The identity question is uppermost in Europe today, where « monolingualism » and cc monoculturalism » are the received norm. Little has been said, however, about the identities produced in families in which fathers and mothers come from different countries. Thirty-two binational children living in France or Germany are presented here. The author studies the objective factors of their education as well as the experience of biculturalism described by « mixed » teenagers. While bilingualism is theoretically the most distinctive element of the children's « dual identity », real conditions vary vastly according to the social standing in a given country of foreign groups and the languages they speak. Not all binational families have the same opportunities for raising their children bilingually. The question thus arises as to whether someone can be bicultural without being bilingual. The children's bilingualism and biculturalism are important stakes : for the parents, they represent the survival of their own language-and-culture- linked identities. As for the children, even before knowing if bilingualism is important to themselves, they know it is of great value to their parents. When they consider themselves bilingual, they feel proud but when they do not, they express regret and sometimes resentment. A special feeling of identity appears to exist among mixed children though in different ways. However, a child is always a stake between hisjher parents and their kin; the mixed child illustrates the general human condition, that of all individuals, who have to build their « identity » out of a double or multiple heritage.
Throughout history, relations between France and Hungary have been complex and ambiguous, often characterized by a certain distance and sometimes marked by a genuine resentment. During the early modern period, the Turkish occupation and the long association of Hungary to the Habsburg Empire certainly contributed to building barriers between the two states and thus to slowing down the development of stronger ties. In a similar manner, during the 20th century, even though many factors – geographical, cultural, as well as societal – should have led France to develop a similar relationship of confidence and friendship with Hungary as those it had with other central European capitals, the two World Wars – and the revisionist and communist periods that followed in Hungary – as well as the deep "injury" inflicted on the Hungarians by the Treaty of Trianon have constantly pushed both states into opposing camps. In a country where the intelligentsia was historically quick to "look towards Paris", these factors and events contributed to creating the myth of an "impossible love" between the two countries. Considered for a very long time as a German zone of influence, Hungary never really represented a favored partner for France in the eastern part of the continent, and the relations between the countries remained largely irregular and asymmetrical. Under these conditions, the major upheavals of the years 1989-1990, while offering an opportunity to redesign a new Europe, also allowed a chance for a new start in French-Hungarian relations. This thesis provides the first analysis of the overall strengthening of French-Hungarian relations in this new historical context. Starting with the observation that French-Hungarian relations undergo a change of dimension from 1989 – a transformation that will be discussed and analyzed – our work tries to understand on the one hand whether this mutation represents a modification of the real nature of French foreign policy towards Hungary, given that the country was mostly treated until ...
Throughout history, relations between France and Hungary have been complex and ambiguous, often characterized by a certain distance and sometimes marked by a genuine resentment. During the early modern period, the Turkish occupation and the long association of Hungary to the Habsburg Empire certainly contributed to building barriers between the two states and thus to slowing down the development of stronger ties. In a similar manner, during the 20th century, even though many factors – geographical, cultural, as well as societal – should have led France to develop a similar relationship of confidence and friendship with Hungary as those it had with other central European capitals, the two World Wars – and the revisionist and communist periods that followed in Hungary – as well as the deep "injury" inflicted on the Hungarians by the Treaty of Trianon have constantly pushed both states into opposing camps. In a country where the intelligentsia was historically quick to "look towards Paris", these factors and events contributed to creating the myth of an "impossible love" between the two countries. Considered for a very long time as a German zone of influence, Hungary never really represented a favored partner for France in the eastern part of the continent, and the relations between the countries remained largely irregular and asymmetrical. Under these conditions, the major upheavals of the years 1989-1990, while offering an opportunity to redesign a new Europe, also allowed a chance for a new start in French-Hungarian relations. This thesis provides the first analysis of the overall strengthening of French-Hungarian relations in this new historical context. Starting with the observation that French-Hungarian relations undergo a change of dimension from 1989 – a transformation that will be discussed and analyzed – our work tries to understand on the one hand whether this mutation represents a modification of the real nature of French foreign policy towards Hungary, given that the country was mostly treated until ...
