The article deals with three terrorist attacks of right-wing extremists: in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019) and Germany (2019). First, the modus operandi of perpetrators was shown and the course of each attack was analyzed. It was indicated what tactics the attackers used and why it was or was not effective. Secondly, the ideological background and motivations of the perpetrators were shown. It was possible to analyze the manifestos that the perpetrators left, and thus their way of thinking, their ideologies, and the purposes of organizing the attacks. Thirdly, issues related to the publicizing of the attacks by the perpetrators were shown. The goal of the article is to show that radical ideology of right-wing extremists (expressed in manifestos) leads to tragedies. In analyzed cases radical appointment of the perpetrators caused three deadly attacks. The article shows that the radical actions are preceded by radical speech, expressions, manifestos. The second goal is to pay attention to hate speech (also expressed in manifestos), which is just as dangerous as bullets or improvised explosive devices. The third goal is to show how the attackers used acts of terror to spread the ideologies to which they were devoted.
This article investigates the linguistic-discursive construction of others in one international right-wing extremist online discussion forum. By means of a positioning analysis and an appraisal analysis, the article shows how reference to absent third parties is used to establish others as outgroups in forum posts aimed at an international audience. The analysis reveals an othering practice that links the online extremist discourse world with international and local as well as with political, social, and personal concerns, providing various opportunities for user affiliation. The results of this investigation contribute to understanding of the linguistic-discursive construction of online hate speech in multicultural virtual (rhetorical) communities; the study also highlights how social media and the use of English as a lingua franca combine to connect geographically and linguistically separate individuals and facilitate the globalization of extremist discourse through the construction of a shared discourse world online
This policy brief traces how Western right-wing extremists have exploited the power of the internet from early dial-up bulletin board systems to contemporary social media and messaging apps. It demonstrates how the extreme right has been quick to adopt a variety of emerging online tools, not only to connect with the like-minded, but to radicalise some audiences while intimidating others, and ultimately to recruit new members, some of whom have engaged in hate crimes and/or terrorism. Highlighted throughout is the fast pace of change of both the internet and its associated platforms and technologies, on the one hand, and the extreme right, on the other, as well as how these have interacted and evolved over time. Underlined too is the persistence, despite these changes, of right-wing extremists' online presence, which poses challenges for effectively responding to this activity moving forward. ; Peer reviewed ; Final article published ; right-wing extremism ; online tools ; history ; contemporary trends ; online forums ; social media ; messaging applications ; Web 2.0 ; policy challenges
An analysis of the general election, which took place in Slovakia on Saturday 5th March 2016. Its results were strongly influence by the fear-mongering of the incumbent PM Robert Fico, who assumed a fiercely anti-refugee and islamophobic stance. As a result, his electoral support collapsed and a large number of votes went to extreme right wing parties.
Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one's group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp.
Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one's group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp.
Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one's group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion
Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one's group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp. ; Funding: Linnaeus University Centre for Discrimination and Integration Studies
In recent years, an emerging body of work, centred on specific communicative forms used in facilitating collective and connective action, have contributed to greater understanding of how digital communication relates to social mobilisation. Plenty of these studies highlight the progressive potentiality of digital communication. However, undemocratic actors also utilise the rapid advancement in digital technology. This article explores the online video activism of extreme right-wing groups in Sweden. It analyses more than 200 clips on YouTube, produced by five right-wing extremist organisations. The study shows that the extreme right deploy video activism as a strategy of visibility to mobilise and strengthen activists. Moreover, the groups attempt to alter the perception of (historically-rooted) socio-political identities of the extreme right. Furthermore, YouTube becomes a political arena in which action repertoires and street politics are adapted to the specific characteristics of online video activism. Finally, video activism could be understood as an aestheticisation of politics.
