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Communist discourse of origins — our findings will be limited to the interwar — can be defined as a revolutionary discourse by two of its main and original functions that settle with traditional republican archaetypes: organise the party in an obsessive manner, which is armed by the revolution, and encourage, on a daily basis, disruptive action, the fight and the general repetition of the great evening. These claims need first to be demonstrated. The rigorous comparison of Thorez's speech between 1930 and 1939, not only with the right-wing speech (P.E. Flandin and A. Tardieu), but better with the socialist discourse (L. Blum), will provide us with evidence of the revolutionary marginality of the speech. More subtly, these statements need to be qualified in a diachronistic way, since it is known that the Communist discourse is undergoing a major change in its current consensual form in the 30s: this change takes place around a benchmark shift in the revolutionary speech act defined no longer in relation to 1917 but in relation to 1789. ; International audience ; Communist discourse of origins — our findings will be limited to the interwar — can be defined as a revolutionary discourse by two of its main and original functions that settle with traditional republican archaetypes: organise the party in an obsessive manner, which is armed by the revolution, and encourage, on a daily basis, disruptive action, the fight and the general repetition of the great evening. These claims need first to be demonstrated. The rigorous comparison of Thorez's speech between 1930 and 1939, not only with the right-wing speech (P.E. Flandin and A. Tardieu), but better with the socialist discourse (L. Blum), will provide us with evidence of the revolutionary marginality of the speech. More subtly, these statements need to be qualified in a diachronistic way, since it is known that the Communist discourse is undergoing a major change in its current consensual form in the 30s: this change takes place around a benchmark shift in the ...

L'activité en ligne des groupes extrémistes politique est de plus en plus importante, à l'échelle tant canadienne que mondiale. D'ailleurs, une relation complexe entre l'extrémisme et la violence s'est établie dans la littérature. Le sens communautaire en tant que sentiment que les membres ont de faire partie d'un même groupe est généralement étudié en termes positifs. Pour cette raison, plusieurs pays basent leurs politiques de prévention de l'extrémisme violent sur ce concept. Cependant, des travaux soulignent les risques associés à un sens communautaire élevé au sein de groupes violents. De plus, les jeunes adultes sont les plus vulnérables à adhérer à toutes formes d'extrémisme. Cette étude vise à comprendre le rôle que joue le sens communautaire dans l'acceptation de la violence pour les jeunes adultes s'identifiant à un extrême ou l'autre du continuum politique. Pour ce faire, 161 participants de 18 à 30 ans ont répondu à un questionnaire en ligne mesurant leur degré d'extrémisme, leur sens communautaire et leur degré d'acceptation de la violence à des fins politiques. Les perceptions et la compréhension de l'extrémisme des participants ont également été documentées à l'aide de trois questions à développement. Les résultats présentent un lien entre l'extrémisme et l'acceptation de la violence à des fins politiques où le sens communautaire agit comme facteur de protection de l'extrémisme. La notion de violence est très présente dans les définitions et les perceptions de l'extrémisme rapportées par les participants. ; The online activities of extremist groups have increased globally. Furthermore, literature has established a complex relationship between extremism and violence. Sense of community is a concept defined as members' feeling of belonging to the same group. Because members of a community generally benefit from their sense of community, multiple countries base their violent extremism prevention programs on this concept. However, studies have highlighted risks associated with a strong sense of community within violent groups. Moreover, young adults are the most vulnerable to adhere to any type of extremism. The present study aims to understand the sense of community function within political extremism and violence acceptance relationship. Participants ranging from 18 to 30 years old (N = 161) are asked to complete an online survey collecting quantitative and qualitative data. Extremism, sense of community, and the degree of acceptance of violence for political means are measured. Participants' perceptions and understanding of extremism are measured through open questions. Results showed that individuals leaning towards the ends of the political spectrum (left- to right-wing) are more willing to accept the use of violence for political means. Sense of community act as a protective factor against extremism in this sample.The concept of violence is heavily included in participant's definitions and perceptions of extremism.