Throughout history, relations between France and Hungary have been complex and ambiguous, often characterized by a certain distance and sometimes marked by a genuine resentment. During the early modern period, the Turkish occupation and the long association of Hungary to the Habsburg Empire certainly contributed to building barriers between the two states and thus to slowing down the development of stronger ties. In a similar manner, during the 20th century, even though many factors – geographical, cultural, as well as societal – should have led France to develop a similar relationship of confidence and friendship with Hungary as those it had with other central European capitals, the two World Wars – and the revisionist and communist periods that followed in Hungary – as well as the deep "injury" inflicted on the Hungarians by the Treaty of Trianon have constantly pushed both states into opposing camps. In a country where the intelligentsia was historically quick to "look towards Paris", these factors and events contributed to creating the myth of an "impossible love" between the two countries. Considered for a very long time as a German zone of influence, Hungary never really represented a favored partner for France in the eastern part of the continent, and the relations between the countries remained largely irregular and asymmetrical. Under these conditions, the major upheavals of the years 1989-1990, while offering an opportunity to redesign a new Europe, also allowed a chance for a new start in French-Hungarian relations. This thesis provides the first analysis of the overall strengthening of French-Hungarian relations in this new historical context. Starting with the observation that French-Hungarian relations undergo a change of dimension from 1989 – a transformation that will be discussed and analyzed – our work tries to understand on the one hand whether this mutation represents a modification of the real nature of French foreign policy towards Hungary, given that the country was mostly treated until ...
The co-management of protected areas can be approached through an innovativemodel making it possible to improve the conditions of the people surrounding theprotected areas as well as to assure the sustainable conservation of its biologicalresources. The research in this thesis tests this model in the actual situation of thetwo biosphere reserves in the North of Cameroon: the Waza and Benoué NationalParks. In order to be able to explain differences between expected and obtainedresults we have developed a methodology analysing bio-ecological data, filedmeasurements, questionnaires and interviews with the different stakeholdersinvolved as well as an examination of the different co-managed territories. Theresults show that because of the application of co-management, potential conflictsituations between the different stakeholders have been prevented. Also it hasstimulated a better understanding of the actors in charge of the two reserves, aboutthe interest in the reserves' natural resources by the people living around them.Nevertheless, the results show also that the benefits from the co-managementsystem in terms of protection of biodiversity and survival of the people living at theborders have not been promising in terms of financial and material means investedand in terms of the hope local people had in it. The co-management situation hasprovoked violent conflicts, resentment and decay of the biological entities, subject ofthis co-management. This research shows how actors have multiple agendas, likeusing co-management for their personal gain, while also tormenting other actors whostand in their way. It also puts some light on State stakeholders and theirengagement in this process without having done a feasibility study and with theconstraint of having to hand over part of their power to representatives in the field.At the local level, the analysis of the existing relationships shows that the statestructures stay rigid without compromising and without taking into consideration thelocal communities. The latter, ...
The co-management of protected areas can be approached through an innovativemodel making it possible to improve the conditions of the people surrounding theprotected areas as well as to assure the sustainable conservation of its biologicalresources. The research in this thesis tests this model in the actual situation of thetwo biosphere reserves in the North of Cameroon: the Waza and Benoué NationalParks. In order to be able to explain differences between expected and obtainedresults we have developed a methodology analysing bio-ecological data, filedmeasurements, questionnaires and interviews with the different stakeholdersinvolved as well as an examination of the different co-managed territories. Theresults show that because of the application of co-management, potential conflictsituations between the different stakeholders have been prevented. Also it hasstimulated a better understanding of the actors in charge of the two reserves, aboutthe interest in the reserves' natural resources by the people living around them.Nevertheless, the results show also that the benefits from the co-managementsystem in terms of protection of biodiversity and survival of the people living at theborders have not been promising in terms of financial and material means investedand in terms of the hope local people had in it. The co-management situation hasprovoked violent conflicts, resentment and decay of the biological entities, subject ofthis co-management. This research shows how actors have multiple agendas, likeusing co-management for their personal gain, while also tormenting other actors whostand in their way. It also puts some light on State stakeholders and theirengagement in this process without having done a feasibility study and with theconstraint of having to hand over part of their power to representatives in the field.At the local level, the analysis of the existing relationships shows that the statestructures stay rigid without compromising and without taking into consideration thelocal communities. The latter, ...
