This study focuses on community relations policies followed by public bodies in Northern Ireland during the Troubles [1969-1998]. The author compares the first plan, which lasted from 1969 to 1974, with the second series of measures taken from 1987. She also examines policies set up during the intervening thirteen years [1974-1987] when the issue of CR remained dormant. This examination shows that the consistency of government policies in the field of community relations is questionable. Community relations programmes have been looked at alongside peacebuilding initiatives involving public bodies as well as community activists. Despite an initial assumption that there has been no continuity in community relations policies between 1969 and 1998, it appears from the research that, throughout the Troubles, such policies have emanated from modes of thinking and acting which are well established among decision makers. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse aux politiques de relations communautaires, community relations [CR], conçues et mises en place par les autorités publiques dans le contexte du conflit nord-irlandais entre 1969 et 1998. Elle s'interroge sur la filiation entre les dispositifs de 1969 et 1987-1990 et sur la cohésion de ces programmes dans la période étudiée. Elle insère les politiques de CR dans une démarche globale de construction de la paix, peacebuilding, parfois adoptée par les autorités publiques dans le contexte du conflit nordirlandais. La thèse décrit les caractéristiques de cette démarche et les met en relation avec les développements ayant lieu au sein du secteur associatif nord-irlandais. Malgré une première impression de discontinuité dans les politiques de CR, ce travail doctoral met progressivement en exergue la permanence de schémas de pensée et d'action au sein des autorités publiques entre 1969 et 1998, desquels émergent les programmes de CR étudiés.
This study focuses on community relations policies followed by public bodies in Northern Ireland during the Troubles [1969-1998]. The author compares the first plan, which lasted from 1969 to 1974, with the second series of measures taken from 1987. She also examines policies set up during the intervening thirteen years [1974-1987] when the issue of CR remained dormant. This examination shows that the consistency of government policies in the field of community relations is questionable. Community relations programmes have been looked at alongside peacebuilding initiatives involving public bodies as well as community activists. Despite an initial assumption that there has been no continuity in community relations policies between 1969 and 1998, it appears from the research that, throughout the Troubles, such policies have emanated from modes of thinking and acting which are well established among decision makers. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse aux politiques de relations communautaires, community relations [CR], conçues et mises en place par les autorités publiques dans le contexte du conflit nord-irlandais entre 1969 et 1998. Elle s'interroge sur la filiation entre les dispositifs de 1969 et 1987-1990 et sur la cohésion de ces programmes dans la période étudiée. Elle insère les politiques de CR dans une démarche globale de construction de la paix, peacebuilding, parfois adoptée par les autorités publiques dans le contexte du conflit nordirlandais. La thèse décrit les caractéristiques de cette démarche et les met en relation avec les développements ayant lieu au sein du secteur associatif nord-irlandais. Malgré une première impression de discontinuité dans les politiques de CR, ce travail doctoral met progressivement en exergue la permanence de schémas de pensée et d'action au sein des autorités publiques entre 1969 et 1998, desquels émergent les programmes de CR étudiés.
This study focuses on community relations policies followed by public bodies in Northern Ireland during the Troubles [1969-1998]. The author compares the first plan, which lasted from 1969 to 1974, with the second series of measures taken from 1987. She also examines policies set up during the intervening thirteen years [1974-1987] when the issue of CR remained dormant. This examination shows that the consistency of government policies in the field of community relations is questionable. Community relations programmes have been looked at alongside peacebuilding initiatives involving public bodies as well as community activists. Despite an initial assumption that there has been no continuity in community relations policies between 1969 and 1998, it appears from the research that, throughout the Troubles, such policies have emanated from modes of thinking and acting which are well established among decision makers. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse aux politiques de relations communautaires, community relations [CR], conçues et mises en place par les autorités publiques dans le contexte du conflit nord-irlandais entre 1969 et 1998. Elle s'interroge sur la filiation entre les dispositifs de 1969 et 1987-1990 et sur la cohésion de ces programmes dans la période étudiée. Elle insère les politiques de CR dans une démarche globale de construction de la paix, peacebuilding, parfois adoptée par les autorités publiques dans le contexte du conflit nordirlandais. La thèse décrit les caractéristiques de cette démarche et les met en relation avec les développements ayant lieu au sein du secteur associatif nord-irlandais. Malgré une première impression de discontinuité dans les politiques de CR, ce travail doctoral met progressivement en exergue la permanence de schémas de pensée et d'action au sein des autorités publiques entre 1969 et 1998, desquels émergent les programmes de CR étudiés.