L'histoire coloniale française a été abordée sous de nombreuses facettes, mais peu étudiée du point de vue des mouvements politiques de droite. Pour comprendre ce que les droites attendent de l'empire, l'entre-deux-guerres est une période particulièrement intéressante. En1919, les droites sont à la tête du gouvernement français, après en avoir été éloignées pendant une vingtaine d'années, et elles parviennent à y rester sur la majeure partie de la période. De même, en 1919, les frontières de l'empire français sont désormais fixées et cela marque l'apogée de la colonisation ainsi qu'un renouvellement de la question coloniale. En effet, la question n'est plus de savoir si les frontières doivent être encore repoussées, mais que faire de cet empire. Ainsi en arrivant au pouvoir les droites vont concevoir une politique coloniale à leur image, avec comme base les principes du libéralisme et du protectionnisme. Pour favoriser la prospérité économique de la France, les droites imaginent une politique dans laquelle l'empire français sert de pilier économique à sa métropole, en l'aidant à regagner sa puissance sans rien demander en retour. Seulement, les droites comprennent progressivement que la métropole ne peut rester éloignée des affaires coloniales. De la création d'un programme de mise en valeur, en passant par la construction d'un soutien financier aux territoires outre-mer, jusqu'au maintien de l'autorité française dans les colonies, les droites se retrouvent confrontées à la réalité impériale et au besoin de réviser leurs idéaux politiques pour l'empire. ; The French Colonial Empire has been studied using multiple points of reference, rarely however, has the subject has been considered from the right-wing political coalition's perspective. As it happened, the interwar period exercised a crucial influence on the right-wing's expectations for the empire at that time. After being out in the cold for two decades,1919 eventually saw the right-wing being re-elected to power. Significantly, 1919 also saw of the demarcation of the extent of the French colonies, with the finalization of the physical borders. This resulted in an important shift in debate from the 'scope and scale of the Empire', to how to 'administer or manage the Empire'. True to their fundamentals, the Rights embraced liberalism and protectionism at the heart of their policy. In order to best serve and foster France's economic prosperity, they devised policies in which the French empires served as a strong contributor to France's domestic economic ambitions, without the colonies expecting to receive any reciprocity. The Rights, however, soon came to appreciate that they would be required to ensure greater contribution equality; as was evident in the creation of the program mise en valeur. This plan offered a platform to deliver their imperial ideology and authority, by leveraging a financial support plan to the overseas territories.

In March 1986, right-wing parties' victory in France's parliamentary elections place the country in an unprecedented situation: the two "chiefs" of the executive, the sitting president and the Prime Minister of the newly elected majority, do not lean the same way politically. This is the first "cohabitation," as it will come to be called. The newly elected government decides to repeal the 1984 law on universities. Alain Devaquet, the junior minister for Universities and Research, introduces a new bill. But his own majority considers that the reform does not go far enough or promote market based reforms aggressively enough. The bill is only introduced into the Senate in October 1986. Although throughout the spring, students and the main student union, the UNEF-ID, had remained very muted, in the fall, massive protests start. Two huge demonstrations are organized, in November and December. Clashes with the police suddenly catapult the movement into a different political dimension, when on the night of December 5, 1986, policemen beat young Malik Oussekine to death. Public opinion sides with the students. Fearing a major political crisis, the government drops the bill on December 10, 1986. Most remember this dramatic context as what cut short the Devaquet reforms, but in reality, the seeds of failure were there all along: beyond the student protests, one must look to the institutional context created by the anomalous "cohabitation," and especially, to the antagonism between France's two right-wing parties (RPR and UDF), which undermined the Devaquet bill at every stage, setting it up to fail. ; À l'issue de la victoire des droites à l'élection législative de mars 1986, la France se trouve dans une situation politique inédite avec un exécutif dont les deux têtes n'ont pas la même couleurs politique : c'est la première cohabitation. Le gouvernement décide d'abroger la loi sur l'enseignement supérieur en vigueur depuis 1984. Alain Devaquet, le jeune ministre délégué à l'Enseignement supérieur et à la Recherche propose ...

A good part of today's Greeks must surely remember a strange statement made in 1993 by K. Mitsotakis, Greek right-wing Prime Minister of the time: "in ten years' time, the skopjian case will be forgotten". This is seen as astonishing, if not scandalous, and truly "national treason", by a large part of the political world, public opinion and the press at the time it was pronounced seems to have had something of prophetic in itself seen from a current prism. Curious destiny for a statement seen as an insult to the collective feeling of a revolted people, as well as a case that took the proportions of a "Greek soul theft".Looin of us the will to take political sides by referring to this sentence. Only its content is of interest to us. Before talking about it, let us go back to the atmosphere that prevailed in Greece during these years, so that readers could form an idea, of what the Macedonian (or 'skopjian') really meant at that specific moment. ; International audience ; A good part of today's Greeks must surely remember a strange statement made in 1993 by K. Mitsotakis, Greek right-wing Prime Minister of the time: "in ten years' time, the skopjian case will be forgotten". This is seen as astonishing, if not scandalous, and truly "national treason", by a large part of the political world, public opinion and the press at the time it was pronounced seems to have had something of prophetic in itself seen from a current prism. Curious destiny for a statement seen as an insult to the collective feeling of a revolted people, as well as a case that took the proportions of a "Greek soul theft".Looin of us the will to take political sides by referring to this sentence. Only its content is of interest to us. Before talking about it, let us go back to the atmosphere that prevailed in Greece during these years, so that readers could form an idea, of what the Macedonian (or 'skopjian') really meant at that specific moment. ; Une bonne partie des Grecs d'aujourd'hui doit sûrement se souvenir d'une déclaration étrange prononcée ...

