The approach of Critical Legal Studies that law is a cultural artefact that can be criticised is taken as point of departure in this paper. This insight is applied to food as a very important cultural artefact that permeates virtually every aspect of our personal and social lives. The paper then examines three types of restrictive diets, namely Kosher food production, halal food rules and vegetarianism. From this study it concludes that all three perform a vital social function of providing adherents with a unifying and identifying set of rules to foster social coherence. But it also provides adherents with a strong moral foundation that serves to justify a sense of moral superiority. Most importantly, all three these diets rest on a modernist view of morality in which absolute, unquestioning and universal truths are possible. It therefore serves to provide certainty in the postmodern condition of uncertainty and relativism. For that reason this study concludes that vegetarianism is the new religion – it provides people who no longer believe in traditional religions with a new certainty. ; https://doi.org/10.4102/td.v8i1.2
Added t.-p. and text in Hebrew. ; I. The existence of God.--II. The Mosaic law.--III. The improved law of Ezra.--IV. The Talmudic systems.--V. The social and political laws. ; Mode of access: Internet.
There is a widespread tendency in modern, secular society to view law and religion as unrelated except insofar as they may, from time to time, come into conflict. However, intimate relations between the two have been constituted and constantly changed throughout history. Law and religion are two great interconnecting values and belief structures with their own normative, authoritative sources and mechanisms, as well as their own legislation and amendment processes and steps. However, at the practical level, the relationship between the two has not often been smooth sailing. This paper seeks to untangle the confusion, conflicts and complications that have arisen, especially in the Zimbabwean context, when legal statutes have appeared to be in opposition with religious beliefs and practices. The major question arising from such a scenario is: How are communities of faith across the religious divide supposed to react when laws demand that they act in ways that conflict with either their sacred text whether written or oral? The focus of this paper, therefore, is to simultaneously examine the place of religion in the public sphere as well as explore the impact of enacted laws on religion in Zimbabwe. This paper made use of public discourse, as presented in a WhatsApp group chat of a Bible Challenge Group which took place on 21 February 2021. Secondary sources were utilised in informing this paper's conceptualisation of religion and the law.
This article examines documents of the Sephardic Community of Livorno during the 17th century, with special attention to the escamot that refer to legal aspects of Jewish life in this port-city, in order to contribute to the study of the religious community experiences during political changes in Europe in the Early Modern Period. This enables analysis of how, and to what extent, the mechanisms of communal socialization and social control in the public and private spheres were related to the process in which the territorial authority and the political control of its borders were reinforced in Tuscany. It argues that Sephardic community legal decisions reinforced political processes in Livorno (and Tuscany), rather than merely been unconnected to them. This argument implies reconsidering not only the role of Diasporic religious communities in local political context, but also the role of local context in the tension between religion and law. From this perspective, it is possible to deepen our understanding of the experience of religious communities regarding the conception on Justice. ; Este artículo examina documentos de la Comunidad Sefardí de Livorno durante el siglo XVII, con especial atención a las escamot que se refieren a los aspectos jurídicos de la vida judía en esta ciudad-puerto, con el objetivo de contribuir al estudio de las experiencias de las comunidades religiosas frente a los cambios políticos en Europa durante la Edad Moderna. Esto permite analizar el alcance de los mecanismos de sociabilización comunitaria y de control social en las esferas pública y privada en relación con los procesos en donde se reforzó la autoridad territorial y el control político de las fronteras en Toscana. El argumento del artículo sostiene que las decisiones legales de la comunidad sefardí reforzaron los procesos políticos en Livorno (y en Toscana), en lugar de simplemente ser independiente de ellos. Este argumento implica reconsiderar no solo el papel de las comunidades religiosas diaspóricas en el contexto político local, sino también el rol del contexto local en la tensión entre la religión y el derecho. Desde esta perspectiva, es posible profundizar la comprensión de la experiencia de las comunidades religiosas respecto a la concepción de la Justicia. ; Ciencias Religiosas ; Derecho
Most histories of Early Modern English common law focus on a very specific set of individuals, namely Justices Edward Coke and Matthew Hale, Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Henry Finch, Sir John Doddridge, and-very recently-John Selden. The focus is partly explained by the immense influence most of these individuals exercised upon the study and practice of common law during the seventeenth century. Moreover, according to J.W. Tubbs, such a focus is unavoidable because a great majority of common lawyers left no record of their thoughts. It is my contention that Tubbs' view is unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to reconstruct the thoughts of a vast majority of common lawyers, there is no reason to limit our studies of common law to the aforementioned group of individuals. In fact, if we are to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the place of common law in political and intellectual culture of the seventeenth century, it is necessary to move beyond the limits to which current historiography has confined itself.