Salafism appeared in Yemen around Muqbil al-Wâdi'î of Dammâj, north Yemen, in the early 1980s. Since then it has spread throughout the country in various teaching centres and mosques. Dominant political and academic narratives often regard the salafi movement as the offspring of a Saudi religious proselytism that aims at spreading its own model, and this in order to manipulate the loyalty of Yemeni citizens and to satisfy its own national interest. In that framework, religion and transnational actors (migrants, business men or students) are seen as simple instruments of domination and state power. Explaining the rise of salafism in Yemen in terms of imperialism and confrontation of power appears superficial. In the Yemeni context, this political and religious movement develops less because of centralised policies than because of various local, global and translocal social dynamics witnessed in the contemporary Arabian Peninsula. These processes mix individual migratory trajectories, recompositions of religious and political identities in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in Muslim societies and the effects of the "global war against terror". The trajectory of salafism in the Yemeni environment is affected by domestic structures and institutions. For individuals at grass-roots level, this religious practice does not bear the same meaning in Yemeni society as it does in Saudi Arabia's. It is mainly for this reason that the state, even when it is dominant, does not control the ideological evolution of salafism and of its entrepreneurs and advocates. ; Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi'î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la ...
Salafism appeared in Yemen around Muqbil al-Wâdi'î of Dammâj, north Yemen, in the early 1980s. Since then it has spread throughout the country in various teaching centres and mosques. Dominant political and academic narratives often regard the salafi movement as the offspring of a Saudi religious proselytism that aims at spreading its own model, and this in order to manipulate the loyalty of Yemeni citizens and to satisfy its own national interest. In that framework, religion and transnational actors (migrants, business men or students) are seen as simple instruments of domination and state power. Explaining the rise of salafism in Yemen in terms of imperialism and confrontation of power appears superficial. In the Yemeni context, this political and religious movement develops less because of centralised policies than because of various local, global and translocal social dynamics witnessed in the contemporary Arabian Peninsula. These processes mix individual migratory trajectories, recompositions of religious and political identities in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in Muslim societies and the effects of the "global war against terror". The trajectory of salafism in the Yemeni environment is affected by domestic structures and institutions. For individuals at grass-roots level, this religious practice does not bear the same meaning in Yemeni society as it does in Saudi Arabia's. It is mainly for this reason that the state, even when it is dominant, does not control the ideological evolution of salafism and of its entrepreneurs and advocates. ; Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi'î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la ...
Salafism appeared in Yemen around Muqbil al-Wâdi'î of Dammâj, north Yemen, in the early 1980s. Since then it has spread throughout the country in various teaching centres and mosques. Dominant political and academic narratives often regard the salafi movement as the offspring of a Saudi religious proselytism that aims at spreading its own model, and this in order to manipulate the loyalty of Yemeni citizens and to satisfy its own national interest. In that framework, religion and transnational actors (migrants, business men or students) are seen as simple instruments of domination and state power. Explaining the rise of salafism in Yemen in terms of imperialism and confrontation of power appears superficial. In the Yemeni context, this political and religious movement develops less because of centralised policies than because of various local, global and translocal social dynamics witnessed in the contemporary Arabian Peninsula. These processes mix individual migratory trajectories, recompositions of religious and political identities in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in Muslim societies and the effects of the "global war against terror". The trajectory of salafism in the Yemeni environment is affected by domestic structures and institutions. For individuals at grass-roots level, this religious practice does not bear the same meaning in Yemeni society as it does in Saudi Arabia's. It is mainly for this reason that the state, even when it is dominant, does not control the ideological evolution of salafism and of its entrepreneurs and advocates. ; Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi'î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la ...