National audience since the early 1980s, the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties in Europe has relaunched long-standing debates on the impact of electoral regimes. The development of a new pan-European far-right has contributed to renewed interest in analysing the effects of voting methods, their degree of openness and the opportunities they offer new entrants to integrate the politico-electoral arena. With, in essence, an implicit indictment of a proportional regime deemed far too 'favourable' to radical parties, while majority systems would, in contrast, act as a remedy against this new wave of extremism. ; National audience Depuis le début des années 1980, le surgissement sur la scène européenne de partis de droite radicale populiste a relancé des débats déjà anciens quant à l'impact des régimes électoraux. Le développement d'une nouvelle extrême-droite pan-européenne a contribué à renouveler l'intérêt notamment pour l'analyse des effets des modes de scrutin, leur degré d'ouverture et les opportunités qu'ils offrent aux nouveaux entrants d'intégrer l'arène politico-électorale. Avec, pour l'essentiel, une mise en accusation implicite d'un régime proportionnel jugé par beaucoup trop "favorable" aux partis radicaux, tandis que les systèmes majoritaires agiraient, par contraste, comme des remparts contre cette nouvelle vague d'extrémisme.

French women, who were granted the right to vote in 1944 only, have eventually become full citizens through three stages, training, take off and autonomy. Today their turn out in elections is similar to that of men and they vote for the left wing parties in the same proportion. This evolution can be explained by the sociological and cultural changes which have modified the status of women in the more recent period. ; Les Françaises, qui n'ont obtenu le droit de vote qu'en 1944, sont devenues progressivement des citoyennes à part entière, en trois temps qu'on peut désigner comme ceux de l'apprentissage, du décollage et de l'autonomie. Aujourd'hui, elles participent aux scrutins autant que les hommes et votent à gauche dans les mêmes proportions qu'eux. Cette évolution s'explique par les changements sociologiques et culturels qui ont redéfini le statut des femmes dans la période récente.

French women, who were granted the right to vote in 1944 only, have eventually become full citizens through three stages, training, take off and autonomy. Today their turn out in elections is similar to that of men and they vote for the left wing parties in the same proportion. This evolution can be explained by the sociological and cultural changes which have modified the status of women in the more recent period. ; Les Françaises, qui n'ont obtenu le droit de vote qu'en 1944, sont devenues progressivement des citoyennes à part entière, en trois temps qu'on peut désigner comme ceux de l'apprentissage, du décollage et de l'autonomie. Aujourd'hui, elles participent aux scrutins autant que les hommes et votent à gauche dans les mêmes proportions qu'eux. Cette évolution s'explique par les changements sociologiques et culturels qui ont redéfini le statut des femmes dans la période récente.

Since 1981, due to the left-wing politics, the place of women in governments has increased, each time the leftist political parties had won the elections. The right-wing parties did not follow this trend, so France is to day in the « third group » (the countries with about 20 % women ministers), very far from Spain (47 %) or Chile (50 %). But, even when they are in countries who try to promote women, these one very rarely obtain the ministry of Interior, of Economy, or of Foreign Affairs. A movement is happening now with the election as president of the Republic or the nomination as head of Government: 12 women in the world are occupying these posts. In France, in 2007, the presidential election could add one woman more on this list. ; Depuis 1981, en raison d'une politique volontariste de la gauche, la place des femmes dans les gouvernements s'est accrue chaque fois qu'elle a été au pouvoir. La droite n'a pas suivi, ce qui fait figurer la France, aujourd'hui, dans « le 3e groupe » (les pays qui ont autour de 20 % de femmes ministres), loin derrière l'Espagne (47 %) ou le Chili (50 %). Mais, même lorsqu'elles sont dans des pays particulièrement favorables à la promotion politique des femmes, celles-ci obtiennent très rarement des postes de ministre de l'Intérieur, de l'Économie ou des Affaires étrangères. Un léger mouvement se produit actuellement avec l'élection à la présidence de la République ou la nomination comme chef de Gouvernement de 12 femmes dans le monde. En France, il n'est pas exclu que 2007 porte ce chiffre à 13.