The co-management of protected areas can be approached through an innovativemodel making it possible to improve the conditions of the people surrounding theprotected areas as well as to assure the sustainable conservation of its biologicalresources. The research in this thesis tests this model in the actual situation of thetwo biosphere reserves in the North of Cameroon: the Waza and Benoué NationalParks. In order to be able to explain differences between expected and obtainedresults we have developed a methodology analysing bio-ecological data, filedmeasurements, questionnaires and interviews with the different stakeholdersinvolved as well as an examination of the different co-managed territories. Theresults show that because of the application of co-management, potential conflictsituations between the different stakeholders have been prevented. Also it hasstimulated a better understanding of the actors in charge of the two reserves, aboutthe interest in the reserves' natural resources by the people living around them.Nevertheless, the results show also that the benefits from the co-managementsystem in terms of protection of biodiversity and survival of the people living at theborders have not been promising in terms of financial and material means investedand in terms of the hope local people had in it. The co-management situation hasprovoked violent conflicts, resentment and decay of the biological entities, subject ofthis co-management. This research shows how actors have multiple agendas, likeusing co-management for their personal gain, while also tormenting other actors whostand in their way. It also puts some light on State stakeholders and theirengagement in this process without having done a feasibility study and with theconstraint of having to hand over part of their power to representatives in the field.At the local level, the analysis of the existing relationships shows that the statestructures stay rigid without compromising and without taking into consideration thelocal communities. The latter, ...
International audience ; For a long time, in France, its first « homeland », as in Latin America from 1945, populism has been connected with democracy, in an ambivalent or ambiguous relationship. Populism can be understood as the disposition of political action to polarize, to simplify and to emphasize antagonisms; for democracy always carries in her the seeds of crisis. The vote in favor of populist organizations is then often lived as a re-appropriation of political decision by those who no longer feel represented by the major parties. Democracy becomes then in populist speech, a vector of affect. The populist appeal to democracy, which we could qualify as « counter-performative », undoes the democratic consensus of representative government provoking polarization and tension, and aims at legitimized violent action. Now, if in the past, the live discourse of the leader was decisive for giving substance to mobilization, today, the mobilizing discourse is at the same time more diffuse and more scattered: populist discourse is self-constitutive and auto-occurs as a hegemonic standard of reference. The populist dynamic shapes characters according to the necessities of the moment and each can then shop in his populist market, choosing such or such a leader-idol on the world stage and changing according to the humors and the situation. Political « lapses » and populist « excesses » all fall within the framework of Justicialist demands (centered on an abstract, immediate and total ideal of justice, and based on a deep and widespread resentment). Another structuring « populithema » of democratomorphic populism is indeed the notion of « impunity ». Used at first in the context of the question of the bringing to justice of the crimes of dictatorships, the notion of impunity extends to economic crimes and more generally, spreads to underscore the privileges of the powerful. When it evokes imperialism and post-colonialism, contemporary populism, posing as a redresser of wrongs, uses fewer economic arguments than a vague ...
Obtenue avec la mention " Très honorable avec les félicitations du jury à l'unanimité " ; The Turks dominated the Balkans for more than five centuries and this historical presence makes the Balkans a specific area for Turkey. The withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the peninsula is widely commented on and resented in the national historiography and the Turks confront the area in a rather deeply emotional way. How does Turkey deal - or how can it deal - with this legacy now? Is Turkey particularly inclined to rush to help its "persecuted Muslim brothers"? In short, are all these historical and cultural affinities or kinship real, are they asserted, and, are they influential on the orientation of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans? Historical, cultural and affective ties between Turkey and Turks and Muslims in the Balkans are real but political dimension always prevails over religious dimension for the Turks and the others Muslims in the area. Besides, it was against the Ottoman Empire that the people of the Balkans forged their independence. This phenomenon of "fundamental enmity" is not a specificity of the Balkans. However, what is particular in this case, however, is the inability of the peoples of the Balkans to overcome this enmity; enmity that takes on the aspects of a struggle between Islam and Christianity, between civilization and obscurantism. Turkey could not not take into account the persistence and the strength of these resentments. Ankara has therefore systematically secured its Balkan diplomacy by the "principles and positions" of the international community. Turkey has also worked hand-in-hand with Washington in the planning of its diplomacy in the area, and especially for 'sensitive' questions (ethnic tensions in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo). Last, the analysis of Turkey's policy in the Balkans has to be comprehended on a wider political and geographical spectrum. Western (European and American) powers' diplomacy and/or economic implication did influence significantly Turkish policy in the ...