Salafism appeared in Yemen around Muqbil al-Wâdi'î of Dammâj, north Yemen, in the early 1980s. Since then it has spread throughout the country in various teaching centres and mosques. Dominant political and academic narratives often regard the salafi movement as the offspring of a Saudi religious proselytism that aims at spreading its own model, and this in order to manipulate the loyalty of Yemeni citizens and to satisfy its own national interest. In that framework, religion and transnational actors (migrants, business men or students) are seen as simple instruments of domination and state power. Explaining the rise of salafism in Yemen in terms of imperialism and confrontation of power appears superficial. In the Yemeni context, this political and religious movement develops less because of centralised policies than because of various local, global and translocal social dynamics witnessed in the contemporary Arabian Peninsula. These processes mix individual migratory trajectories, recompositions of religious and political identities in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in Muslim societies and the effects of the "global war against terror". The trajectory of salafism in the Yemeni environment is affected by domestic structures and institutions. For individuals at grass-roots level, this religious practice does not bear the same meaning in Yemeni society as it does in Saudi Arabia's. It is mainly for this reason that the state, even when it is dominant, does not control the ideological evolution of salafism and of its entrepreneurs and advocates. ; Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi'î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la ...
Le discours politique évoque régulièrement le "vivre ensemble". Le présent article présente les dispositifs étatiques en ce sens afin d'évaluer si le discours est suivi d'un réel soutien. ; Peer reviewed
This study presents constitutional law as an ideal framework to analyze the foreign relations of the State. Through a double standpoint, it examines these relations from the State's perspective and through the action of the empowered organs of the State. In this way, the study aims to highlight the institutional and normative specificities of State's foreign relations. When the State establishes diplomatic and military relations at the outer-limits of its borders, it assumes a singular role compared to other political non-state unities. It performs a political function (fonction-fin), as defined by Charles Eisenmann, which belongs to the field of foreign relations. This political function is hold by the State in order to fulfill one basic need of the sovereign collectivity: to establish and to maintain "good relations" outside its boundaries – irrespective of the conflictual or cooperative nature of these relations. Because law and politics are intertwined, the function of foreign relations do not pre-define the distribution of powers within the State. Nevertheless, it exerts some influence on the constituent's choices and on the practices of the empowered organs. At the interface between the State's interior and exterior, constitutional analysis enables therefore to reexamine many elements usually taken as evident. This study assesses them and observe its effects. For example, it is possible to nuance the State's monopoly on foreign relations and, through a historical perspective, to moderate the governmental concentration of the direction of foreign affairs. ; L'étude proposée soutient que le droit constitutionnel offre un cadre privilégié pour observer les relations extérieures de l'État. L'approche envisage de les appréhender à la fois au prisme de l'État lui-même, et à travers l'action des organes compétents organisés dans l'État. Cette étude entend ainsi mettre en lumière les spécificités institutionnelles et normatives des relations extérieures de l'État. Lorsque celui-ci établit des rapports à ...
This study presents constitutional law as an ideal framework to analyze the foreign relations of the State. Through a double standpoint, it examines these relations from the State's perspective and through the action of the empowered organs of the State. In this way, the study aims to highlight the institutional and normative specificities of State's foreign relations. When the State establishes diplomatic and military relations at the outer-limits of its borders, it assumes a singular role compared to other political non-state unities. It performs a political function (fonction-fin), as defined by Charles Eisenmann, which belongs to the field of foreign relations. This political function is hold by the State in order to fulfill one basic need of the sovereign collectivity: to establish and to maintain "good relations" outside its boundaries – irrespective of the conflictual or cooperative nature of these relations. Because law and politics are intertwined, the function of foreign relations do not pre-define the distribution of powers within the State. Nevertheless, it exerts some influence on the constituent's choices and on the practices of the empowered organs. At the interface between the State's interior and exterior, constitutional analysis enables therefore to reexamine many elements usually taken as evident. This study assesses them and observe its effects. For example, it is possible to nuance the State's monopoly on foreign relations and, through a historical perspective, to moderate the governmental concentration of the direction of foreign affairs. ; L'étude proposée soutient que le droit constitutionnel offre un cadre privilégié pour observer les relations extérieures de l'État. L'approche envisage de les appréhender à la fois au prisme de l'État lui-même, et à travers l'action des organes compétents organisés dans l'État. Cette étude entend ainsi mettre en lumière les spécificités institutionnelles et normatives des relations extérieures de l'État. Lorsque celui-ci établit des rapports à ...
