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In recent years, a number of political thinkers in philosophy, political theory and law have defended political theories which are deeply indebted to classical republicanism. Like classical republicans, these thinkers have claimed that a flourishing polity depends upon citizens' exercise of the civic virtues. Unlike classical republicans, some of these thinkers have defended what might be called "political republicanisms"—republicanisms which are also indebted to the methodological restraint of Rawls's political liberalism. The article argues that political republicanism suffers from a viability problem. Its list of civic virtues is too short. More worrisome, the public justifications that would be available to a political republican regime are not sufficient to motivate the development of the civic virtues. Therefore, if we are to be republicans, we should be "perfectionist republicans" instead.

AbstractThis article criticizes radical labor republicanism on republican grounds. I show that its demand for universal workplace democracy via workers' cooperatives conflicts with republican freedom along three different dimensions: first, freedom to choose an occupation . . . and not to choose one; second, freedom within the very cooperatives that workers are to democratically govern; and, third, freedom within the newly proletarian state. In the conclusion, I ask whether these criticisms apply, at least in part, to the more modest, incrementalist strand of labor republicanism. To the extent that they do, delaboring republicanism might be the best response.

Socialist republicans advocate public ownership and control of the means of production in order to achieve the republican goal of a society without endemic domination. While civic republicanism is often attacked for its conservatism, the relatively neglected radical history of the tradition shows how a republican form of socialism provides powerful conceptual resources to critique capitalism for leaving workers and citizens dominated. This analysis supports a programme of public ownership and economic democracy intended to reduce domination in the workplace and wider society. I defend this socialist republicanism from both the Marxist objection that it overlooks the impersonal nature of domination under capitalism and the left-liberal objections that property-owning democracy or worker codetermination are sufficient to suppress dominating relationships. The resulting position identifies the need for more ambitious institutional grounds for republican liberty than is often supposed, while offering us a distinctive emancipatory justification for socialism.

A Rawlsian interpretation of citizenship that combines both liberal & republican themes is argued to provide an account of citizenship more appropriate for modern democracies than alternative interpretations, eg, that offered by communitarian critics of political liberalism. Liberal republicanism gives a convincing interpretation of the nature & value of citizenship & provides the basis for a radical political agenda. 35 References. Adapted from the source document.

In this article I defend a broadly Rawlsian interpretation of citizenship which combines both liberal and republican themes to provide an account of citizenship which is more appropriate for modern democracies than alternative interpretations, such as that offered by communitarian critics of political liberalism. Liberal republicanism, I argue, gives a convincing interpretation of the nature and value of citizenship and provides the basis for a radical political agenda.

A review essay on books by Philip Pettit, (1) The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (Oxford: Oxford U Press, 1993); & (2) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). These volumes represent a recapitulation of the many articles & co-authored works produced by Pettit over the last 20 years. They cover the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of social science, & political philosophy, without any serious attempt to link them under one theoretical umbrella. Instead, they illustrate how philosophy is related to practical arenas of political & social life. The Common Mind presents a fairly traditional metaphysical & epistemological view of a physical world whose underlying processes realize higher-level systems with both emergent & distinct properties. Knowledge relies on the right causal relation between the knower & the world. Republicanism supports a special sense of freedom for political theory that is a prerequisite for other social values, including justice. A second theme focuses on the contrast between consequential & deontological approaches in relation to how freedom should be articulated in social institutions. Pettit's transition from social metaphysics to his social, political conceptions is examined. J. Lindroth

A re-examination of two heavily covered 2008 legal battles -- the "virginity" & "burqa" affairs -- illustrates the capacity of the secular spirit to resist the religious spirit in France. These two affairs served as occasions for confirming & consolidating the republican consensus that had in 2004 been forged over the law prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. This consensus places strict limits on the recognition of cultural & religious (especially Muslim) religious particularisms in the Republic. Some of its ambiguities, however, are worth unpacking -- in particular, the confusion between arguments drawn from republican law & those drawn from French culture. In contrast to this conservative republicanism, critical republicanism takes care not to posit that the institutions & norms specific to a particular community -- up to & including that of the French Republic -- are necessarily in keeping with republican principles. While it is absent from the Stasi Commission Report (France 2003), a similar line of reasoning can be found in the Bouchard-Taylor Report, which offers a republican justification for certain practices based on "reasonable compromises" (Quebec 2008). Adapted from the source document.

Republicanism has recently been defended by a variety of authors as a desirable alternative to liberalism. John W. Maynor is one of these. In his recent book, he has argued that republicanism is superior to liberalism, both in that its objectives are normatively preferable and because it is not beset with the same constitutive deficiencies as liberalism. However, his argument fails because the deficiencies he identifies in liberalism only apply to one class of liberals, and many of the normative aspects of his republicanism can be found in other forms of liberalism.