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In recent years, a number of political thinkers in philosophy, political theory and law have defended political theories which are deeply indebted to classical republicanism. Like classical republicans, these thinkers have claimed that a flourishing polity depends upon citizens' exercise of the civic virtues. Unlike classical republicans, some of these thinkers have defended what might be called "political republicanisms"—republicanisms which are also indebted to the methodological restraint of Rawls's political liberalism. The article argues that political republicanism suffers from a viability problem. Its list of civic virtues is too short. More worrisome, the public justifications that would be available to a political republican regime are not sufficient to motivate the development of the civic virtues. Therefore, if we are to be republicans, we should be "perfectionist republicans" instead.

AbstractThis article criticizes radical labor republicanism on republican grounds. I show that its demand for universal workplace democracy via workers' cooperatives conflicts with republican freedom along three different dimensions: first, freedom to choose an occupation . . . and not to choose one; second, freedom within the very cooperatives that workers are to democratically govern; and, third, freedom within the newly proletarian state. In the conclusion, I ask whether these criticisms apply, at least in part, to the more modest, incrementalist strand of labor republicanism. To the extent that they do, delaboring republicanism might be the best response.

Socialist republicans advocate public ownership and control of the means of production in order to achieve the republican goal of a society without endemic domination. While civic republicanism is often attacked for its conservatism, the relatively neglected radical history of the tradition shows how a republican form of socialism provides powerful conceptual resources to critique capitalism for leaving workers and citizens dominated. This analysis supports a programme of public ownership and economic democracy intended to reduce domination in the workplace and wider society. I defend this socialist republicanism from both the Marxist objection that it overlooks the impersonal nature of domination under capitalism and the left-liberal objections that property-owning democracy or worker codetermination are sufficient to suppress dominating relationships. The resulting position identifies the need for more ambitious institutional grounds for republican liberty than is often supposed, while offering us a distinctive emancipatory justification for socialism.

In this article I defend a broadly Rawlsian interpretation of citizenship which combines both liberal and republican themes to provide an account of citizenship which is more appropriate for modern democracies than alternative interpretations, such as that offered by communitarian critics of political liberalism. Liberal republicanism, I argue, gives a convincing interpretation of the nature and value of citizenship and provides the basis for a radical political agenda.

Republicanism has recently been defended by a variety of authors as a desirable alternative to liberalism. John W. Maynor is one of these. In his recent book, he has argued that republicanism is superior to liberalism, both in that its objectives are normatively preferable and because it is not beset with the same constitutive deficiencies as liberalism. However, his argument fails because the deficiencies he identifies in liberalism only apply to one class of liberals, and many of the normative aspects of his republicanism can be found in other forms of liberalism.

The strategy of this article is to consider republicanism in contrast with liberalism. We focus on three aspects of this contrast: republicanism's emphasis on 'social goods' under various conceptualizations of that category; republicanism's emphasis on political participation as an essential element of the 'good life'; and republicanism's distinctive understanding of freedom (following the lines developed by Pettit). In each case, we are skeptical that what republicanism offers is superior to the liberal alternative and indicate the grounds for that skepticism.

Recent scholarship has called attention to the republican dimension of Hans Morgenthau's approach to politics in the postwar era, but the role republicanism played in his thought remains ambiguous. This essay examines that role, and explores its tensions with other aspects of his understanding of politics. It argues that he expanded and deepened his approach to politics as he developed a republican critique of American domestic politics. However, his conception of international politics remained rooted in the reason-of-state tradition, and evinces little evidence of his increasing engagement with republicanism. In this selective use of republicanism, he left its tensions with other aspects of his thinking unresolved, but this usage also suggests his recognition of the inadequacy of the original formulation of his realist approach. In considering what IR theorists today may learn from republicanism, his example is highly instructive in any effort to reconstruct the foundations of realism.