This study presents constitutional law as an ideal framework to analyze the foreign relations of the State. Through a double standpoint, it examines these relations from the State's perspective and through the action of the empowered organs of the State. In this way, the study aims to highlight the institutional and normative specificities of State's foreign relations. When the State establishes diplomatic and military relations at the outer-limits of its borders, it assumes a singular role compared to other political non-state unities. It performs a political function (fonction-fin), as defined by Charles Eisenmann, which belongs to the field of foreign relations. This political function is hold by the State in order to fulfill one basic need of the sovereign collectivity: to establish and to maintain "good relations" outside its boundaries – irrespective of the conflictual or cooperative nature of these relations. Because law and politics are intertwined, the function of foreign relations do not pre-define the distribution of powers within the State. Nevertheless, it exerts some influence on the constituent's choices and on the practices of the empowered organs. At the interface between the State's interior and exterior, constitutional analysis enables therefore to reexamine many elements usually taken as evident. This study assesses them and observe its effects. For example, it is possible to nuance the State's monopoly on foreign relations and, through a historical perspective, to moderate the governmental concentration of the direction of foreign affairs. ; L'étude proposée soutient que le droit constitutionnel offre un cadre privilégié pour observer les relations extérieures de l'État. L'approche envisage de les appréhender à la fois au prisme de l'État lui-même, et à travers l'action des organes compétents organisés dans l'État. Cette étude entend ainsi mettre en lumière les spécificités institutionnelles et normatives des relations extérieures de l'État. Lorsque celui-ci établit des rapports à l'extérieur de ses frontières au moyen de ses outils diplomatique et militaire, il assume un rôle singulier en comparaison des autres unités politiques non étatiques. En effet, il remplit une fonction-fin, au sens de Charles Eisenmann, propre à la matière des relations extérieures. Cette fonction politique est assurée par l'État afin de répondre à un besoin de la collectivité souveraine, à savoir nouer de « bons rapports » au-dehors de son territoire – sans préjuger si la relation en cause est conflictuelle ou coopérative. En raison de l'imbrication du droit et du politique, la fonction des relations extérieures de l'État, si elle ne préjuge pas de la répartition des compétences au sein de celui-ci, n'est pas sans influencer les choix du constituant et la pratique des organes habilités. Placée à l'interface entre le dedans et le dehors de l'État, l'analyse constitutionnelle permet de réinterroger plusieurs éléments souvent présentés comme relevant de l'évidence. L'étude conduit autant à les examiner qu'à en observer les effets. Ainsi est-il possible, par exemple, de relativiser le monopole étatique des relations extérieures ou encore de tempérer, au regard de l'histoire, la concentration gouvernementale de la direction des affaires extérieures.
In the years 1990/2000, the Failling State, Failed State, Collapsed State, Quasi-State and Weak State upset the international political thought. What definition (s) could we bring to these states in one or more meanings that political science would hear? In what way would they contribute to enriching political theory?Fearing the normative effects and lack of scientific objectivity of a provisional definition at the outset, we have chosen to define the concept descriptively, that is to say at the end of an empirical analysis. The problem was then methodological: how to describe an object that we did not suspect existed there is little? And how to analyze it?We started from the idea that Failling State, Failed State, Collapsed State, Quasi-State and Weak State were synonymous notions from the same concept, "failing states". The use of this philosophical term therefore gave us the task of determining all the meanings, notions and uses attached to it. The concept could also be characteristic of a paradigm. This term borrowed from the philosophy of science made it possible to envisage the existence of a community of thinkers, co-authors of the concept-paradigm thanks to their socio-political lexical uses, even to their theories.With these two reflective frameworks, we had to follow the lexicographer's approach. Supported by the tools of discourse analysis, especially on form and lexicological methods, it was a question of retracing the history of the concept over a long period of time: from its genesis, its phases of construction and deconstruction to our days.From this diachronic approach, three results have emerged:The first was to discover the theoretician of the concept-paradigm "Failling State" in the person of René de Lucinge, Sieur des Allymes. The ambassador of Savoy to the Court of France under King Henry III, friend a time of Giovanni Botero, exposes for the first time, the theory of failure that is to say the fall of the state in his little political treatise De la Naissance, Duree et Cheutte des Estats, ...
