Suchergebnisse

Although much has been written on the general subject of the President's pardoning power, there is still considerable confusion concerning the use of that power for the restoration of civil and political rights to persons who have been deprived of them as a punishment for crime. Particular questions frequently raised are: What rights are lost? How are they lost? How may they be restored? That the issue is a live one is supported by the fact that in the year 1938 no fewer than 203 pardons were granted by the President to restore civil rights.The confusion on the subject is due in large measure to the complexities of our federal form of government. This was clearly noted by Attorney-General Caleb Cushing in his opinion of July 9, 1856, in the case of Oliver Robbins of Sackett's Harbor, New York. Robbins was convicted in 1851, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, of an offense against federal law, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary of New York. In 1852, he received from President Fillmore a general pardon.

"Compilation of laws used in this study": p. xvii-xx. ; Doris Stevens, chairman. ; Mode of access: Internet.

In the report of the Association's Committee on War-time Services occurs the following passage: "It seems to the Committee that the customary individualism of the profession is a luxury that cannot be unimpaired in war-time; political scientists must not go through the war with a business-as-usual attitude toward research and critical writing. The crises upon the nation and awaiting the nation demand that the profession recognize priorities in its scholarly work…. Students, mature and immature, should know what men of affairs consider to be the more crucial issues … The Committee … does ask … that the profession be given leadership in determining what to do …."The Research Committee of the Association considered this challenge and sought an answer from those members of the profession who had temporarily left their academic halls and plunged into the war effort in Washington. This group gave generously of their time and thought to the matter. The Committee's own function became merely that of a reporter or synthesizer of the views thus expressed. It is this synthesis which this statement incorporates. The suggestions are deliberately not attributed to any one individual. In the first place, many suggestions were made by more than one person; in the second place, the total pattern is even more intriguing than the individual suggestions.

Some Illustrations of Militant Democracy. Before a more systematic account of anti-fascist legislation in Europe is undertaken, recent developments in several countries may be reviewed as illustrating what militant democracy can achieve against subversive extremism when the will to survive is coupled with appropriate measures for combatting fascist techniques.1. Finland: From the start, the Finnish Republic was particularly exposed to radicalism both from left and right. The newly established state was wholly devoid of previous experience in self-government, shaken by violent nationalism, bordered by bolshevik Russia, yet within the orbit of German imperialism; no other country seemed more predestined to go fascist. Yet Finland staved off fascism as well as bolshevism. At first, the political situation was not unlike that of the Weimar Republic in the years of disintegration. The Communist party, declared illegal by the High Tribunal as early as 1925, reconstituted itself and, in 1929, obtained a large representation in the Riksdag, thereby blocking any constitutional reform. Under the decidedly extra-constitutional pressure of the nationalist and semi-fascist movement of the Lapuans, the Communists were so intimidated that nationalists, and progressives (bourgeois liberals), against the opposition of the social Democrats, were able to carry the constitutional reforms which not only strengthened the position of the government but also eventually barred subversive parties—meaning, at that time, the Communists—from national and communal representation.

Fascism a World Movement. Fascism is no longer an isolated incident in the individual history of a few countries. It has developed into a universal movement which in its seemingly irresistible surge is comparable to the rising of European liberalism against absolutism after the French Revolution. In one form or another, it covers today more areas and peoples in Europe and elsewhere than are still faithful to constitutional government. Fascism's pattern of political organization presents a variety of shades. One-party-controlled dictatorships rule outright in Italy, Germany, Turkey, and, if Franco wins, also Spain. The so-called "authoritarian" states may be classified as belonging to the one-party or multiple-party type. To the one-party authoritarian group, without genuine representative institutions, adhere at present Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Portugal; while Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Latvia, and Lithuania may be classed together as authoritarian states of the multiple-party type, with a semblance of parliamentary institutions.

When the American form of government and our democratic way of life hang in the balance of armed conflict, the political scientist feels impelled more than ever to rally to the defense of these values. He Writes volumes to defend our system and to attack the systems of our enemies. He writes political philosophy and political ethics—just plain politics is forgotten.The uninformed layman might expect from his title that the political scientist would be an expert in the analysis of political processes in his own community. He would be disappointed. The following comment made by Aristotle centuries ago applies with equal validity to the problem of political science today: "Must we not admit that the political science plainly does not stand on a similar footing to that of other sciences and faculties? I mean that while in all other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves exert them are identical (physicians and painters, for instance), matters of Statesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them practices it, that being left to those actually engaged in it: and these might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack and by mere practice rather than by any intellectual process; for they neither write nor speak on these matters (though it might do more to their credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly)…." Since the politician of today remains inarticulate when it comes to discussing his methods for publication, the responsibility of building a science of politics, if there is to be such a science, continues to rest with the political scientists.

The German national public officer—a term which covers public employees of every rank, from watchmen and gate-keepers to the chancellor, and in every type of occupation, from engineering to diplomacy, from teaching to service on the bench of the highest courts—has a very special status, governed in part by the constitution, in part by the Law of Officers, and in part by many other statutes, such as a law fixing salaries. This status involves many rights and privileges, and on the other hand, many duties and restrictions. The oath of office required of all national officers consists of a pledge to be faithful to the constitution, obedient to the laws, and conscientious in the performance of official duties. The law requires every officer to conduct himself at all times, even in his private capacity, in such a way as to merit the respect due to his office. Misconduct is liable to the "ordinary" penalties of reprimand, warning, and money fine, or, after due hearing, to the "disciplinary" penalties of suspension and dismissal. The criminal code takes cognizance of certain specified crimes and misdemeanors in office, such as the improper bringing about of arrests and prosecutions, and the falsification of official records. Naturally, the officer is also liable when he commits any other type of crime or misdemeanor.The rights and privileges of public officers are very substantial. National officers are appointed, as a rule, for life; unless any appointment is specified as being revocable, it is per se a life appointment, involving protection against arbitrary dismissal or suspension.