Obtenue avec la mention " Très honorable avec les félicitations du jury à l'unanimité " ; The Turks dominated the Balkans for more than five centuries and this historical presence makes the Balkans a specific area for Turkey. The withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the peninsula is widely commented on and resented in the national historiography and the Turks confront the area in a rather deeply emotional way. How does Turkey deal - or how can it deal - with this legacy now? Is Turkey particularly inclined to rush to help its "persecuted Muslim brothers"? In short, are all these historical and cultural affinities or kinship real, are they asserted, and, are they influential on the orientation of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans? Historical, cultural and affective ties between Turkey and Turks and Muslims in the Balkans are real but political dimension always prevails over religious dimension for the Turks and the others Muslims in the area. Besides, it was against the Ottoman Empire that the people of the Balkans forged their independence. This phenomenon of "fundamental enmity" is not a specificity of the Balkans. However, what is particular in this case, however, is the inability of the peoples of the Balkans to overcome this enmity; enmity that takes on the aspects of a struggle between Islam and Christianity, between civilization and obscurantism. Turkey could not not take into account the persistence and the strength of these resentments. Ankara has therefore systematically secured its Balkan diplomacy by the "principles and positions" of the international community. Turkey has also worked hand-in-hand with Washington in the planning of its diplomacy in the area, and especially for 'sensitive' questions (ethnic tensions in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo). Last, the analysis of Turkey's policy in the Balkans has to be comprehended on a wider political and geographical spectrum. Western (European and American) powers' diplomacy and/or economic implication did influence significantly Turkish policy in the ...
Obtenue avec la mention " Très honorable avec les félicitations du jury à l'unanimité " ; The Turks dominated the Balkans for more than five centuries and this historical presence makes the Balkans a specific area for Turkey. The withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the peninsula is widely commented on and resented in the national historiography and the Turks confront the area in a rather deeply emotional way. How does Turkey deal - or how can it deal - with this legacy now? Is Turkey particularly inclined to rush to help its "persecuted Muslim brothers"? In short, are all these historical and cultural affinities or kinship real, are they asserted, and, are they influential on the orientation of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans? Historical, cultural and affective ties between Turkey and Turks and Muslims in the Balkans are real but political dimension always prevails over religious dimension for the Turks and the others Muslims in the area. Besides, it was against the Ottoman Empire that the people of the Balkans forged their independence. This phenomenon of "fundamental enmity" is not a specificity of the Balkans. However, what is particular in this case, however, is the inability of the peoples of the Balkans to overcome this enmity; enmity that takes on the aspects of a struggle between Islam and Christianity, between civilization and obscurantism. Turkey could not not take into account the persistence and the strength of these resentments. Ankara has therefore systematically secured its Balkan diplomacy by the "principles and positions" of the international community. Turkey has also worked hand-in-hand with Washington in the planning of its diplomacy in the area, and especially for 'sensitive' questions (ethnic tensions in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo). Last, the analysis of Turkey's policy in the Balkans has to be comprehended on a wider political and geographical spectrum. Western (European and American) powers' diplomacy and/or economic implication did influence significantly Turkish policy in the ...