In the years 1990/2000, the Failling State, Failed State, Collapsed State, Quasi-State and Weak State upset the international political thought. What definition (s) could we bring to these states in one or more meanings that political science would hear? In what way would they contribute to enriching political theory?Fearing the normative effects and lack of scientific objectivity of a provisional definition at the outset, we have chosen to define the concept descriptively, that is to say at the end of an empirical analysis. The problem was then methodological: how to describe an object that we did not suspect existed there is little? And how to analyze it?We started from the idea that Failling State, Failed State, Collapsed State, Quasi-State and Weak State were synonymous notions from the same concept, "failing states". The use of this philosophical term therefore gave us the task of determining all the meanings, notions and uses attached to it. The concept could also be characteristic of a paradigm. This term borrowed from the philosophy of science made it possible to envisage the existence of a community of thinkers, co-authors of the concept-paradigm thanks to their socio-political lexical uses, even to their theories.With these two reflective frameworks, we had to follow the lexicographer's approach. Supported by the tools of discourse analysis, especially on form and lexicological methods, it was a question of retracing the history of the concept over a long period of time: from its genesis, its phases of construction and deconstruction to our days.From this diachronic approach, three results have emerged:The first was to discover the theoretician of the concept-paradigm "Failling State" in the person of René de Lucinge, Sieur des Allymes. The ambassador of Savoy to the Court of France under King Henry III, friend a time of Giovanni Botero, exposes for the first time, the theory of failure that is to say the fall of the state in his little political treatise De la Naissance, Duree et Cheutte des Estats, published in 1588 in Paris. Disgraced in 1602 for having signed the Treaty of Lyon, his name and his works were damnati for three hundred years. Through the discovery of René de Lucinge, the original community of the paradigm's thinkers can be revealed. The "failing state" thus appears at the same time as the concept of "state" itself, that is to say in the sixteenth century.The second result concerns the cognitive changes of the concept-paradigm between Naissance and the 2000s. For example, it loses one of its key concepts, the antonym, the conservation of state. And, the dominance of the jurists, at several moments of the "life" of the concept, exerts an effect stopping on its meaning. Words having a "memory", it is indeed no longer possible to think or use it without associating it with the terms "deficiencies", "duties" or "obligations". This second result makes it possible to reveal other communities of scientists thanks to their socio-political uses.The last result allows us to evaluate the American contribution in the history of the concept. Certainly, this innovation pushes the paradigm towards its climax. It is enriched by models that reveal the existence of analytical rules common to the communities of the paradigm. However, American domination makes it enter the international political field. However, this evolution leads to the creation of a competitor, the Fragile State, whose gradual emergence causes, in the end, the concomitant extinction of the concept-paradigm "failling states" ; Dans les années 1990/2000, les termes Failling State, Failed State, Collapsed State, Quasi-State et Weak State bouleversent la pensée politique internationale. On s'est alors posé la question de savoir s'ils n'étaient pas en train de créer une nouvelle catégorie d'États dans le champ de la science politique, une catégorie des États « déviants » ? De quelles déviances s'agissait-t-il alors ? Quelles normes politiques et internationales avaient-t-ils transgressé ? Au final, quelle(s) définition(s) pouvions-nous apporter à ces États dans un ou des sens que la science politique entendrait ? En quoi contribueraient-t-elles à enrichir la théorie politique ? Craignant les effets normatifs et l'absence d'objectivité scientifique d'une définition provisoire de départ, nous avons choisi de définir le concept de manière descriptive c'est-à-dire au terme d'une analyse empirique. Le problème était alors d'ordre méthodologique : comment décrire un objet dont on ne soupçonnait pas l'existence il y a peu? Et comment l'analyser ? Nous sommes parties de l'idée que les Failling State, Failed State, Collapsed State, Quasi-State et Weak State étaient des notions synonymes issues d'un même concept, « États défaillants ». L'emploi de ce terme philosophique nous donnait donc pour tâche de déterminer tous les sens, notions et usages rattachés. Le concept pouvait également être caractéristique d'un paradigme. Ce terme emprunté à la philosophie des sciences permettait d'envisager l'existence d'une communauté de penseurs, co-auteurs du concept-paradigme grâce à leurs usages lexicaux