balance to unipolar power is complicated for several reasons.[.].

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

The Republic of Belarus is the most authoritarian state in Central and Central-Eastern Europe. The international security community identifies the threats of Aleksandr Lukashenko's regime at global and regional levels. The article analyses the problem: what are the concrete threats posed to Lithuania by the Belarusian authoritarianism? The profiles of the problem presented here - the origins of authoritarianism in Belarus, the pattern of the dependence in the relations between Belarus and Russia, the international security community and Belarus, the development of the Lithuania-Belarus relationship - make it possible to identify eventual threats to Lithuania arising within political, social, economic and ecological sectors.

The Republic of Belarus is the most authoritarian state in Central and Central-Eastern Europe. The international security community identifies the threats of Aleksandr Lukashenko's regime at global and regional levels. The article analyses the problem: what are the concrete threats posed to Lithuania by the Belarusian authoritarianism? The profiles of the problem presented here - the origins of authoritarianism in Belarus, the pattern of the dependence in the relations between Belarus and Russia, the international security community and Belarus, the development of the Lithuania-Belarus relationship - make it possible to identify eventual threats to Lithuania arising within political, social, economic and ecological sectors.

The Republic of Belarus is the most authoritarian state in Central and Central-Eastern Europe. The international security community identifies the threats of Aleksandr Lukashenko's regime at global and regional levels. The article analyses the problem: what are the concrete threats posed to Lithuania by the Belarusian authoritarianism? The profiles of the problem presented here - the origins of authoritarianism in Belarus, the pattern of the dependence in the relations between Belarus and Russia, the international security community and Belarus, the development of the Lithuania-Belarus relationship - make it possible to identify eventual threats to Lithuania arising within political, social, economic and ecological sectors.

The Republic of Belarus is the most authoritarian state in Central and Central-Eastern Europe. The international security community identifies the threats of Aleksandr Lukashenko's regime at global and regional levels. The article analyses the problem: what are the concrete threats posed to Lithuania by the Belarusian authoritarianism? The profiles of the problem presented here - the origins of authoritarianism in Belarus, the pattern of the dependence in the relations between Belarus and Russia, the international security community and Belarus, the development of the Lithuania-Belarus relationship - make it possible to identify eventual threats to Lithuania arising within political, social, economic and ecological sectors.

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or development of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or deve¬lopment of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or deve¬lopment of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or deve¬lopment of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or development of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]