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Currently, republicanism is accused of thinking of civic virtue as linked to an ideal of the good life and, therefore, impossible to be realized in modern, plural and neutral societies. On the other hand, liberalism is accused of basing its argument on the ideal of individual autonomy, leading to political fragmentation. Faced with this clash, we intend to present the republican civic virtue as one of the political virtues required by political liberalism. The adequate foundation of this hypothesis will allow us to make sense of the recent proposals of a liberal republicanism as an answer to some of the current problems of liberal democracies.

Marx's engagement in philosophy has from the outset attempted a more objective development of humanism insofar as it only enters into such discipline in pursuit of a rationality whose development is not cut off from the concrete transformation of the world. Such is his impression of philosophy under the Hegelian dialectic: only philosophical reason would perceive itself as an undisputed form of reality, being able to realize the humanism that in Law is given as a pure idealism. In the Preparatory Notes for his doctoral thesis entitled Difference between the Philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus (DFDE) Marx developed a philosophy of history alternative to that of Hegel, indicating that democracy did not suffer decline in Greece due to the development of philosophical reason, but because of the victory of a philosophical reason that had undergone a change to theology.

Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444), chancellor and historian, is the author of one of the main praises of the city of Florence of this period. In writing to Laudatio florentinae urbis (1403-1404), the humanist describes Florence and its government as a well-ordered, beautiful, wholesome, free and participatory city. The paper analyzes this text not only as a rhetorical piece, but highlights the republican ideals of freedom, self-government and citizenship. From an institutional point of view, Laudatio offers the foundations of mixed government, which would become a central aspect of Renaissance republicanism. From the ancients, Bruni removes the idea of the division of powers from the classic triad monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, with the separation of functions in each of these pure forms. Bruni points out that both aspects of antiquity can be found in the Florentine institutions of his time, in such a way that he observes in the historical fact the realization of an ancient political theory, complementing, therefore, the idealization of the city.

The main aim of this paper is to understand the fundamental concepts that were part of what we all nowadays as the republican tradition and collate them with the sense of politics that underpins the current liberal democratic societies. The proposal has as a path of theoretical analysis a set of political themes that served as the foundation for the construction of republican ideals which contemporary scholars will call as republicanism.

The normative basis of the republican conception of justice is freedom as non-domination. This concept of political freedom comprises social relations in equality of power. Non-domination represents the social condition of not being submissive to the capacity of arbitrary interference of others. Republican freedom presupposes the development of human capabilities in their fullness. The potential for human capacity development must be protected by the legal structure of the State. The State has the function of equating the differences of individuals' assets and resources with their institutional structure. It acts to offer the necessary conditions, rights and basic liberties, to individuals in their social and political life. The Republican perspective of Philip Pettit leads to the normative deduction of republican liberty and to demonstrating that the theory of justice has to presuppose the resources necessary for the development of human life in its condition of equality and freedom. The democratic structuring of society presupposes the establishment of social relations that are characterized by the social status of non-domination.

This article intends to confront two notions about the notion of liberty, central theme on Political Philosophy. On one side, we'll start on some observations of political liberalism, where in the first moment, we'll explore the book "Two Concepts of Liberty" by Isaiah Berlin. To this author the negative liberty - "being free of" and, not the positive liberty - "being free to", should be the biggest worry of political bodies, that is, the State must exist to avoid that individual liberty is reduced by the own state interference or other subjects. Meeting this idea, and anchored in Arendt, we want to sustain that one of the big problems about political liberalism is the not action (negative liberty), that is, the lack of participation from the citizens on subjects and on political decisions. Showing this, we will defend in Arendt the central role of positive liberty (political freedom) of action and speak, and, thereafter, the possibility of a civic republicanism as an alternative to the isolation and the political apathy conceived by the bourgeois liberty, since, to Arendt, Berlin's bet and the liberal tradition are unsatisfying to think the events of contemporary politics.