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For six decades, between 1945 and 2005, Belgian officers and soldiers carried out part of their career or of their military service in Germany. Created as the Belgian Occupation Army, the name changed in the early 1950s to Belgian Forces in Germany, a symbolic name change that marked the beginning of an evolution during which the former enemy became a partner in the framework of NATO in 1955. The article focuses on the first years of this presence in Germany, when the memory of the Second World War and of the second occupation of Belgium by Germany was still fresh. It questions the representation of Germany and the Germans among the soldiers and the officers, but also among those who outlined Belgian military policies in Germany. It shows the "moral superiority complex" of many Belgians towards the defeated, but also towards the British ally who was suspected of being lenient towards the Germans and failed to understand their mentality. Furthermore, the relations between Belgians, British and Germans were conditioned by the Allied refusal to confer the political competences of the military government to the Belgians and by a unilateral British decision to extend the Belgian divisional area to Westphalia, two hundred kilometres east of the Rhine. The principal objective of the Belgian participation in the occupation, the guarantee of the Belgian interests with respect to the defeated Germany, then seemed impossible to reach. Two geographical areas are at the centre of the analysis : the border region, subject to claims of Belgian reparations, and the city of Cologne which the Belgian troops occupied at the expense of French aspirations on the Rhineland. The article also seeks to understand the very difficult introduction of a Belgian cultural propaganda, which illustrates the tense terrain of Belgian politicy towards Germany. If the government adopted a moderate position with regard to the reparations relatively early on, it maintained a hard line where the relations between Belgians and Germans were concerned, fearing a public opinion little disposed to accept a rapprochement. However, the reality on the ground often defied this attitude. ; Peer reviewed

Public service and lower-class suburbs, a coproduction on crime :
The Parisian Transit Authority's bus network —
On the basis of empirical research conducted on bus lines in the northern suburbs of Paris, the problem of insecurity is taken to be not so much a measurable statistic as the result of a coproduction out of both drivers' and passengers' experiences. Following a presentation of statistical indicators and a typology of passengers' beha¬ viors, the problem of insecurity is approached from the inside by. successively examining the following issues : ticket prices and cheating (free riders) ; the bus driver's job as well as the contrast between reality and bureaucratic rules ; and the inse¬ curity of the personnel, who have adopted a defensive group position (and even "poor white " reactions). The resentment of the lower classes, who see themselves negatively as excluded from society, joins up with the resentment of the drivers. When these two resentments meet inside a bus, they coproduce situations of insecurity.

Libya and Africa, by Charles Tripp
Africa has become a particular focus of Qadhafi's attention. This has been due to his isolation in the Arab world, his ideological proclivities, and the sensé of missionary zeal and insecurity which have characterised his révolution in Libya. Thèse same forces have driven him to seek a compliance with his will in Africa as absolute as that which he has created in Libya itself. In this he has failed. Resentment at Qadhafi's methods and his inability to overcome this resentment hâve denied him success. As elsewhere, this has also marred his policies in Chad. Insulated by his autocracy, he has been disinclined to modify his attitude, with the resuit that he tries the same tac tics repeatedly. However, there are indications that the security not only of neighbouring states, but also of Qadhafi's own régime are now being affected by the consequences of the régional conflicts in which he has persisted in embroiling his country, to no very useful end.