The freedom to receive and impart information, privacy and the freedom from discrimination on grounds of religious belief are universally recognised as fundamental human rights and, as such, also form part of the basic values of democratic societies. These rights have, in the main, only been adequately articulated and increasingly protected at the international level after the Second World War, relatively very late in more than seven thousand years of civilization In contrast, the values promoted by religions have often been recognised as such for millennia. Where do the values of privacy law and religions conflict and where do they converge, especially in a world where information technology is ubiquitous? The paper examines the debate over privacy from various perspectives, identifying those areas where religions appear to have confronted issues of human rights and where lawyers have been joined in the debate by philosophers within the rapidly developing field of information ethics. It concludes by listing a minimum ten areas where religions may possibly contribute to the intercultural debate on privacy in the Information Society. ; peer-reviewed
My dissertation, Mexican Religion on Trial: Race, Religion and the Law in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, presents three critical junctures in United States history (between the nineteenth century and the present) to explore political and legal discourses surrounding Mexican Catholicism after the Mexican-American war. This research employs historical, archival, and ethnographic methods. My analysis of numerous legal case studies, law enforcement training manuals, oral histories, ethnographic methods, and archival documents reveal processes by which Mexican Catholic practices and performances become signifiers of illegality and criminality, used as evidence against the inclusion and extension of national and cultural citizenship. While the surveillance of Mexicans communities reflects increased anxiety and suspicion about immigrant communities and their religions in the 9/11 period, this history positions contemporary legal debates on Mexican religion within a larger history of anti-Mexican and anti-Catholic attitudes in the Southwest.
The process through which European States and institutions have responded to the social and cultural mutation in the European religious landscape has been met with increasing criticism. Depending upon the interests and the agendas at stake, European instances have been blamed for being too weak or too strong in their policies affecting religion, for being biased either in favor or against religion and ultimately for an insufficient commitment to worldwide religious liberty. This paper aims at responding to criticism through a three-step approach. First, it will highlight the peculiarity and salience of developments in European law and religion, based on the four projects that drove the interaction of law and religion in the European integration process: the human rights project, the single market project, the secular project and the religious project. In this part, I will suggest that, prior to any discussion on the direction that Europeans should take in the future, it is necessary to acknowledge Europe as an extraordinary laboratory of equality and diversity, allowing for an extremely dynamic interaction of law and religion to develop. Second, the paper will underline the concoction of human rights and single market in the making of European dynamic law and religion, and will study the implications thereof. Third, the paper will point at the emergence of a threefold pattern of clashing forces and ideas: the secular versus the religious; States versus Europe; and majorities versus minorities. I will observe that a defensive strategy has fuelled the threefold divisive pattern, consecrating a paradigm increasingly at odds with the dramatically changed picture of beliefs and convictions in Europe, I will argue that the disconnection between the old, dominant paradigm and the various European realities, means that a new paradigm is badly needed. I will conclude that Europe needs the courage to honor its inclination towards a dynamic, constantly evolving interaction of law and religion. This will imply acknowledging change as a key feature of the European experience with law and religion, and, once again, 'choosing change' in order to enhance religious pluralism, reassess the role of the State as the 'neutral and impartial organizer of the practising of the various religions, denominations and beliefs,' (European Court of Human Rights, 2001) assert the European Union as 'impartial' and 'not aligned with any specific religion or belief' (EU Guidelines on the protection and promotion of freedom of religion or belief, 2013), and encourage actors involved in religion and belief to reinvent structures and actions.
This paper explores the Naha Confucius Temple case, resolved by the Supreme Court in February 2021, in light of postwar decisions on Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese constitution. Religion is a contested category in Japanese legislation, appearing both in the constitution and in laws regulating the freedoms and restrictions of legally registered religious organizations. While the organization behind the Confucius Temple in Naha was registered as a general corporate juridical person, the majority opinion sided with the plaintiffs' argument that the free lease granted to the temple by the municipality of Naha constituted a violence of the ban on public sponsorship of religious institutions and activities. In order to reach their decision, the Supreme Court and the lower courts not only had to decide on whether Confucianism was a religion or not, but also on whether the organization behind the temple—a group dedicated to the history and memory of the Chinese immigrant community in Naha—should in fact be considered a religious organization. The outcome of the case is a good example of religion-making in courts of law, with a central institution of power employing notions of sui generis religion to regulate and define civil actors.
The articles seeks to understand the politics of transnational Islamic family law in Canada, the United States, France and Germany, through the migration of one particular legal institution: Mahr, "the gift which the bridegroom has to give to the bride when the contract of marriage is made and which becomes the property of the wife." The issue of Mahr typically presents itself in a crisis-like fashion: married Muslim women, engaged in religiously structured marriages, and living in Western liberal states, reach out to the secular court upon the dissolution of their marriage to claim the enforcement of Mahr, presumably because their husbands have previously refused to give them the amount of deferred Mahr. Through an analysis of the case law, I will explore the ways in which legal pluralism, formal equality and substantive equality are being used by courts to accept or root out Islamic law from the family of institutions that are deemed appropriate in Western countries. How do the diverse and contradictory conceptual themes around Islamic law and Islamic theory get received or brought to Western liberal courts? What are the modes of influence in the selection and imposition processes of Mahr as a legal transplant? Does the reification of religion by courts simultaneously fragment it as rules move across borders? Does the way Mahr travels affect subjectivity, in both productive and reactive terms? ; (Product of workshop No. 6 at the 10th MRM 2009).
