West German opinion of America, as reflected in & reinforced by its mass media, is ambivalent, insecure, full of misunderstanding & often contradictory. An examination of the stereotypes of `materialistic America', `God's own country', & `Americans are crazy'. US occupation often reflected German feelings of inferiority, insecurity, resentment, & guilt, projected onto the powerful victor. Instability of US occupation policy was prompted by sensitivity to Russian policy, & 'to many Germans, Americans appeared as a people sadly lost on the international scene'. 'Anti-Americanism' of the violent, obsessionally prejudiced type is very rare in Germany. It is usually to be found among the 'lunatic fringe' of unreconstructed Nazis & Communists, comprising together less than 3% of the total pop. The number of passionate & unqualified pro-Americans seems hardly bigger, & the remainder would fall within these extremes, tending to express feelings of cultural superiority, political & moral distrust, personal & national resentments toward what is supposed to be America; 'a picture that often conflicts with American realities, yet much more often than not accepts America as the `lesser evil' in comparison with Soviet Russia'. Germans also tend to accept US as a `necessary evil' to support them in their defense against the Soviet evil. (See also SA 2685, 2734, 2735, 2737, 2738, 2744, 2745, 2746, 2748) P. Widem.
Soviet agriculture in the 1950's has been characterized by the same econ problems & ideological contradiction that have been evident since the Bolsheviks assumed power, & the sullen resentment of the peasants has remained at the core of the agri'al problem. The agri'al reforms begun in 1953 at the insistence of Krushchev & consummated in the sale of the machinery of the Machine Tractor Stations to the collective farms in 1958 should produce positive results in future yrs, provided that no further measures are introduced to reduce the already low income of the peasants. IPSA.
A brief account of the main projects of sedentarization suggested by the authorities concerned in Egypt, outlining their expected effects upon the econ system & modes of living, & indicating the repercussions they may eventually have on the whole soc structure of the semi-nomadic clans. Apart from the planned projects, there is a marked & growing tendency among these people, esp the younger generation, to abandon the traditional way of life & to settle down. This tendency is generally stimulated by the changing soc conditions. Reactions to the proposed sedentarization projects vary widely, from indifference, reluctance & resentment to the absolute acceptance of them together with the changes which they may be expected to bring about. WAERSA.
The images of foreign nations which exist at any time in the minds of the people have a great variety of sources. The historian, faced with the claim that they are novel & original often does not find it difficult to trace their ancient roots, their forerunners & models. He is aware that historical development means both continuity & change. Old national cliches & prejudices have a long lease of life, but they are constantly modified by new events. New pol'al & soc constellations at home & abroad lead to the formation of fresh stereotypes which reflect & classify what is regarded as characteristic of a foreign people, its rulers, or its policies. Criticism, resentment, propaganda play a part in arriving at such convenient formulae. In many fields German National Socialism claimed to offer something brand new, a real pol'al order, an unheard of arrangement of society to last for 1,000 years. Yet in retrospect it becomes evident that whilst Hitler & Goebbels could boast a moderate amount of originality in their ideology it was more deeply rooted in certain German traditions than they cared to admit. (IPSA).
A sample study was made in 1954 of 98 Japanese who were part of the pop of 10,000 in an internment camp in which riots had occurred in 1942. Of those interviewed, 26 reported having attended one or more of the demonstrations. The size of the sample is small & the results are presented with diffidence, though it is considered that they present reasonably accurate findings in an unusually difficult area of res. The precipitate cause of the disturbances was resentment at the jailing of people accused of assaulting Japanese collaborators with the camp admin. The analysis indicates that rioters differ from nonrioters mainly in their marginality between the 2 cultures of America & Japan: though, statistically, more often native American than non-rioters, they were nevertheless more selfconsciously Japanese. Other important characteristics of rioters as compared with non-rioters were their tendency to be socially active (an aspect of their search for stronger cultural ties), their relative lack of an econ stake in society, their relative youth & their relative freedom from family ties. Compared with the non-rioters, the rioters were a restless, dissatisfied category of people, reacting more strongly to the conditions of society, to which both groups alike were subject. The analysis suggests that, though it may be supported by a majority of the society, rebellion is the work of a minority whose individual circumstances make it possible for them not to tolerate the intolerable. IPSA.