International audience ; The past several decades, segregation has been widely discussed by social scientists and especially by geographers. But whatever the focus of their studies (on the problem of measuring segregation, on the mechanism explaining the development of the phenomenon, etc.), almost all of them considered segregation as a spatial injustice. This paper closely examines this implicit relationship between segregation and injustice by reviewing the existing literature from different fields (geography, sociology, history, urban studies, political science, philosophy, etc.): is the segregated city unjust by essence? Is any social-spatial division of space – of urban space in particular – unjust? If not, when is it to be considered unjust? Conversely, is the diverse city the model of a just city? All these questions imply to carefully question the underlying assumptions that most of contemporary discourses make when dealing with segregation. ; Depuis plusieurs décennies, la ségrégation est un thème abondamment investi par les sciences sociales en général et par la géographie en particulier. Or quelles que soient les orientations adoptées (portant sur la question de la mesure du phénomène, ou celle des mécanismes, etc.), presque toutes ces recherches assimilent la ségrégation à une injustice spatiale. C'est cette implicite corrélation ségrégation/injustice que cet article examinera de plus près, à travers une revue de la littérature de différents champs disciplinaires (géographie, sociologie, histoire, urbanisme, sciences politiques, philosophie) : la ville ségrégée est-elle injuste par essence ? Toute division socio spatiale de l'espace – urbain en particulier – est-elle injuste ? Sinon, quand doit-elle être considérée comme injuste ? Et inversement, la ville mixte est-elle le modèle de la ville juste, vers lequel on doit tendre ? Autant de questions qui invitent à réinterroger les présupposés sur lesquels reposent de nombreux discours sur la ségrégation aujourd'hui.

International audience ; The past several decades, segregation has been widely discussed by social scientists and especially by geographers. But whatever the focus of their studies (on the problem of measuring segregation, on the mechanism explaining the development of the phenomenon, etc.), almost all of them considered segregation as a spatial injustice. This paper closely examines this implicit relationship between segregation and injustice by reviewing the existing literature from different fields (geography, sociology, history, urban studies, political science, philosophy, etc.): is the segregated city unjust by essence? Is any social-spatial division of space – of urban space in particular – unjust? If not, when is it to be considered unjust? Conversely, is the diverse city the model of a just city? All these questions imply to carefully question the underlying assumptions that most of contemporary discourses make when dealing with segregation. ; Depuis plusieurs décennies, la ségrégation est un thème abondamment investi par les sciences sociales en général et par la géographie en particulier. Or quelles que soient les orientations adoptées (portant sur la question de la mesure du phénomène, ou celle des mécanismes, etc.), presque toutes ces recherches assimilent la ségrégation à une injustice spatiale. C'est cette implicite corrélation ségrégation/injustice que cet article examinera de plus près, à travers une revue de la littérature de différents champs disciplinaires (géographie, sociologie, histoire, urbanisme, sciences politiques, philosophie) : la ville ségrégée est-elle injuste par essence ? Toute division socio spatiale de l'espace – urbain en particulier – est-elle injuste ? Sinon, quand doit-elle être considérée comme injuste ? Et inversement, la ville mixte est-elle le modèle de la ville juste, vers lequel on doit tendre ? Autant de questions qui invitent à réinterroger les présupposés sur lesquels reposent de nombreux discours sur la ségrégation aujourd'hui.

The Public Middle School's District Policy Reform has had an impact on parent's expectations and representations. In front of rejections and of the opacity of the application, and because of very high expectations and involvement, the resentment is particularly acute. In depressed urban areas characterized by urban and school segregation, it takes the form of a strong feeling of spatial and ethno-racial discrimination, which leads to call into question their loyalty to the institution. One can question the diffusion of that mechanism to other public services concerned by a process of individualizing application and of encouraging people to take greater responsibility, and by a strong process of social and ethnic differentiation of the targeted population. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines how the Front National's electoral victories could be explained, partially, in terms of a new discursive rhetoric adopted by Marine Le Pen. In order to compare rhetorical strategies used by both Marine and Jean-Marie Le Pen and their impact on their followers, we use comparable data, which consist of press articles published during the presidential campaigns of each politician and postings by online discussants related to interviews. Using corpus linguistics tools and lexical semantics, we assess how differently both leaders position themselves emotionally and how this emotional positioning is reconstructed within the postings of the viewers. Although no important quantitative difference can be observed in the number of emotion key-words they used respectively, a shift in both politicians' rhetoric positioning can be observed when analyzing the context in which these keywords are embedded. If Jean-Marie Le Pen focuses on negative feelings towards the Other (anger, resentment), Marine Le Pen promotes a positive ethos (empathy) in order to detoxify the image of her party and broaden her electoral base. ; This paper examines how the Front National's electoral victories could be explained, partially, in terms of a new discursive rhetoric adopted by Marine Le Pen. In order to compare rhetorical strategies used by both Marine and Jean-Marie Le Pen and their impact on their followers, we use comparable data, which consist of press articles published during the presidential campaigns of each politician and postings by online discussants related to interviews. Using corpus linguistics tools and lexical semantics, we assess how differently both leaders position themselves emotionally and how this emotional positioning is reconstructed within the postings of the viewers. Although no important quantitative difference can be observed in the number of emotion key-words they used respectively, a shift in both politicians' rhetoric positioning can be observed when analyzing the context in which these keywords are embedded. If Jean-Marie Le Pen focuses on negative feelings towards the Other (anger, resentment), Marine Le Pen promotes a positive ethos (empathy) in order to detoxify the image of her party and broaden her electoral base.