Since 1981, due to the left-wing politics, the place of women in governments has increased, each time the leftist political parties had won the elections. The right-wing parties did not follow this trend, so France is to day in the « third group » (the countries with about 20 % women ministers), very far from Spain (47 %) or Chile (50 %). But, even when they are in countries who try to promote women, these one very rarely obtain the ministry of Interior, of Economy, or of Foreign Affairs. A movement is happening now with the election as president of the Republic or the nomination as head of Government: 12 women in the world are occupying these posts. In France, in 2007, the presidential election could add one woman more on this list. ; Depuis 1981, en raison d'une politique volontariste de la gauche, la place des femmes dans les gouvernements s'est accrue chaque fois qu'elle a été au pouvoir. La droite n'a pas suivi, ce qui fait figurer la France, aujourd'hui, dans « le 3e groupe » (les pays qui ont autour de 20 % de femmes ministres), loin derrière l'Espagne (47 %) ou le Chili (50 %). Mais, même lorsqu'elles sont dans des pays particulièrement favorables à la promotion politique des femmes, celles-ci obtiennent très rarement des postes de ministre de l'Intérieur, de l'Économie ou des Affaires étrangères. Un léger mouvement se produit actuellement avec l'élection à la présidence de la République ou la nomination comme chef de Gouvernement de 12 femmes dans le monde. En France, il n'est pas exclu que 2007 porte ce chiffre à 13.

Jean Charbonnel was part of that generation of "young wolves", sponsored by Georges Pompidou, which - from the beginning of the 1960s - embarked on the conquest of those parts of the country that were hostile to Gaullism. That was how Jean Charbonnel succeeded in being elected a "député" in a part of the Corrèze that was "radical-socialiste", in which the initial contacts with local politics were more than difficult. With that victory on which to build, Jean Charbonnel made for himself a real stronghold in the south of the department (the "Pays de Brive") where he became a "conseiller général" (1964-1968), mayor of Brive (1966-1995), the initiator of the first forms of "intercommunalité", and a deputy for a total of fifteen years. With this base of practical experience on the ground, his Gaullism became clearly orientated towards a search for, and the defence of, a better social justice through the realisation of novel mechanisms whose aim was the integration of handicapped schoolchildren, and of young people into the world of work, or through the responsibility that was taken for older members of the community with the construction of "foyers-logements" (sheltered housing). Such local social action was echoed on the national level, particularly when Jean Charbonnel became "Ministre du Développement industriel et scientifique" (1972-1974), within the context of the "affaire Lipp" when he tried to obtain true recognition for the eminently "gaullien" principle of Participation, taking into account the interests of the workers, of the salaried employees and of the management. Jean Charbonnel's political action claimed to be resolutely progressive but above all reformist as it sought to associate the citizen - according to the place that he actually occupied within the Community - with the great reforms of the country. This thesis seeks therefore to comprehend how a Gaullist managed to establish himself in a left-wing area - the "Pays de Brive" -and the way in which his action made of him a left-wing Gaullist or rather a "gaulliste social" because he was intellectually nearer the Right than the Left, and above all because he never sought to break away from mainstream gaullism, by which he was quite different from the left-wing Gaullists ; [pas de résumé]

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.

The sharp reversal in the electoral fortunes of Austria's FPÖ in November 2002 should not blind observers to the fact that recent elections in France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands all saw parties of the extreme right consolidate their position in the political landscape. Several member States of the European Union have witnessed in their midst a recent convergence of an old radical Western-European right wing with various forms of contemporary populism around certain themes traditionally dear to the extreme right: anti-immigration; crime and feelings of insecurity that feed authoritarian tendencies; a hybrid economic platform advocating free markets but protecting national social systems; and an exploitation of all possible forms of anti-party attitudes and political resentment. ; Le revers cuisant subi en novembre dernier par le FPÖ, en Autriche, ne doit pas faire illusion : les dernières consultations électorales au Danemark, en France, en Norvège ou aux Pays-Bas ont toutes marqué l'essor et la consolidation des formations d'extrême-droite. Dans plusieurs des pays membres de l'Union européenne, les partis à la confluence de la vieille droite radicale ouest-européenne et du populisme moderne, malgré des pedigrees politiques variés, convergent unanimement, depuis plusieurs années, vers certains des thèmes centraux du discours classique de l'extrême-droite : anti-immigration, exploitation autoritaire des enjeux liés à la criminalité et au sentiment d'insécurité, programme économique hybride intégrant des orientations néo-libérales et la défense des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, et mobilisation de toutes les formes existantes de ressentiment envers les grandes formations de gouvernement.