Le 7 octobre 2018 : implosion de la démocratie brésilienne. Dès le lendemain, on apprit le lynchage à Bahia d'un célèbre maître de capoeira qui disait son opposition au vainqueur de l'élection. Quels sont les motifs de la soumission de la majorité à un programme politique contraire à ses intérêts? Durant les années d'agonie du gouvernement du Parti des travailleurs de Lula et Dilma, les démocrates brésiliens furent toujours en retard d'un combat. Les élus de tous bords ont joué avec le feu en se livrant à de pénibles jeux d'appareils, persuadés qu'ils étaient d'incarner la société politique. Lula fut le bouc émissaire désigné par l'activisme de juges qui ont ouvert la voie à un politicien sans scrupules qui alimente les préjugés les plus crus pour asseoir son autorité. L'indifférence des plus riches au sort de leurs concitoyens et le ressentiment de la majorité des électeurs face aux turpitudes des élites comptent pour beaucoup dans la victoire de Jair Bolsonaro. L'abdication de la démocratie au Brésil ouvre un nouveau chapitre de l'histoire agitée de ce pays-continent… ; October, 7th, 2018 : implosion of Brazilian democracy. Few hours later occured the lynching in Bahia of a famous capoeira master who said his opposition to the winner of the election. What are the reasons for the majority's submission to a political agenda contrary to its interests? During the agony of the Lula and Dilma Workers' Party government, the Brazilian Democrats were always late for a fight. The elected officials of all sides played with the fire by indulging in painful games of apparatuses, persuaded that they were to incarnate the political society. Lula was the scapegoat appointed by the activism of judges who paved the way for an unscrupulous politician who feeds the most extreme prejudices to establish his authority. The indifference of the richest to the fate of their fellow citizens and the resentment of the majority of voters against the turpitude of the elite account for much in the victory of Jair Bolsonaro. The abdication of democracy in Brazil opens a new chapter in the troubled history of this country-continent…
In 1770, without the author's name, appeared to be a philosophical and political history of the establishments and trade of Europeans in the two Indes, of which the abbee Raynal was the prime contractor, but not the sole author. In particular, Diderot had worked together for almost a third. The book has a huge success and has been reedited several times. Raynal signs the 1780 edition with its border portrait. The scandal broke out and Grimm's literary Correspondence, a natural ally of philosophers, is separated from Raynal. Mr Grimm opposed this dilemma to Raynal: "Or you believe that those you are attacking will not be able to come from you, and it is a chilling time to attack them; or you think they will be able and willing to come up; and it is a folie to expose themselves to their resentment". Diderot reacts violently to this dilemma and takes Raynal's defence against his 30-year-old friend Grimm: it is the apologetic letter of the abbee Raynal, which sets out the principles of the political commitment of the philosopher of the Enlightenment, beyond the humanist requirement of postity. The question then arises of engagement without the name, which is intended to be examined in this article. ; International audience ; In 1770, without the author's name, appeared to be a philosophical and political history of the establishments and trade of Europeans in the two Indes, of which the abbee Raynal was the prime contractor, but not the sole author. In particular, Diderot had worked together for almost a third. The book has a huge success and has been reedited several times. Raynal signs the 1780 edition with its border portrait. The scandal broke out and Grimm's literary Correspondence, a natural ally of philosophers, is separated from Raynal. Mr Grimm opposed this dilemma to Raynal: "Or you believe that those you are attacking will not be able to come from you, and it is a chilling time to attack them; or you think they will be able and willing to come up; and it is a folie to expose themselves to their ...
International audience The past several decades, segregation has been widely discussed by social scientists and especially by geographers. But whatever the focus of their studies (on the problem of measuring segregation, on the mechanism explaining the development of the phenomenon, etc.), almost all of them considered segregation as a spatial injustice. This paper closely examines this implicit relationship between segregation and injustice by reviewing the existing literature from different fields (geography, sociology, history, urban studies, political science, philosophy, etc.): is the segregated city unjust by essence? Is any social-spatial division of space – of urban space in particular – unjust? If not, when is it to be considered unjust? Conversely, is the diverse city the model of a just city? All these questions imply to carefully question the underlying assumptions that most of contemporary discourses make when dealing with segregation. ; Depuis plusieurs décennies, la ségrégation est un thème abondamment investi par les sciences sociales en général et par la géographie en particulier. Or quelles que soient les orientations adoptées (portant sur la question de la mesure du phénomène, ou celle des mécanismes, etc.), presque toutes ces recherches assimilent la ségrégation à une injustice spatiale. C'est cette implicite corrélation ségrégation/injustice que cet article examinera de plus près, à travers une revue de la littérature de différents champs disciplinaires (géographie, sociologie, histoire, urbanisme, sciences politiques, philosophie) : la ville ségrégée est-elle injuste par essence ? Toute division socio spatiale de l'espace – urbain en particulier – est-elle injuste ? Sinon, quand doit-elle être considérée comme injuste ? Et inversement, la ville mixte est-elle le modèle de la ville juste, vers lequel on doit tendre ? Autant de questions qui invitent à réinterroger les présupposés sur lesquels reposent de nombreux discours sur la ségrégation aujourd'hui.