It has been stressed on many occasions that there is now one before and after 11 September 2001, as the attacks in New York and Washington have serious implications for international relations. The bipolar world before East-West rivalry no longer exists, but the fall of the Berlin Wall did not erode the antagonisms of global relations and resentments "towards Western hegemony in economic and cultural terms. The North-South divide, perceived differently by one and the other, has never seemed as deep as in a globalised world, which increases its unbearable character for those at the bottom of the scale. ; Il a été maintes fois souligné qu'il y a désormais un avant et un après 11 septembre 2001, tant les attentats de New York et de Washington sont lourds de conséquences pour les relations internationales. Le monde bipolaire d'avant la rivalité Est-Ouest n'existe plus, mais la chute du Mur de Berlin n'a pas effacé pour autant les antagonismes des rapports mondiaux et les ressentiments "a l'égard de l'hégémonie occidentale sur les plans économique et culturel. La fracture Nord-Sud, perçue différemment par les uns et les autres, n'a jamais semblé aussi profonde qu'a l'heure de la mondialisation qui accroît son caractère insupportable pour ceux qui sont en bas de l échelle

If the feelings of frustration against the representative system are expressed by populism, it is crucial to question the link between a disappointment vis-à-vis the institutions and the semi-direct democracy instruments. By comparing France and United States in order to analyze on the one hand how popular initiatives and referenda influenced the legislation of some American States and on the other hand how national referenda in France were reduced to plebiscites, we wonder whether the nature of semi-direct democracy comes from the resentment against the slowness of the representative work or whether it deeply completes the transformation of representative government. ; Si le populisme se caractérise par l'incarnation d'un ensemble de frustrations à l'égard du système représentatif, il est primordial de s'interroger sur le lien entre une déception à l'égard des institutions et les instruments de démocratie semi-directe. En nous appuyant sur une comparaison entre la France et les Etats-Unis pour analyser dŽune part comment le référendum et l'initiative populaire ont modifié la donne dans certains Etats américains et d'autre part comment en France les référendums nationaux ont connu la suspicion « plébiscitaire » à plusieurs reprises, nous souhaiterions comprendre si par nature la démocratie semi-directe n'est que le ressentiment engendré par la lenteur du travail de représentation ou si elle est le complément essentiel à la transformation du régime représentatif.

A few authors, while comparing the foreign policy of the Shah with that of khomeiny, have come to the conclusion either of a "total break" or, conversely, of a "continuity" with regard to the policy of Iran towards the Soviet Union. However, keeping only the Soviet Union in mind, but viewed from various levels in time and space, one can observe a break which derives from ideological incompatibility, then again a continuity which result s from some kind of realization of internal or external pressures. The fear arising from a threatening contiguity, the diplomatic isolation which followed the seizing of power in 1979, the pressure of political forces favourable to the USSR, the Kurdish minority in search of external allies, especially from the north, the ruinous war with Irak, the geopolitical constraints are such that the fundamentalists have not followed through their hostility to the end, in spite of its being fed by a series of historical resentments. The attitude of Iran towards the USSR still remains a real stake in its internal policy. The revolutionary turmoil has brought about a less blurred image of the USSR despite some confusion, an image once varied, then becoming apparently unified. The course of relations between Iran and the USSR depends to a great extent on the internal dynamics of the Iranian revolution, but also on the political evolution in the Middle East and on the new power struggle which could come about in that region.

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.