UAVs have been used by non-state actors in the past decade. However, no known attack by right-wing extremists has been carried out using them. Håvard Haugstvedt reviews recent developments in attacks – through online activity in open forums and by examining groups that have already used UAVs in their operations – by such actors, to explore the possibility of right-wing extremists adopting UAVs. The article argues that right-wing extremist groups lack a strong entity, such as a state, backing their development and operations. However, terrorist groups learn from one another, and as extreme right-wing ideologies have gained currency among some members of the military and law enforcement agencies, the capability to develop and use UAVs may be more possible than that which has been revealed thus far. Nonetheless, this article casts doubt on right-wing extremists' capability and desire to incorporate UAVs into a violent repertoire that has historically been composed of fists, fires and firearms. ; publishedVersion
The amount of uploaded extremist propaganda on the internet is increasing. In particular, right-wing extremist as well as Islamic extremist groups take advantage of the opportunities presented by the internet to spread their ideas to worldwide masses. Both tackle in-group specific topics and address their audiences in their respective political, national or religious identities. Several factors, such as higher levels of authoritarian value orientations and threatening life situations (such as existential threats or psychological uncertainty) have been found to shape people's reactions towards radical groups as well as to propaganda. The current study investigated whether the response to extremist propaganda videos (namely, aversion felt for the video and the perceived persuasiveness of the video) is shaped by an individual's authoritarian attitudes and psychological uncertainty and whether this is a global process or in-group specific. Further, it considered the effects of exposure to extremist propaganda on the identification with one's in-group. In a laboratory experiment, German students were confronted with a right-wing extremist and an Islamic extremist video after manipulating their level of uncertainty (high vs. low levels of psychological uncertainty). The results confirmed that the interaction between authoritarianism and psychological uncertainty affected the evaluation of right-wing extremist videos addressing participants' national in-group. Under conditions of uncertainty, authoritarianism predicted less aversion and a higher persuasiveness of these videos. Further, psychological uncertainty increased the identification with participants' German nationality, irrespective of authoritarian attitudes. Notably, the effect was in-group bound: The same effect was not found for Islamic extremist propaganda referring to a religious out-group. The results are discussed regarding the potential of propaganda to foster behavioral intentions and engagement in extremist groups in specific threatening situations.
Die vorliegende Arbeit geht der Frage nach, welche Reaktionen durch unterschiedliche Formen der Berichterstattung über Rechtsextremismus bei den Anhängern der rechten Szene ausgelöst werden und welche Strategien diese verfolgen, um ihre mediale Selbstinszenierung zu optimieren. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist es, Ansätze für einen verantwortungsbewussten Umgang mit Themen rechtsextremen Schwerpunkts für Medienmacher zu finden. Es werden 7 Aussteiger zu ihren Erfahrungen mit Medien in der Szene befragt. Zu den wichtigsten Ergebnissen dieser Arbeit zählt die Erkenntnis, dass die rechtsextreme Führungsriege aktiv Berichterstattung in den Massenmedien rezipiert und systematisch auswertet, um auf dieser Basis ihre politischen Selbstinszenierungsstrategien zu entwickeln. Die Szene reagiert also taktisch auf Berichte in den Massenmedien und versucht diese durch Anschlusskommunikation für ihre Zwecke zu instrumentalisieren. Wichtig für die Berichterstattung über Rechtsextremismus erscheint den Probanden die Betonung der Pluralität der Szene und eine ausführliche Hintergrundberichterstattung, die im besten Falle identitätsstiftende Attribute rechtsextremer Gruppen dekonstruiert und somit deren Glaubwürdigkeit in Frage stellt. English AbstractThe present study examines the question of which reactions are triggered by different forms of media reporting on right-wing extremism among the supporters of the right-wing scene and which strategies they pursue in order to optimize their medial self-staging. The aim of the work is to find approaches for a responsible dealing with right-wing extremist issues for media-makers. Seven former right-wing extremists are asked about their experiences with the media while they were in the movement. One of the most important results of this study is the recognition that right-wing extremist leaders actively receive and systematically evaluate media coverage in the mass media in order to develop their political self-staging strategies on this basis. The movement thus tactically reacts to reports in the mass media and tries to exploit them for its own purposes by means of follow-up communication. For reporting on right-wing extremism, the interviewees consider it important to emphasise the plurality of the movement and to provide a detailed background report, which at best deconstructs the identity-generating attributes of right-wing extremist groups and thus calls their credibility into question. The article was written in German.