This paper explores the Naha Confucius Temple case, resolved by the Supreme Court in February 2021, in light of postwar decisions on Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese constitution. Religion is a contested category in Japanese legislation, appearing both in the constitution and in laws regulating the freedoms and restrictions of legally registered religious organizations. While the organization behind the Confucius Temple in Naha was registered as a general corporate juridical person, the majority opinion sided with the plaintiffs' argument that the free lease granted to the temple by the municipality of Naha constituted a violence of the ban on public sponsorship of religious institutions and activities. In order to reach their decision, the Supreme Court and the lower courts not only had to decide on whether Confucianism was a religion or not, but also on whether the organization behind the temple—a group dedicated to the history and memory of the Chinese immigrant community in Naha—should in fact be considered a religious organization. The outcome of the case is a good example of religion-making in courts of law, with a central institution of power employing notions of sui generis religion to regulate and define civil actors.
Is it right or entrenched? The people of India have to make India a democratic republic and have freedom, power, and opportunity injustice, society, economy, politics, and religion The fraternity is to be fulfilled in order to achieve equality and the dignity of the individual and the integrity of the country and society. Baba Saheb Ambedkar aptly says that No matter how good a political act is a political law will certainly become bad if the rulers are bad. The constitution can be good if it is good for a political act. The Indian nation has eight thousand castes. How can the fraternity and equality come into existence if a few people have tendency of superiority with the frenzied religion? It is not possible indifference shown in terms of birth, by the birth and the status quo.
Published online: 27 January 2016 ; In the first chapter the historical relationship of Judaism and Zionism was discussed, while the second discusses the constitutional conflict between Jewish and the democratic character of the State of Israel. The third chapter analyzes the millet system of religious laws (inherited from the Ottoman Empire) for both Jews, as the religious majority, and for different minorities. The main question is, whether or not this pluralist legal system can be considered as liberal, providing equal rights, and what other alternatives are feasible in Israel today. The more general constitutional question behind the legal one is, whether or not the Jewish and the democratic character of the State of Israel based on Zionism can be consolidated.
By examining the intersection of Islamic law, state law, religion, and culture in the Egyptian nation-building process, Recasting Islamic Law highlights how the sharia, when attached to constitutional commitments, is reshaped into modern Islamic state law. Rachel M. Scott analyzes the complex effects of constitutional commitments to the sharia in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. She argues that the sharia is not dismantled by the modern state when it is applied as modern Islamic state law, but rather recast in its service. In showing the particular forms that the sharia takes when it is applied as modern Islamic state law, Scott pushes back against assumptions that introductions of the sharia into modern state law result in either the revival of medieval Islam or in its complete transformation. Scott engages with premodern law and with the Ottoman legal legacy on topics concerning Egypt's Coptic community, women's rights, personal status law, and the relationship between religious scholars and the Supreme Constitutional Court. Recasting Islamic Law considers modern Islamic state law's discontinuities and its continuities with premodern sharia.
In pre-democratic – also pre-modern – times, religion had been at the centre of much of human life, filling the private as well as the public realm of people's daily existence. However, with the change to democratic rule in major countries in the modern world (see, most influentially, Article 1 of the French Constitution after the French Revolution and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, influencing all other democracies in their wake), religion has for the most part reflexively been sidelined from public life. Or has it? Does religion not still hold a special place in law in democratic societies, but now in reverse? Firstly, whereas matters of religious faith had throughout the greater part of human history been included in matters of politics, it is now as a matter of course of law excluded, purposely so. Religion is thus still a 'special case', a unique aspect of humanity when compared to all other matters, in law as much as in politics and other aspects of public life. Secondly, in the post-secular cultural climate dawning across the world, matters of faith (religion, spirituality) are no longer as stringently excluded from public life, which impacts directly on how religion is touched upon in law, sociology, philosophy, music and other academic disciplines too. Our dawning post-secular age is bringing something new. Two scholars, who have been doing foundational work in this regard, have done so fully in parallel, not taking cognisance of the mutualities in their academic contributions. Otto in Munich, Germany, has been combining his two areas of expertise, the Pentateuch in the Hebrew Bible and the sociologist Max Weber, to indicate the trajectory through history of democratic impulses from Ancient Near Eastern founding documents into the current era. Benson in Sydney, Australia, has on his part been drawing on his expertise in law as practised in Canada and taught in Europe, South Africa and Australia to indicate how, in inclusively liberal democracies, law cannot justifiably be ...