International audience ; In 1974, in a geopolitical context of extreme tension between Greece and Turkey (Mauss-Copeaux, 2011), the sudden establishment (Novosselof, Neisse, 2007) of the Buffer Zone split Cyprus into two parts, confining the Greek Cypriots to the south of the island and the Turkish Cypriots to the north. If the creation of borders establishes on both sides distance in proximity (Arbaret-Schulz, 2008), the Buffer Zone in Cyprus has also introduced hostility in humanity, trulypitting people against each other. Besides the constituent stigma from the implementation of the Buffer Zone such as the ghost tourist resort Varosha (Lageiste, 2011), the distinction coming from material and symbolic membership (Groupe frontière, 2004) has come into force and shape all along the border : ostentatious display of their respective national and cultural attributes - Greek flags versus Turkish flags, steeples versus minarets. This opposition of identities (Di Méo, 2001) continues to assert itself despite repeated conciliatory attempts from the European Union and the United Nations.Nevertheless, from 2003, the opening of breaches in this hitherto hermetic separation - 6 passages are open today - has raised a lot of interest among tourists always eager to experience otherness. Flows (Van Houtum, 2007) have taken shape and led to the development of tourism in the northern part of the island which had remained away from tourist interest since the separation. Some opportunistic agencies have picked up this border originality and used it as a really attractive tourist product : observation of the Buffer Zone in Famagusta, coastal cruising along the abandoned Varosha seafront, opening of shopping centres on both sides of the crossing point opened in the heart of Nicosia, a pedestrian street with western franchises on the Greek side and souks on the Turkish side. This debordering phenomenon (Scott, 2009) has been maintaining, if not strengthening some territorial opposition, while the staging that accompanies it has allowed its capitalizing. Thus, this unique development of tourism has led to a renewed functioning , offering an apparent fluidity through the tourist flows, and also designing a scenography of opposition, conflictuality and resentment. ; En 1974, dans un contexte géopolitique d'extrême tension entre la Grèce et la Turquie (Copeaux, Mauss-Copeaux, 2011), l'instauration brutale (Novosselof, Neisse, 2007) de la Buffer Zone a scindé Chypre en deux parties, cantonnant les Chypriotes grecs au sud de l'île et les Chypriotes turcs au nord. Si la mise en place de frontières établit communément de la distance dans la proximité (Arbaret-Schulz, 2008), à Chypre la Buffer Zone a introduit de l'hostilité dans l'humanité, dressant véritablement les populations les unes contre les autres. Outre la présence des stigmates constitutifs de la mise en place de la Buffer Zone telle la station touristique fantomatique de Varosia (Lageiste, 2011), la distinction par l'appartenance matérielle et symbolique (Groupe frontière, 2004) a pris forme et force au long de la frontière. Affichage ostentatoire des attributs nationaux et culturels respectifs - drapeaux grecs contre drapeaux turcs ; clochers contre minarets -. Cette opposition identitaire (Di Méo, 2001) continue de s'affirmer malgré les multiples tentatives conciliatrices de l'Union européenne et des Nations Unies.Toutefois, l'ouverture de brèches à partir de 2003 au sein de cette séparation jusqu'alors hermétique - six points de passage désormais possibles -, a suscité la curiosité, l'intérêt touristique toujours avide d'altérité. Des flux (Van Houtum, 2000) ont pris forme à travers l'île, occasionnant la mise en tourisme de la partie nord de l'île restée hors du fait touristique depuis la séparation. Certains acteurs opportunistes, se sont emparés de cette originalité frontalière pour l'exploiter comme un véritable produit touristique : observation de la Buffer Zone à Famagouste, croisière côtière au long du front de mer abandonné de Varosia, ouverture de commerces de part et d'autre du point de passage ouvert au coeur de Nicosie - rue piétonne avec franchises occidentales côté grec, bazars côté turcs -. Ce phénomène de debordering (Scott, 2009) maintient, sinon renforce l'opposition territoriale, tandis que la mise en scène qui l'accompagne en permet la mise à profit. Ainsi, cette mise en tourisme singulière conduit-elle à un fonctionnement renouvelé, offrant l'apparence d'une fluidité à travers des flux touristiques, tout en scénographiant l'opposition, la conflictualité et le ressentiment.