'Gefühle des Abgehängtseins', welche vor allem in ländlichen Räumen vorzufinden seien, werden oft als Erklärung für den Wahlerfolg der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 herangezogen. Was unter 'abgehängt sein' zu verstehen ist, wird wissenschaftlich jedoch nicht definiert. In diesem Thünen Working Paper setze ich mich deshalb systematisch damit auseinander, wie der Ausdruck 'Abgehängtsein' im Kontext des AfD-Wahlerfolgs 2017 und ländlicher Regionen diskursiv besetzt und in welche inhaltlichen Zusammenhänge er gebettet wird. Dabei greife ich auf die Methodik der Grounded Theory zurück. 233 Beiträge(online und print) des populär-medialen Diskurses stellen den Materialkorpus dar. Neben Artikeln aus überregionalen Tages- und Wochenzeitungen habe ich auch Beiträge aus regionalen Zeitungen und durch die Onlinesuche bedingt auch Magazinartikel sowie vereinzelt Fernseh- sowie Audiobeiträge einbezogen. Die Sichtung der Printmedien wurde auf das dritte und vierte Quartal 2017 beschränkt. Deutlich werden drei verschiedene (im oben benannten Kontext verortete) Formen des 'Abgehängtseins': infrastrukturell, wirtschaftlich und kulturell. Das 'Abgehängtsein' geht dabei sowohl mit einem Gefühlskonglomerat aus Ängsten, Unzufriedenheit und Ohnmacht als auch mit einer Kritik am demokratischen System selbst einher. ; Feelings of being 'left behind,' which, according to the discourse, can be found especially among people in rural areas, are often cited as an explanation for the success of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the 2017 federal elections. The concept of being 'left behind' has not been scientifically defined. Therefore, in this Thünen Working Paper, I examine systematically what meanings are discursively attached to the expression being 'left behind' in the context of the success of the AfD in the 2017 elections, and the rural regions and in which these connections are embedded. For this analysis, I use the methodology of Grounded Theory. The material corpus consists of 233 articles (online and print) of the popular media discourse.In addition toe xamining articles from national daily and weekly newspapers,I have included in my analysis articles from regional newspapers, and, through an online search, magazine articles and occasional television and audio reports. My review of the print media was limited to reports that appeared in the third and fourth quarters of 2017. In the abovementioned context, three different discursive forms of being 'left behind' – economically, culturally, and in access to infrastructure– become evident. Being 'left behind' goes hand in hand with a conglomeration of feelings of fear, dissatisfaction, and powerlessness; and with a criticism of the democratic system itself.
This study analyzes the importance of parental socialization on the development of children's far right-wing preferences and attitudes towards immigration. Using longitudinal data from Germany, our intergenerational estimates suggest that the strongest and most important predictor for young people's right-wing extremism are parents' right-wing extremist attitudes. While intergenerational associations in attitudes towards immigration are equally high for sons and daughters, we find a positive intergenerational transmission of right-wing extremist party affinity for sons, but not for daughters. Compared to the intergenerational correlation of other party affinities, the high association between fathers' and sons' right-wing extremist attitudes is particularly striking.
This study analyzes the importance of parental socialization on the development of children's far right-wing preferences and attitudes towards immigration. Using longitudinal data from Germany, our intergenerational estimates suggest that the strongest and most important predictor for young people's right-wing extremism are parents' right-wing extremist attitudes. While intergenerational associations in attitudes towards immigration are equally high for sons and daughters, we find a positive intergenerational transmission of right-wing extremist party affinity for sons, but not for daughters. Compared to the intergenerational correlation of other party affinities, the high association between fathers' and sons' right-wing extremist attitudes is particularly striking.