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The aim of this paper is examination of general relationship between political ideology and radical environmental activism, with a special focus on considering the extent of influence and the exact position of the politics in the domain of mentioned eco-activism. Within the first four parts, the general characteristics of radical environmentalism, as well as its relationship with the political left-wing, political right-wing and apolitical/anti-political beliefs are analyzed, while the final part is devoted to discussion and general conclusions. Among other things, it was concluded that the basic ideological dimension of radical eco-activism is based on the idea of biocentrism, as the original environmental and nonpolitical category, while political ideological elements represent secondary and facultative components that can influence the specification of the ideology of a part of eco-activists. At the same time, it was pointed out that the proper perception of such (i.e. secondary) position of political beliefs within the radical eco-activism creates a precondition for understanding heterogeneity and frequent contradictions in the political beliefs of radical eco-activists.

Main objective in this article is to describe in more details specific interlinkages and exchange that is unfolding between political elite and entrepreneurs as key actors that possess, manage and deploy economic resources in the private sector of the economy. The focus is on the specific mechanisms through which the exchange has been unfolding, as well as on the perception of the functionality of the exchange for the position and interests of both type of actors. The analysis is conducted using empirical findings from the qualitative, in-depth research on political clientelism and party patronage implemented in the spring 2015 upon sample of 55 representatives of political elite, 26 economic actors, 9 interlocking broker and 8 experts. From the research, it is clear that economic actors have, to put it mildly, ambivalent attitude towards this way of functioning of the market. On the one hand, they feel all the risks they are exposed to: additional expenditure, unforeseen requirements, interference in their own personnel policy, uncertainty of their business in the long term, unfair competition, demand unpredictability etc. On the other hand, they take this play as given. When they think strategically, they rationally consider alternatives and cost-benefit relationship. Although the desire to get rid of the political embrace is present, the support that comes from that side represents at least a short-term guarantor of their position security. Political actors take this system as given to a certain extent and when describing the mechanisms of its functioning, they do not question the system itself.

Nach Meinung der Autoren leidet die Handelskooperation der Europäischen Union (EU) mit der Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) unter einem eklatanten "Legitimationsdefizit", welches durch das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen deklaratorischer Bereitschaft zur Kooperation und einer rigorosen Politik der Marktabschottung gekennzeichnet ist. Zur Untermauerung ihrer These stützen sich die Autoren auf die bislang zugänglichen Daten von Eurostat, Internationalem Währungsfond (IWF) und dem Statistischen Bundesamt im Zeitraum von 1980 bis 1996. ; Nach Meinung der Autoren leidet die Handelskooperation der Europäischen Union (EU) mit der Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) unter einem eklatanten "Legitimationsdefizit", welches durch das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen deklaratorischer Bereitschaft zur Kooperation und einer rigorosen Politik der Marktabschottung gekennzeichnet ist. Zur Untermauerung ihrer These stützen sich die Autoren auf die bislang zugänglichen Daten von Eurostat, Internationalem Währungsfond (IWF) und dem Statistischen Bundesamt im Zeitraum von 1980 bis 1996.

On the basis of three case studies, the authors attempt to identify changes in relationships between politicians and senior civil servants. Reforms inspired by 'New Public Management' (NPM) have been implemented with the aim of creating a clearer separation between strategic activities entrusted to politicians, and the operational or managerial tasks generally under the remit of senior civil servants. By analysing the reforms implemented in three Swiss cantons, the article tests the hypothesis of strategic contingency of political-administrative relations, in particular in view of the different modernization routes selected in each of the three cantons. Obtained using both quantitative and qualitative survey techniques, the empirical results allow us to cast strong doubt on the emergence of greater distance between politicians and the civil service. While our results indicate elements of strategic contingency, no empirical factor allows us to identify greater separation between political and administrative spheres as a result of the reforms. In contrast, politicians and senior civil servants still freely admit their very high level of interdependence in designing, deciding and implementing public policies. Other explanations must therefore be put forward to explain this lack of distinction in the results, in particular institutional aspects. Points for practitioners This article shows that senior civil servants must be regarded as key players in the definition and implementation of public policies. Admittedly, administrative reform strategies influence relations between political and administrative spheres and contribute towards the development of new dynamics. However, the results of the research presented in this article clearly show that, from a public management point of view, it is hardly reasonable to attempt at all costs to separate these two spheres which are in fact complementary.

This paper is dedicated to the relation between market development and democracy. We distinguish contexts and preferences and ask whether it is true that the demand for democracy only emerges after a certain degree of market development is reached, and whether, conversely, democratization is likely to be an obstacle to the acceptation of market liberalization. Our study hinges on a new survey rich in attitudinal variables: the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) conducted in 2006 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, in 28 post-Transition countries. Our identification strategy consists in relying on the specific situation of frontier-zones. We find that democracy enhances the support for market development whereas the reverse is not true. Hence, the relativist argument according to which the preference for democracy is an endogenous by-product of market development is not supported by our data.

This paper is dedicated to the relation between market development and democracy. We distinguish contexts and preferences and ask whether it is true that the demand for democracy only emerges after a certain degree of market development is reached, and whether, conversely, democratization is likely to be an obstacle to the acceptation of market liberalization. Our study hinges on a new survey rich in attitudinal variables: the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) conducted in 2006 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, in 28 post-Transition countries. Our identification strategy consists in relying on the specific situation of frontier-zones. We find that democracy enhances the support for market development whereas the reverse is not true. Hence, the relativist argument according to which the preference for democracy is an endogenous by-product of market development is not supported by our data. ; Cet article tente de discerner des relations de causalité entre démocratie et marché en distinguant contexte et préférences. Il s'agit de savoir si le développement du marché favorise le soutien à la démocratie et, inversement, si le développement de la démocratie est propice à l'adhésion des citoyens au marché. Ce travail s'appuie sur une nouvelle enquête, Life in Transition Survey, conduite en 2006 par la BERD dans 26 pays en transition. Notre stratégie d'identification repose sur l'exploitation de la situation particulière des zones-frontalières présentes au sein de l'enquête. Nos résultats suggèrent que la démocratie est favorable à la demande de marché tandis que le développement du marché ne conduit pas è une plus forte demande de démocratie. L'argument relativiste selon lequel la préférence pour la démocratie est un effet endogène du développement économique n'est donc pas validé par nos données.