socio-politiques voire à leurs théories.Il nous restait à emprunter la démarche du lexicographe. Appuyée sur les outils de l'analyse du discours, en particulier sur les méthodes formulaire et lexicologiques, il s'est agi de retracer l'histoire du concept sur un temps long : de sa genèse, ses phases de construction et de déconstruction à nos jours.De cette approche diachronique, trois résultats ont été dégagés :Le premier a été de découvrir le théoricien du concept-paradigme « État-défaillant » en la personne de René de Lucinge, Sieur des Allymes. L'ambassadeur de la Savoie à la Cour de France sous le roi Henri III, proche un temps de Giovanni Botero, expose pour la première fois, la théorie de la défaillance c'est-à-dire de la chute de l'État dans son petit traité politique De la Naissance, Duree et Cheutte des Estats, publié en 1588 à Paris. Disgracié en 1602 pour avoir signé le traité de Lyon, son nom et ses œuvres ont été damnati trois cents ans durant. À travers la découverte de René de Lucinge, la communauté originelle des penseurs du paradigme peut ainsi être révélée. L' « État défaillant » apparaît donc au même moment que le concept d' « État », lui-même, c'est-à-dire au XVIe siècle.Le second résultat porte sur les évolutions cognitives du concept-paradigme entre Naissance et les années 2000. Il perd, par exemple, une de ses notions phares, la notion antonyme de conservation de l'État. Et, la domination des juristes, à plusieurs moments de la « vie » du concept, exerce un effet dirimant sur son sens. Les mots ayant une « mémoire », il n'est, en effet, plus possible de le penser ou de l'employer sans lui associer les termes de « manquements », « devoirs » ou « obligations ». Ce second résultat permet de révéler d'autres communautés de savants grâce à leurs usages socio-politiques. Le dernier résultat permet d'évaluer l'apport américain dans l'histoire du concept. Certes, cette innovation pousse le paradigme vers son apogée. Il s'enrichit de modélisations qui révèlent l'existence de règles analytiques communes aux communautés du paradigme. Cependant, la domination américaine le fait entrer dans le champ politique international. Or, cette évolution conduit à la création d'un concurrent, le Fragile State, dont l'émergence progressive provoque, au final, l'extinction concomitante du concept-paradigme « États défaillants »
Le régime belge de relations entre l'État et les communautés religieuses et philosophiques reconnues se traduit notamment par des soutiens financiers aux bâtiments affectés au culte ou à l'assistance morale. Ces interventions s'inscrivent pour l'essentiel dans un dispositif hérité de l'époque concordataire française, peu remis en cause par la large régionalisation de la matière. Ce dispositif est aujourd'hui sous tension car il doit répondre à des situations contrastées, entre cultes reconnus au XIXe siècle ¬– généralement en déclin – et cultes reconnus plus récemment – généralement en expansion –. La situation est également complexifiée par des différences liées à la propriété des bâtiments ou à leur classement au titre du patrimoine culturel. La présente contribution questionne l'équité du dispositif et aborde les développements possibles. ; The Belgian regime of relations between the State and religious or philosophical communities results notably in financial supports for buildings used for worship and moral counselling. These interventions are essentially a legacy of the French Concordat, largely unchallenged by the regionalization process. Today, it has to respond to contrasting situations between religions recognized in the 19th century – generally declining – and more recently recognized ones – generally expanding –. An additional complication originates in differences in ownership of the buildings or their classification as listed buildings. After presenting the situation by religious and philosophical community and level of power, this paper questions the equity of the system and addresses the possible developments. ; Peer reviewed
The European Court of Human Rights has developed the idea that religious freedom, as recognised by the European Convention on Human Rights, limits States possible approaches toward religion. The limits are related to the privatisation of religion as well as its differentiation from political power. The article proposes to evaluate the role of the European Court in the construction of a principle of State religious neutrality from the point of view of a critically revisited concept of secularisation. ; La Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme a développé l'idée que la liberté religieuse, reconnue par la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme, impose des limites aux attitudes possibles des États envers le religieux. Ces limites s'inscrivent dans une démarche de privatisation du phénomène religieux ainsi que d'autonomisation entre celui-ci et le pouvoir politique. L'article propose de revisiter de manière critique l'idée de sécularisation pour comprendre le rôle de la Cour Européenne dans la construction d'un principe de neutralité étatique en matière de religion.