The anti-Semitism of the Nazis during the period of their struggle for power has usually been treated as a problem in soc psychol or intellectual history: it has been explained in terms of resentments & frustrations of the German people or Nazi leaders or in terms of the influence of racist authors. But there are elements of central importance which emerge only when the problem is considered from a pol'al point of view which takes account of the conditions of electoral competition in a multi-party system of Weltanschauung parties. An examination of Hitler's writings & speeches shows that he believed it necessary for the success of his movement to gain the support of workers, the lower Mc, officials, & business leaders & at the same time to develop a distinctive ideology on which a fanatical cadre could be built. With an electorate accustomed to the Weltanschauung party, he desired to make appeals to diverse SE groups to gain electoral victories without seeming merely opportunistic. In anti-Semitism he found a technique which could be used to reconcile on the ideological level the contradictions between his blatant econ appeals to groups with quite divergent econ interests, & could also provide the basis for a fanatical mass movement. It was not so much that anti-Semitism was popular in itself - some observers have maintained that on balance it constituted a liability in scaring away respectable support -- it rather gave a superficial consistency & plausibility to the inconsistent appeals of an unprincipled opportunism. AA.
The last 10 yrs in East Africa have seen a remarkable increase in the quantity & quality of anthrop'al, econ & sociol'al res: (1) general studies: 'Social Class and Education in East Africa' by J. E. Goldthorpe provides a general introduction & points out that among Africans, the criteria of soc stratification differ in diff (indigenous) societies as compared to the rigid framework of soc class among Europeans. Racial lines are at least as important as those of social class. (2) Uganda: JINJA TRANSFORMED: A SOCIAL SURVEY OF A MULTIRACIAL TOWNSHIP by C. & R. Soper, provides data useful to the gov in forming policy & in academic res & experimentation. In 1951 Jinja contained about 14,900 Africans, 5,100 Asians & 300 Europeans who tended to live in separate areas, & there is a division of labor related to race. Diff's in educ'al attainment r'ed with diff's in occup in each racial category; thus there are differentual econ rewards, resentment & charges of discrimination. R. Mukherjee's THE PROBLEM OF UGANDA: A STUDY IN ACCULTURATION, is written from a Marxist & strongly anti-colonial bias. (3) Kenya: Mary Parker maintains that in Kenya there is a considerable overlapping of econ levels among the diff races. Europeans are characteristically racially exclusive & present a united front. The Indian community is torn with internal dissension & tends to concentrate on religious issues. There has been a tendency toward solidarity among Africans, & clashes between Indians & Africans usually take the form of conflicts between employers & employees. (4) Tanganyika: the interracial situation has been discussed by A. K. Datta in TANGANYIKA: A GOVERNMENT IN A PLURAL SOCIETY, where it is stated that the upper income group is predominantly European with Asians holding a moderate second place & Africans being excluded. Other relevent studies include: BANTU BUREAUCRACY by Lloyd A. Fallers, BWAMBA ECONOMY by E. H. Winter, TOWNSMEN IN THE MAKING by A. W. Southall & P. C. W. Gutkind, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRIBAL CHANGE ed by A. I. Richards. B. J. Keeley.
The totalitarian state fears its subjects because it rules by terror & deception, & such methods arouse resentment. At best, part of Soviet domestic discontent benefits America as the chief source & symbol of resistance to Kremlin power. In addition, there is a tenacious tradition of friendship for the US among the Ukrainians, Georgians, Russians, & other peoples under the Kremlin rule. One of the chief concerns of Soviet policy since 1945 has been to obliterate this tradition. 'As far as I have been able to determine, this effort to arouse hatred has not been as successful as one who credits a totalitarian regime with absolute power to mold opinion might imagine.' 'While holding firmly to the over-all end of maintaining & expanding the area of direct Soviet administrative control & of strengthening the tentacles that project out into the non-Soviet world, the Kremlin adopts a 'general line' for each historical period, & to a certain extent for each political situation & for each geographic & cultural area.' There is an examination of how the Korean War influenced the Soviet image of Americans, analysis of Soviet propaganda in 1953 & 1954, & some comparison of pre- & post-Stalin images of the US. 'Moscow's post-Stalin presentation of the image of the US seems designed to create the impression that the world situation has changed & that a new Soviet Union without the dread figure of Stalin is prepared to be cooperative but that an inflexible & obstructive US refuses to meet Moscow half way. In the meantime, Moscow has returned to the slogan of the 'international solidarity of the workers of all countries'. One could sum up the Soviet line now as Soviet nationalism at home, & abroad, a paradoxical but not unsuccessful attempt to identify Moscow with nationalism & with revolution & internationalism wherever these forces can be used to weaken US influence. A good deal will depend upon the comparative ability of Moscow & of Washington to effectively formulate & clearly project to the various world audiences images capable of establishing identifications & evoking responses.' (See also SA 2685, 2735, 2737, 2738, 2739, 2740, 2742, 2744, 2745, 2746, 2748) P. Widem.